First International Conference on EU and Black Sea Regions

CHALLENGES FROM EU IN THE BLACK SEA REGION:

FACING NEW GEOPOLITICS REALITIES

Challenges from EU in the Black Sea Region: Facing New Geopolitics Realities

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Edited by:
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Foreword

This publication is a compilation of the keynote address and papers presented at the Conference on *EU and Black Sea Region: Challenges and Opportunities for a multilateral cooperation* supported by **CNCS – UEFISCDI** Project No. PNII – IDEI/ WE-PN-II-ID-WE-2011-06

The conference, held at the Christian University „Dimitrie Cantemir" Bucharest, Romania on May 3rd-5th, 2012 highlighted the main aspects of EU and Black Sea cooperation in history and actuality.

The topic of this conference holds particular importance today. Unfortunately, the end of the Cold War in 1989–1991 failed to bring universal peace. On the contrary, crises and conflicts have erupted all over the globe and in the Black Sea region also. International community and EU has had to assist many times to end wars, to stabilize countries, and to implement conditions that could serve as a basis for peace and cooperation in the future.

In our fast-moving times, past experience and lessons are quickly forgotten, and there are tendencies to reinvent the wheel. Examining the historical events, is not just of interest for historians; it also provides many vital tools for understanding the present and to building the future.

It is my pleasure and privilege to invite you to read this volume of papers presented at the International Conference on the EU and Black Sea Region.

Momcilo **LUBURICI**,
President of the „Dimitrie Cantemir" Christian University, Bucharest

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE BLACK SEA AREA

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Abstract

The European Union is interested in the democratization of the Black Sea area for two geopolitical reasons. Firstly, to secure its eastern borders towards new risks arising from terrorism, organized crime and migration. Secondly, to ensure energy security through free access, under the conditions of a free market economy, to the existing resources in the Black Sea area.

The democratization process of this area is a complicated one. Possible solutions can be: the development of regional cooperation, offering assistance through investment and financial aid, support of pro-European and reformist movements based on the Baltic or Central European example.

The EU needs to develop a coherent policy which at one and the same time takes into account energy security, the promotion of democracy, and respect for human rights.

Keywords: theories, democratization, cooperation, energy security, risk factors

I. GEOPOLITICAL AND SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE EU IN THE BLACK SEA AREA

The Black Sea area includes Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Moldavia in the west, Ukraine and Russia in the north, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan in the east and Turkey in the south [1]. Although Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldavia and Greece are countries that have no outlet to the Black Sea, through history, proximity and close ties they are natural regional actors. The Black Sea region is a distinct geographic area, rich in natural resources and strategically positioned where Europe, Central Asia and The Middle East meet.

The Black Sea has always constituted an important geostrategic region for Europe. The Black Sea area transformed after 1990, with the disintegration of the USSR, in an area of instability, marked by political, military and economic disputes between countries in the vecinity of the Black Sea but also by other states' concern of reconsidering their interests in the area [2]. Another important aspect is that it's located on the expected routes for the transport of Caspian and Central Asian oil to Western consumers. On the one hand, the Black Sea area is the primary connector to the Caspian sea energy resources, which holds important reserves for the next decades of global development, thus becoming the front line of the battlefield for resource control and for the main transport systems. On the other hand it projects itself as a potential supplier of energy resources. These considerations hold lit the constant interest manifested by the great actors of the geopolitical world stage.

Today, due to the globalization process, this area is important to the EU for at least two reasons, with a powerful geopolitical and security relevance.

Firstly, it is important because it lays at the Union's eastern borders, from where risks towards its security may rise. At present, security risks and threats are no longer caused by World states, but rather by the presence of unconventional phenomenon's caused by non-state actors and sustained through the politics of problem-states or of those states with precarious statehood. Internal and, especially, external security challenges which the EU and its member states are facing, manifest themselves as a complex, dynamic and opened system. These are diversified, in a continuous expansion and interdependent. Because of changes that occur in the national security environment of the Euro- Asian area, both zonal and regional, also due to the reconfiguration of large institutions, the Black Sea area represents both a source and a target of insecurity generating processes.

Factors that can result into risks to the Black Sea regional security, with extension towards the EU, would be [3]:
- the development of terrorism, terrorist and organized crime transit to Central and Western Europe through the Black Sea region;
- massive migration flows from Africa and Asia towards Central and Western Europe;
- the vicinity of one of the most instable regions of the world: Central Asia;
- close vicinity of the Caucasus and the Balkans- areas characterized by tensions and conflicts.

Other threats and challenges would be: the increasing pollution of the Black Sea basin, ethnic- separatist conflict emphasis/maintenance (Transnistria, Abhazia, Adjaria, Nagorno-Karabah), the instability export, promoting Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic countries' interests to south-eastern Europe, through the existence of compact ethnic groups in adjacent areas (tatars-turks from the Crimeea peninsula, gagauzii from the Moldavia Republic, turks from south-eastern Bulgaria, etc). Noteworthy is that, unlike the instability sources that manifest themselves at classic levels, the ones listed above have a special feature, given by the fact that their consequences are not limited to a certain level (political, economic, social), but are felt at all levels, making them to be considered major sources of instability, with repercussions both on national and on regional security, hence on global security. As a possible answer, the EU, through its security strategy has established, as a strategic objective, the build of a secure area in its vicinity.*It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe. The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations''* [4]

Secondly, the Black Sea area is a production and distribution area of strategic importance to the energy security of the EU. Through the Black Sea's geostrategical positioning, the European region becomes strategically connected

with Central Asia, south Caucasus and the Middle East, all being major energy production and supplying regions.

It has significant potential to diversify the energy supply and therefore constitutes an essential element of the European Union's external strategy concerning the energy sector. The energy security concept, in the European Union's vision, is crystalized by the following vectors: access to the energy sources, energy sources security, securing existing energy routes, identifying alternative energy routes, identifying alternative energy sources and protecting the environment [5].

The European Union, in terms of energy, is facing some problematic issues: increased energy consumption along with its decreasing production, which inevitably leads to increased energy imports. In order to meet these challenges, immediate actions both internal and external are required. Internally, it is necessary to find new energy technologies that would play a key role to the Union's sustainable future. Simultaneously, externally, the energy corridors between the European Union and neighbouring countries are of the utmost importance to the energy security [6]. Today, the EU, imports 50% of its energy needs. It is estimated that in 2030 it will increase to 70% [7]. The majority of these resources come from the Black Sea area. These security issues are only few which explain the EU's interest in implementing and consolidating a democratization process in the Black Sea area. In the view of the European Union the existence of an area of democracy, of market economy and the share of common values in the Black Sea region is a guarantee of stability and mutual trust [8]. Therefore the EU is interested and working to build and consolidate democracy in the Black Sea area.

II. THEORETICAL FUNDAMENTALS OF THE EU POLICIES IN THE BLACK SEA AREA DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS

The EU policies regarding the democratization of the Black Sea area are based on several theories: modernization theory, transition studies, wave theory, the international dimension of democratization, democratic peace theory.

Modernization theory is briefly summarized by the idea that industrialization and economic growth lead to positive social and political changes which cause democratization. The classic theorist of the modernization theory is Seymour Martin Lipset [9]. Contemporary debate about the modernization theory, resumes, in many ways, Lipset's initial concerns. Empirical studies which seek correlation between wealth and democracy or between economic and social development have become a trend. Ronald Inglehard analyzed a large database [10] and concluded that the crucial variables that determine the correlations between economic development and political reforms are mass culture and attitudinal changes [11].

Transition studies, or transitology, focuses on the triggering causes of the democratization process. This approach focuses on change, and not on the context (economy, history, development), arguing that democracy can be created independently of the structural context and that political elites have an essential role in determining the direction society is heading [12]. Unlike other democracy theories, transitology makes a clear distinction between economic circumstances

and political negotiations. It considers that the level of economic development and the emergence of a civic consensus are results of democracy, not its causes.

Wave Theory believes that modern democracy has gradually spread around the world since the XIX century. One way of explaining the democratization process is grouping experiences in distinct "waves", in which democratization had common causes. This model was developed by American political scientist Samuel Huntington, in 1991. Huntington identified three waves of democratization (namely 1828-1926, 1943-1962 and 1974-present), the first two followed by contrary waves of authoritarianism (1922-1942 and 1958-1975), therefore only some countries managed to strengthen democracy, whereas others returned to authoritarian systems [13]. With the spread of democracy in increasingly more countries, the fragility and reversibility of the process has begun being worrisome. Democratization does not necessarily lead to a functioning liberal democracy, but may stop in a variety of hybrid political systems whose definition includes the word democracy, but preceded by a series of prefixes – "proto", "quasi", "semi", or accompanied by adjectives such as "limited", "partial", "inoperable". Many World states in transition towards democracy collapse in internal conflict or in new ways of authoritarianism.

The international dimension of democratization and analysis of external factors that contribute to this process are a recent orientation towards research on democratization. The first studies on democratization considered international forces as secondary in the triggering of the process, focusing entirely on the characteristics of nation states and considering that democratization essentially has an internal determination. Even in the 90's, in the peak of the third wave of democratization, when it became a central value of the new world order, international factors were considered secondary [14]. In *"The Third Wave"*, Samuel Huntington identified the global factors as primary factors of contemporary democratization [15]. External factors have a great influence on the democratization processes when they interact and reinforce each other with internal factors. Laurence Whitehead puts forward three conceptualization models of the way international factors influence democratization: contagion, control and consent [16]. American realist Richard Haas consideres that diplomacy, another international factor of democratization, found at the congruency of *control* and *consent*, may act as an incentive for gradual liberalization of authoritarian regimes. „*A foreign policy that integrates, rather than isolate despotic regimes can act as a Trojan horse which moderates their behaviour on the medium term and their nature on the long term*" [17].

Philippe Shmitter adds the concept of democratization by conditioning to these models. It represents a distinctive model because it implies the intentional use of coercion by international institutions by adding specific conditions for distributing benefits to recipient countries. The classic example is the relationship between the International Monetary Fund and the countries credited by it. The European Union, or even the Council of Europe are becoming actors who impose conditions, by insisting on standards of political behaviour as a condition for membership. Conditioning becomes an increasingly important tool for spreading democracy; it is the most recent and also the one which spreads the fastest [18].

Democratic peace theory is one of the most famous and influential ideas in international affairs, becoming an axiom for political scientists and for the general public. The theory argues that democracies do not engage in war against other democracies. For decades it has inspired a foreign policy that encourages and supports democratization in the world, policy carried both by the great western powers and international organizations. A world in which more countries have a democratic political system is a more peaceful world. Michael W. Doyle argues that democratic peace is essentially due to confidence: democracies enjoy mutual trust, while dictators are not trusted by democratic leaders. Therefore, war is not triggered between democracies, but is often found between democracies and dictatorships [19].

Democratic peace theory is the only theory about democratization which links the concepts of democracy and security, and is the philosophy that has inspired both military interventions and various international aid efforts in the last two decades. What is however known about democratization has not fundamentally changed. Recent studies confirm and consolidate what is already known: (1) Democratization is a long and difficult process; (2) Rich countries represent a more fertile ground for democratization than poor ones [20].

Democratization means the transition process of a state from a non-democratic system towards democracy. Democratization refers to a nonlinear change process and often without a clear point of departure or arrival.

III. THE EU'S POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE BLACK SEA AREA

Democratization means building a democratic state. Robert Dahl states that the state has long been the main point of democratic ideas. The state is the embodiment and essence of political power, and political institutions characteristic of a democracy have emerged as means of democratizing states' governments [21]. For a consolidated democratization of the state there are three necessary processes [22]:

   i.Institutional transformation (constitutional design of the state);
  ii.The representativeness transformation (the mechanisms that determine who influences policies and towards whom the state is responsible);
 iii.Functional transformation (which determines the responsibility of the state).

Part of this frame is the EU's policies regarding the finality of the democratization process of the Black Sea area states. In our opinion, in the positive performance of these three processes, several solutions could be taken into consideration.

A first solution to the area's democratization problem is to increase regional cooperation. This aspect is especially important as this area's integration to the Euro-Atlantic structures should be considered, in perspective and in total. Although all of the countries are members of the CoE and the OSCE, the willingness to adhere to their standards is rather limited in some of the countries in the region. As a key player in the region, the EU needs to develop a coherent policy which at one and the same time takes into account energy security, the promotion of democracy,

and respect for human rights. In this context the EU has, in recent years, initiated a large cooperation project called "*The Black Sea Synergy*" [23].

"*The Black Sea Synergy*" was formally launched on February the 14th, 2008, in Kiev, at a meeting of foreign ministers representing the EU's member states and the states in the region. This project summarizes the EU's vision regarding cooperation with the countries part of the Black Sea region. It should be seen as a complementary initiative to existing regional policies which focus on the regional level, in its intention to boost cooperation within the Black Sea region and also between the Black Sea region and the EU.

The European Commission's idea is to provide a greater visibility of the area and to contribute to the dynamics of the ongoing regional cooperation process through enhanced dialogue, one that should strengthen confidence among the envisaged states, placing a particular interest on cross-border cooperation. The European Commission's initiative is based on the ascertainment that the Black Sea region is a market in evolution, a turntable for energy flows and energy transportation routes, but which faces major challenges, being a security consuming region. At the same, the initiative takes into account other regional cooperation programs backed by international organizations or by other major world powers. As a first step, *The Black Sea Synergy* turns its attention to those issues and cooperation sectors which reflect common priorities and where the EU's presence and support are already significant: *democracy, human rights and good governance, managing traffic and improving security, "frozen conflicts", energy, transport, environment, fishing, commerce, research and education networks, science and technology (S&T), employment and social affairs, regional development.* [24]

It also needs to find ways of including and cooperating with Russia in order to ensure the stability of the region. Existing regional initiatives such as the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) should be encouraged to interact more intensively with the EU and its new Eastern Partnership programme. Russia and Turkey are key actors in the region. Their potential should be used more constructively, in particular since both regard the EU as a major partner. It is vital for the Black Sea region that BSEC should develop a constructive and structured relationship with other regional and international actors, in particular with the EU, which has both the resources and expertise to get involved in regional projects. Transforming BSEC into a credible partner, with a clear strategy, will give new meaning to the concept of Black Sea regionalism in a united and democratic Europe. Although the solution of cooperation between the EU and the countries in the area is easy to point out, a problem of contradiction still exists: regional cooperation means a multiplication of contacts, opening new border crossings, trade facilitation and trade between countries. On the other hand, the EU's security interest implies border security and strict control of the movement of persons.

The experience of the Balkan countries showed that the border closing solution is much more important for EU's security interests than the logic of regional cooperation. These states' economic development would have significantly increased if the EU had allowed their citizens free access to the Schengen area by lifting visas. The EU postpones, even for some member states such as Romania and Bulgaria, integration in the Shengen area, while continuing to criticize them for

high unemployment. It is a dilemma to which EU's security policies must find a solution.

A different solution often used in the regional approach is regional assistance. Rich states of a region assist the poor ones with financial aid or through investments. Such a project was conducted by Scandinavian states for the Baltic ones. The problem is that there are no rich, economic developed countries in the Black Sea area, that would support such an approach. There is the solution for the EU as a whole, to invest in this area. But the EU is struggling to finance the enlargement process towards the Western Balkans and therefore it is difficult for the EU to be able to effectively finance the Black Sea area. Generally, EU's investment in the area is exclusively addressed towards the energy sector and strategic infrastructure, where there is a major interest. However, the democratization process mandatory involves one of europeanization, of a social nature, educational and mental. The "orange" revolutions generated positive tendencies and hopes in the democratization of the Black Sea area, stopped however by elections in Belarus and Azerbaijan. These different experiences show how difficult the democratization process is, and that it needs financial support to generate prosperity and social trust.

A third solution to the need of democratization of the Black Sea area should seriously take into consideration the only certainty existing at present: in each of these countries there are pro-european democratic reformers. The basic idea of a regional project, one which takes into account the democratic future of these states, should consider creating and encouraging a pro-european and reformist movement that can generate internal change on the Baltic or Central European model. Sustained aid and the conditionality imposed by the EU and the United States for Romania have contributed to the preparation of the EU accession terms. Since 1989 Romania has developed a balanced political system and a responsible civil society, capable of leading and supporting its integration in the European Union and NATO.

These are, in our opinion, the type of actions suited for those who want to develop democratic processes in the Black Sea area. The approach involves a significant degree of cooperation but not necessarily between member states but rather between well-intentioned foreign supporters.

According to this model, the Balkan space and Central Europe are important areas due to the transfer of best practices they can provide. Investment in the Black Sea area elites rather than in infrastructure may seem an uncertain investment, but it is a solution that can generate safe effects, profound and durable on the long term.

CONCLUSIONS

The EU is interested in the Black Sea area for two geopolitical reasons in addition to providing general support for democratization and the development of civil society. On the one hand there is the question of political and military security and stability, which means its enlargement in the region. On the other, the EU wants to guarantee energy security for its countries, which means access to the gas and oil reserves of Central Asia via the pipelines through the Black Sea region.

The EU considers that the democratization of the Black Sea region is the safe solution on the long term for reaching its security objectives. The theoretic basis of this policy are some of the theories of democracy: modernization theory, transition studies, wave theory, the international dimension of democratization, democratic peace theory.

Encouraging the aggregation of a region of the Black Sea countries would have a series of important advantages, among which we mention the most visible:

- The ability to better attract the attention of the West in case a group of countries of small importance are grouped in a region whose profile is emphasized by a campaign of sensibilization and awareness

- Simplifying the ways of mobilizing resources if a single frame is offered instead of several. This was also the logic of the Stability Pact for the Balkans

- Easier spreading of good practices from the EU, as a whole, or from countries in the area, which are part of EU, towards others which are less developed

Among EU's possible solutions regarding the democratization of the Black Sea area, attention can be made to the intensifying of regional cooperation, to redistributing, creating and encouraging pro-european and reformist movements that can generate internal change based on the Baltic or Central European model.

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THE CULTURAL ROMANIAN IDENTITY
IN THE SOUTH-EASTERN SPACE

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Abstract

This work aims at analyzing how the Romanian culture made itself a special identity in the frame of cultural evolution and development of Europe and especially of the Eastern Europe. From this point of view we carried out this analysis focusing on the 20th century. All of these characteristics show that Romania has a unique specific culture. There is a relationship between culture, on one hand, and identity and difference on the other.

We investigate the most important issues in this respect such as: identity and cultural differences, cultural memory, collective and national identity, nation's characteristic, role of literature creating a Romanian cultural identity. After the collapse of the Iron Curtain in the public debates appeared the issue and idea of an Eastern Europe. How can the invention of the Eastern Europe be described? Is it a process created in the XVIII century? Identities and borders, West Europe versus South-Eastern Europe, The Center versus European suburbs, Central Europe or Balkans are some of many border areas that give us economic, cultural and ideological alternatives. For Romania it has the river Danube as a certain mark if its national identity, sometimes mentioned as "the Little Paris" by the famous writers as Jules Michelet, Lucien Romier and Paul Monrad.

Starting with Panait Istrati's theory and then with the other authors' research we try to explain the increasing importance of the identity European discourse in the contemporary Europe and analyze all these questions.

Keywords: *South-Eastern Europe, identity and cultural differences, Romanian cultural identity.*

I. EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

1.1. Between culture and identity — conceptual approaches

European revolutions in 1989 were, first of all, a central European phenomenon, both from the launching and consequences point of view, as well as from frame of reference point of view when assessing the revolutionary process. Is there a pattern of political system in Central Europe? Furthermore, is there a Central Europe politically defined? Central Europe is a concept that recurs periodically, especially in what we might consider regional crisis moments[1].

Revolution of 1848 would be such an example of crisis moment, in which, incipiently, the idea of a Central Europe was testified in an improper context, in which the nation's emergence as cultural and political entity proved to be a real obstacle.

Year 1989 would be another important moment in the evolution of the idea of a Central Europe. After falling of the Iron Curtain, Europe is not geography anymore, but rather a spiritual domain. Who are we? What are we heading to? What is our diversity, diversity of countries belonging to Central and South-Eastern Europe? What is our Romanian cultural identity after the falling of the Iron Curtain? What is the purpose of identity memory as an essential element in an individual's identity, a social group's identity, a political group's identity and even a nation's one?

Research about European identity start either from understanding the notion of being European, or from social varied daily practices (among which: discourses, business and political partnerships, common consumption practices), or from analysing the perception of borders between member states in Europe. The fact is that the identity of social groups and difference among them is generally insured by the prevalent factor called "culture". How obvious is identity awareness in peripheral cultural areas, such as the Balkans? It is difficult to exactly specify, specialists' opinions being divided.

Identity is a concept very complex and difficult to be identified as a socio political and cultural phenomenon. Some researchers advocate that a European identity sense has begun to develop and that an increasing number of Europeans identify themselves, one way or another, with Europe and European community (Baycroft)[2]. Communities' cultural identities are built as notions that gather around them an array of images, narrations, clichés, attitudes, reactions, opinions.

After 1989, one of the obsessive questions aroused in the public communication field aimed by choice the issue <What does "Romania's image in the world" mean>? Our perception about ourselves is determined by our cultural identity image, as it is understood at the collective mentality level, within its spatial, temporal and symbolic- idealised connotations.

Which are the bench-marks according to which collective identities are perceived and determined?

In Romania, culture has been a major producer of bench-marks regarding the nation's destiny. Intellectuals of cultural origin have played a major role on the historical-social and political stage. Romanian cultural identity has had a European origin, although we have been placed in an intersection are because of several reasons, such as:

a. Strictly geographically, Romania, found at a junction area of Europe, represents a symbiosis between Transylvanian spirit, highly shaped by Central European culture and the spirit in the Old Kingdom, under Slavonian and Byzantine influence.

b. Politically, we were at the junction of three belligerent and expansionist empires: Hamsburgic, Russian and Ottoman.

c. From the religious point of view, Romania has an Eastern, Oriental, Orthodox-Byzantine confessional root.

Essentially, still a European heredity, although defined as Oriental – as it is about a European Orient, Greece, the cradle of europeanity. Generally speaking, culture represents the integrality of material and spiritual values created by humankind and of necessary institutions in order to disseminate these values. It

breeds new social, moral, philosophical and spiritual dimensions. Between the two World Wars, Romanian cultural identity, at the world level, was insured by important names of Romanian culture such as Constantin Noica, Lucian Blaga, Mircea Vulcanescu.

1.2. Collective and national identities

Broadly speaking, studies regarding European identity are based on cultural concepts such as: theoretical perspectives on European identity, cultural identity crisis in the globalization context, building up and rebuilding of narrations and myths about identity by relating to Western identity paradigms.

After the Iron Curtain fell, issues regarding European identity equally concern anthropologists, sociologists, politologists as well as historians, geographists, psychologists or philosophers. For the last 22 years, European states are facing more and more the need of redefining own collective identity. Along Romanian history, collective identity creators were mainly writers-thus the elitist character of identity projections (lower around year 1948 and subsequently much larger, diffused by school and mass-media). Electronic means represent cultural representations tools and constitute the perfect framework of debating identity meanings.

II. THE IRON CURTAIN AND EASTERN EUROPE

2.1. Eastern Europe- the Cold War

The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War relaunched the idea of a United Europe. Unfortunately, the result was also an economic inequity, visible nowadays in Europe. Therefore, we ask ourselves: Has the Iron Curtain disappeared?

Idea of Eastern Europe is much older than the Cold War. Larry Wolf [3] stated that <Western Europe was the one who invented Eastern Europe as its complementary half in the 18th century, in the Age of Enlightenment. All Enlightenment, with its intellectual centers throughout Western Europe, was the one who cultivated and seized the notion of "civilization", a neologism in the 18th century, and civilization discovered its counterpart on the same continent, in countries mantled in the backwardness and even barbarity shadow. That is how Eastern Europe was invented>

In the period between Renaissance and Enlightenment Age, Rome, Florence and Venice had lost their roles of cultural and financial centers, their place being taken by Paris, London and Amsterdam. It is very difficult to define what insures specific European identity. Obviously, it is not linked to a precise territory and it does not limit to the area of the old continent. It is a sort of mental projection that has continually grown and generated a civilization, own values and institutions. Finally, even the political project of the European Union tries to legitimate and develop these acquisitions of the European cultural area, with the help of the common market. European architecture was one of the challenges of the 20th century.

2.2. Mitteleuropa and the Balkans

Is there Central Europe? This political and cultural concept was noticed even from the First World War period, in 1915, once Friedrich Naumann's paper was published in Berlin and subsequently, during the Second World War, when the idea of *Mitteleuropa* played an important ideological role. Paradoxically, in the '80s, the idea of Central Europe was rediscovered by intellectuals from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, as well as by intellectuals from Western Europe and it was promoted as an ideological antidote to the Iron Curtain. Russia did not invent or impose the idea of Eastern Europe. On the contrary, "We are Europeans" declared Mihail Gorbaciv in *Perestroika* in 1987!

As a project achieved in the Age of Enlightenment, Eastern Europe represents a cultural creation strongly connected to the Balkans area. Vesna Goldsworty[4] pointed out that „any attempt to define the borders of the Balkan Peninsula shows that the Balkans itself, as precise geographical entity, represents a historical creation, a series of imaginary spaces that overlap and in which countries are considered Balkanian in some recordings and in others they do not appear at all".

Central Europe has no border, no empire, no territory to be source of frictions and hysterics, as opposed to culture, that binds, connects things and looks for common points. Even since the beginning of 1990, in Romania there has been long discussed what kind of joining Europe can we talk about, as our country is part of the European continent. Undeniable truth, but not as simple as it is at first sight. Historian C. C. Giurescu reminds us that Romanian territory location in the South-East of Europe, in the immediate continuity of the Balkan Peninsula determined certain historians, geographists and politiacians to consider this land as part of the Balkan area. Following the same idea, Adrian Marino, in its paper „For Europe", stated that „Romania was part of Europe and still is today"(...) „Romania was part until the communism settled in, then exited Europe"[5].

In the same train of ideas, it is not very clearly known how far the Balkans stretch. From a certain point of view, the Balkans are considered integral part (even if as a connecting bridge) of Europe, especially in the light of comparison between the European assembly and the Islamic world in the Middle East and Asia. We state and believe that Romania is a country in Central Europe. At the same time located in the north of the Balkan Peninsula, thus not part of the Balkans. Along time, Romania has been considered as either Balkan country (part of the Balkan Peninsula), or East European (actually with political connotations, designating communist countries), or Central European, more recently, as part of Median Europe.

Despite the fact that in Romanian language, in the Romanian Academic Dictionary, the term „Balkan" means „backward, primitive, uncivilized", Europe is rather a cultural and historical creation and not a mere geographical description.

III. CERTAIN BORDERS OF ROMANIAN IDENTITY

3.1. Europe of borders

At the turn of the millenium, Romania is geopolitically placed, at the junction of geoeconomic axes between West and east (Western Europe – Ex-Soviet Eastern) and North-West – South-East (Germany and Central Europe-Asia Minor and Nerar East). From the population, civil and military potential point of view, Romania is at the crossroads of Central Europe - in which it is ranked the second, after Poland - with the larger area of the Balkans, in which our country is ranked the third, after Turkey and Greece (from the surface and population point of view it is ranked the secong, after Turkey). In the context of changes that take place in Europe, Romania is becoming more and more connected to the Balkano Danubian-Pontic area.

Western Europe versus Eastern or South-Esat Europe, center versus European peripheries, MittelEuropa or the Balkans are only some of the many border areas, beyond which ideological, cultural, moral and aesthetic alternatives can be seen. One of the most pregnant Western bench-marks to which East European capitals related was Paris-set as bench-mark of modern cultural Romanian identity (*Little Paris* was a symbolic name frequently used to designate Romanian capital city in the first half of the last century). As testimony of this verisimilitude of this reality are the recordings of some western travellers, and in the 20th century-the mass media. In case of Romania, travellers such as Raymond Poincaré, Jules Michelet, Lucien Romier, Paul Monrad let us edicative narrations about *Little Paris.*

3.2. Contact borders: Panait Istrati

The destiny and perception of Panait Istrati's work are eloquent for narrations of clashes regarding passing areas of Europe. Istrati was born in Braila, thus in a border area with the South-East of Europe, fact that influenced his entire life and work. Panait Istrati abhored modernism, finding it *cold, anti-sentimental* and even *decadent*, lacking spirit. Nowadays, according to the opinion of certain critics and literary Romanian researchers, Panait Istrati was the single real authentic recusant regarding his attitude towards the USSR. Marin Sorescu, stated in April 1996, that Panait Istrati is the first Soljenitin in European literature. Panait Istrati has a special place in the gallery of Romanian writers. Tortured by revolutionary ideas and by himself, Panait Istrati, a wanderer, a maverick left from the Danube River, from Braila port, was a European conscience of first rank. An ex tramp, a self-taught from the Balkans was a very appreciated writer first in France (although, initially, was ostracisted both in France and in Romania), then in entire Europe. He wrote most of his literary work in French. Pilgrim of European stature, Romanian half Greek and writing in French language, Panait Istrati was called by a French journalist „narrator born in scriptural times". Panait Istrati is part of those writers' category who marked the period he lived in being, from medical point a view, an echography of moral dilemmas, of beliefs and disappointments that more generations of Europeans (including Romanians) felt, sometimes too profoundly.

For Romanian culture, the Danube River remains a critical bench-mark of national identity, being perceived as a symbolic border of the Romanian cultural

space. From the historical perspective, the Danube River was an invincible blockade against any aggression (for exemple, the Ottoman Empire).

Romanian cultural identity became a public issue only after national bourgeois revolutions of 1848. After that, Political and Cultural Society *Junimea* launched a well correlated theoretical criticism against superficial and hasty import of French models, calling them „forms without background". Self-exiled in Berlin, toward the end of his life, one of the most important national writers of the 19th century, I.L. Caragiale, made in his prose a thorough X-ray of the golden age of *Little Paris.*

Towards the end of the 19th century, beginning with Carol I reign, the Hohenzollern monarchy initiated the social, economical and political modernization process of the country, setting up the „European Romania".

Between the two World Wars, elegant architecture and Bucharest elite brought Bucharest the nickname of „Little Paris". The end of the 19th century was the most flourishing period of the capital city. Fashionable buildings were built in **Italian or French renaissance style**, buildings that can be still seen today. Architectural elements, as well as Frech influence in literature and art, felt in Bucharest clubs and cafes, changed Bucharest at the beginning of the 20th century into **„Little Paris"** of Eastern Europe.

Romanian identity setting-up constantly presumed identifying external, esteemed and legitimate cultural models. *Little Paris*, that played a key role in setting-up Romanian cultural identity, was the product of a fascinating mixture of ideological clichés, of symbols and of social-cultural Romanian projections of certain European origin. Alike, the pro-German alternative was assumed in the inter-war period by a group of elitist intellectuals, headed by professor of philosophy and politician Nae Ionescu. In the 20th century, francophile was assumed by a group of bright Romanian intellectuals, such as Elena Vacarescu (who represented Romania as diplomat in Paris and Geneva), Marthe Bibesco (who published in Paris and Bucharest more than 30 books, some being awarded prizes by the French Academy), Emil Cioran and Mircea Eliade (established along their lives in Western Europe).

Nowadays European Union is the result of the cooperation effort started over half a century ago, in attempting to rebuild a continent destroyed by war and to set up a safe and wealthy society.

„*In spite of difficulties and obstacles, we are building a larger and more complete Europe that shall be an exceptional actor in the new world politics*"[6], declared the ex-president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi. Communtary reconstruction actors have promoted a peaceful rebuilding of the community, progressive institutionalisation of the communtary organisms being the expression of an „*evolutive dynamism*" as Jean Monnet [7] stated.

The singularity of the European Union is, by essence, the hybrid character of its functioning methods. These are emphasised either by a political alliance or by the economic integration. Less than a federation, more than a confederation, less than a state and more than free-trade association, Eu would be „*an unidentified political object*", according to Jacques Delors' formula or according to many other authors „*a new form of organisation, without a sovereign or center*[8]".

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But, first of all, it is a *sui generis* process worked out by the sates' action, without being entirely controled by them: a moving figure, that contributes, in an uncertain manner towards slow emergence of a superior level of regulation[9].

The community system originality, dynamic balance of this construction is given by its institutions, by the principles on the basis of which it works, by the decisional process and by the introduced innovations. Union's edifice is based on a balance of interests that each institution defends and, together, insure a harmonious functioning.

The real revolution brought by Communities within the European institutions becomes visible when we take into consideration the legal technique used in their building.

At first sight, the Communities law seems to consist of well known elements: international treatises, unilateral legal acts issued by competent organisms, jurisdictional acts. But, if beyond these simple elements, we take into consideration the assembly constituted by their blending, then, the community juridical construction becomes profoundly original.

This originality results from what we might call „the paradox" of European Communities. The difference between the internal and the international juridical order is well known. Internal juridical order governs, through the public law, the organisation of public powers and their relationship with individuals, and, through the private law, the relationships between individuals. This internal law, in force within a state colectivity, has as base the law, unilateral act issued by competent national institutions.

As international juridical order is concerned, this governs the relationships between states, representing the law applied to interstate relationships and the instrument of this kind of law is, of course, the treaty, seen as an agreement between sovereigns.

What we call community „the paradox" is actually the ambition that the „founding fathers" in building an internal juridical order by technical juridical means whose base is given by the international treaty.

Thus, the sources of the community law show, by their complexity, the „paradox" of Communities, forming a hierarchy headed by the Paris and Rome Treaties.

The institutional system of the EU is a mixture of institutions with supranational and intergovernmental character. It has an European Council that has a political purpose unifying, at the highest level, heads of states and government, getting through a path, equally original that started as a political forum, reaching nowadays to be the main political institution. Another institution with an outstanding and unique path is the European Parliament whose members are appointed by direct vote.

Other characteristics that strengthen its *sui generis* character are a series of elements with federalizing character such as the Euro currency, European citizenship, emergence of the community clerk with a well regulated status.

CONCLUSIONS

Almost all peripheric European identities were marked by the hypothesis of border state, that gradually became a bearing point of their significance and importance. European communities have perceived themselves and were perceived in their turn by others as *crossroads, thresholds, gates or bridges* between different identities or between an identity and a cultural alterity. As geopolitical realities, border areas were rather passing areas and cultural mixture than identity barriers. As disputing and arguable identities, they needed all the time to legitimate themselves. Therefore, they invented unrealistic subterfuges, such as *Little Paris, the third or the fourth Rome, Little Vienna*, etc.

To conclude, for border communities, a *pure European identity* remains to be defined. Similar to other European territories, in Romania, the nation promoted by intellectual elites worked as a major argument of cohesion of inhabitants in dispersed territories.

Along its history, although placed at the junction of different pressions and cultural, economic, social and political influences, Romania, as integral part of this area, of Central and South-East Europe, acted both as intersection area and as confluence but actively as well, its cultural identity being build in a clearly defined, historical, political and social area.

And yet, Romania belongs to Europe, no matter of the context, either as country, with geographic lay-out of borders, or as state belonging to Europe in its political and geostrategic meaning. We should mention that Romania is able to carry out external policies of broad international span, based on principles, and having as main objectives the efficient observation of national interests and active support of European joining processes, of actions and efforts of enhancing peace and security.

On the other hand, by Romania's joining to the European Union, our country can bring an important help in fathoming and extension of Cooperation and Strategic Partnerships between the European Union and Russian Federation. Active and constructive participation of our country in this essential side of European Union's activity can positively influence our country's credit within the European Union and contributes to amplifying of regional cooperation in the Black Sea area.

The Lisbon Treaty modifies the Treaty regarding the European Union and the EC Treaties, in force at present, without replacing them.[10] The treaty shall make available to the Union the legal framework and the needed juridical tools in order to cope with future challenges and in order to answer the citizens' expectations.

A more democratic and transparent Europe, in which the European Parliament and the national parliaments enjoy a hardened role, in which citizens have more chances to be heard and that define more clearly what is to be done at national and European level and by whom. A hardened role for the European Parliament: The European Parliament, with members elected directly by citizens of the European Union, shall have attributions regarding legislation, European Union budget and international agreements. By appealing to de co-decision procedure more often when drawing up European policies, the European Parliament shall have

an equal standing with the Council, that represents the member states, when it comes about adopting the vast majority of the European Union's legislation.

A greater involvement of the national parliaments: national parliaments shall take part, to a greater degree, into the European Union's activities, especially due to a mechanism that allows to be insured that this interferes only when better results can be achieved at communitary level (subsidiary principle). Along with the hardened role of the European Parliament, involvement of national parliaments shall lead to reinforcement of the democratic character and to an increase of legitimacy of the Union's actions.

A stronger voice for citizens: due to citizens' initiative, a million citizens from different member states shall be able to ask the Commission to present new political proposals.

Who and what does: the relationship between member states and the European Union shall become clearer oce competences are classified.

Retirement from the Union: the Lisbon Treaty explicitly acknowledges, for the first time, the possibility of a member state to retire from the Union.

A more efficient Europe, with simplified working methods and election rules, with efficient and modern institutions for a European Union with 27 members, capable of acting better in major priority fields for the nowadays Union.

An efficient decisional process: vote with qualified majority in the Council shall be extended to new political domains, so that the decisional process shall be carried out in a faster and more efficient manner. Starting with 2014, calculation of the qualified majority shall be made on the basis of the double majority principle, of the member states and of citizens, thus reflecting the Union's double legitimacy. Double majority is obtained when a decision is taken by the vote of 55% of the member states, representing at least 65% of the Union's population.

A more stable and more efficient institutional framework: The Lisbon Treaty creates the position of president of the European Council [11], elected for a two-and-a-half-year mandate, introduces a new direct connection between election of the Commission president and European elections results, provides new directives regarding the future structure of the European Parliament and the reduction of the commissioners' number and includes clear regulations on strengthened cooperation and financial provisions.

A better life for Europeans: The Lisbon Treaty improves the EU capacity to act in different fields of major priority for the Union nowadays and for its citizens such as: freedom, security and justice (counteracting terrorism and fight against delinquency). To a certain extent, the Treaty refers to other fields as well, among which energy policy, public health, clime changes, general interest services, research, space, territorial cohesion, trade policy, humanitarian aid, sports, tourism and administrative cooperation.

A Europe of rights, values, freedom, solidarity and safety that promotes Union's values, introduces the Charter of fundamental rights within the primary European law, promotes new solidarity mechanisms and insures a better protection to the European citizens.

Democratic values: the Lisbon Treaty specifies and consolidates the values and objectives at the base of the Union. These values are meant to serve as

benchmark for European citizens and to show what Europe has to offer its worldwide partners.

Citizens' rights and the Charter of fundamental rights: The Lisbon Treaty maintains the already existing right and introduces some new ones. Especially it guarantees the freedoms and principles within the Charter of fundamental rights and gives their provisions mandatory juridical force. It refers to civil, political, economical and social rights.

Freedom for European citizens: The Lisbon Treaty maintains and strengthens the "four freedoms" as well as political, economical and social freedom of the European citizens.

Solidarity between member states: The Lisbon Treaty provides the fact that the Union and the member states act together in solidarity in case a member state is the target of a terrorist attack or is the victim of a natural or man-caused disaster. At the same time, solidarity in the field of energy is emphasized.

More safety for all: the Union shall benefit from an extended action capacity as freedom, security and justice are concerned, which shall bring direct benefits regarding the Union's ability to defend itself against terrorism and delinquency. The new provisions in the field of civil protection, humanitarian aid and public health also have the objective of strengthening the Union's capacity to fight back threats aimed at European citizens' security.

Europe as player on the international stage-external policy tools that Europe has shall be regrouped regarding the issuing and adopting new policies. The Lisbon Treaty shall offer Europe a clearer voice in its relationships with its worldwide partners. It shall use the force achieved by Europe in the economic, humanitarian, political and diplomatic field in order to promote European interests and values worldwide, at the same time respecting specific interests of member states in the field of external affairs.

Beyond its political importance, the Lisbon Treaty shall allow the communitary forum to concentrate on its citizens' issues in order to solve them as efficiently as possible.

In the common declaration following the Treaty's enactment, heads of state and government stated that EU has to regard the globalisation phenomenon not only as a challenge but as an opportunity and a responsibility that has to be assumed as well.

In their vision, communitary Europe has to aim at greater opening of markets, global standards improvement and deepening of strategic cooperation with Union's international partners. And EU's success in the context of globalisation depends on accomplishing stronger actions on internal and external ground.

At the same time, the new treaty establishes the EU's competences and, for the first time, exclusive competences arise for the Union compared to the national ones.

There are five fields in which the Union's competences shall come first to the national ones: customs union, establishment of competition rules necessary for internal market functioning, currency policy for the member states in the Euro area, sea biological resources preservation within common fishing policy and, the last but not the least, common trade policy.

Among the fields with shared competences between the EU leadership and the member states there are defence, energy as well as justice and agriculture.

A fundamental message of the Lisbon summit, finalised by a Union's official document, in March 2008, regards the determination of the council and, implicitly, of EU that during the globalisation process not to have the position of a political structure that reacts towards globalisation effects, but to involve themselves in shaping this process. During the summit, the conclusion was drew that EU has to impose or propose its partners, until accepted, sets of regulations that establish equality between the two parts: European Union and its partners, either global powers or not. The major routes on which it has act and that must have the same set of regulations are the environment, energy, competition, assets assessment standards, transparency regarding financial operations as well as intellectual property protection. On these areas, the Union shall focus its effort in achieving the set of viable regulations not only for itself but for its partners as well, either they are the U.S.A., China or India. Although a newly player on the international stage, the EU has a considerable economic power and it is the most important exporter of manufactured goods and services as well as the most important source of investments in the world. External relationships do not represent a separate activity field of the Union but an application in a larger geographical area of its values and principles, aspect observed in the extending policy in which the EU negotiates with eligible states the ways and conditions of adopting by them of the entire body of regulations and practices.

Project founded on the basis of freedom and solidarity, the European Union has come a long process of continuous change and adjustment to the European and international environment challenges and has made, for the last years, to obtain a double legitimacy: states and citizens.

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EUROPE'S FRONTIER TO JIHAD: THE ROLE OF ROMANIA IN WIDER BLACK SEA REGION

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Abstract

Due to immigration and an elevated birth rate, the total number of Muslims in the European Union has tripled in the last 30 years. While some Muslim immigrants living in Europe have integrated in their new homes, most of them do not speak the language of their adoptive country and are often unemployed or living at the limits of poverty.
Taking into consideration the aforementioned, we consider it important to identify and classify the cultural-religious and socio-political factors which can generate significant migration fluxes on the territory of Romania, in order to contribute to the elaboration of an action strategy, designed to increase the efficiency of managing the cultural-religious and socio-economic problems of Muslim immigrants coming from the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia, with the purpose of preventing their radicalization and the import of conflicts among different states, ethnicities or religious creeds.
Keywords: Black Sea, terrorism, radicalization, Romania

I. WAGING JIHAD IN THE 21ST CENTURY: COMBATING MUSLIMS' RADICALIZATION IN EUROPE

The beginning of the 21st century has been marked by the traumatic encounter between the global destiny of the Muslim world and Western civilization, as for most Muslims, the West has become an impervious and incomprehensible symbol of the malefic domination of imperialism.

The economic decline, military defeat and Western colonization of Muslim states have limited their political and cultural development, as they were strongly marked by the limits of modernity, religious conservatism and adversity towards the West.

In the era of globalization, Muslims find themselves in the deviant position of being „the others", and cultural differences have gained new valences, being the ones responsible for mapping the chart of future conflicts. Although democracy represents a global desideratum, still there is no consensus regarding the articulation of universal values, such as social tolerance, equality among sexes and freedom of speech. Presently, the manner in which these values are promoted constitutes the reason behind the Islamic and Western „clash of civilization". The contact between the Islamic and Western civilizations appears, rather, like a confrontation in which Islam acts as a source for a parochial, anti-modernist identity, a collective agent whose tendencies towards violent actions and traditionalism makes religion an

unyielding enemy of pluralism and globalization, becoming a defiant opponent of Western civilization.

Especially as in the 20th century, Westernization did not have the expected results. Modernism did not manage to impose itself in Muslim states, because of religious conservatism and the underdevelopment generated by Western colonialism, as well as the resilience in power of local autarchic and dictatorial elites.

Starting with 2011 the hatred of Muslims against Western colonialism appears to diminish, the dictatorial regimes of Tunisia and Egypt falling under popular pressure, without the West intervening in their support. Furthermore, in the case of Libya, both the US and the EU have condemned the genocide initiated by Muammar Gaddafi against his own population.

But the success of the Tunisian and Egyptian popular revolutions can also be seen as the opening of "Pandora's box", as the political vacuum generated by the fall of Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Gaddafi's regimes may create the necessary preconditions for the rise of fundamentalist regimes in Tunisia or Egypt, or to trigger civil wars, for example in Libya. The possible consolidation of the positions of Islamic fundamentalist groups in the Muslim states of North Africa could have global negative consequences.

In the case of Libya, the risk that some terrorist groups affiliated to Al Qaeda tries to take advantage of these revolts is real. Laurent Wauquiez, the French Minister for European Affairs has estimated that the inflow of immigrants from Libya represents a risk for Europe, as African states, such as Somalia will use the illegal migration flows which pass through Libya.

The Islamic challenges, which Europe faces today is in fact two-fold. On the domestic arena, the European Union must integrate a Muslim minority that lives isolated in ghettos, characterized by a rapid demographic growth, which many Europeans perceive as a threat to European collective identity and secular values. On the outside, the European Union must develop a viable strategy for immigration control in regard to states, which have Muslim populations such as Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, former European colonies, where the Muslim „hatred" against Western colonialism favors the recrudescence of Islamic fundamentalism.

The threat comes both from these Islamic terrorist groups that try to infiltrate in Western states and from the Muslim present on the European continent, which radicalize in an unpredictable manner, at the end of a solitary and invisible journey.

Although its appears we are witnessing a diminishment of Al Qaeda's capacity of perpetrating terrorist attacks, this could be just a change in strategy for the terrorist groups affiliated to Al-Qaeda, as the phenomenon of Muslim radicalization on the web proves that today, anyone can conduct a terrorist attack.

This threat is becomes increasingly important as due to immigration and an elevated birth rate, the total number of Muslims in the European Union has tripled in the last 30 years, demographic studies estimating a similar or even higher rate of growth for future decades. While some Muslim immigrants living in Europe have

integrated in their new homes, most of them do not speak the language of their adoptive country and are often unemployed or living at the limits of poverty.

But each European state must face different problems in relation to the Muslim community inhabiting its soil. A significant percent of the Muslim population from Great Britain comes from Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and the Near East, while in Germany most Muslims come from Turkey and Bosnia. French Muslims originate from French-speaking Africa (especially Algeria and Morocco), while in Spain and Italy, Muslim immigrants brought illegally in these states come from Northern Africa and the Middle East

We are not saying that the Muslims in Europe do not wish to integrate or respect the values and institutions of the country they inhabit, but it is clear they also desire to preserve their Islamic identity, as they fear that their assimilation within the European society will deprive them of their own identity.

In this context, the marginalization of the Muslim minorities, which are left to adjust their own social behaviour, represents a failure for European multiculturalism, as it creates a diffuse basis of needs and services that are disregarded by institutional actors. This status-quo generates opaque subcultures, where Islamic fundamentalist groups act by evading identification.

Muslims „enclaves” represent „green” dots on the map of Western Europe, and the number of neighbourhoods in which being a Muslim is a precondition for living there is continuously raising. These districts are characterized by a high rate of unemployment, crime, poverty and decrepitude. Some of these districts are „out of reach” for Europeans (and even for security forces), as they fear the local community.

European states have adopted different ways of treating Muslim minorities, including aggressive assimilation politics, which often result in the marginalization of the community. Europe has promoted multiculturalism, but presently it appears to change direction. The rejection of multiculturalism is rather an issue of rhetoric and is dependant on the potential of Islamic fundamentalism of remaining a legitimating factor for the perpetration of terrorist suicide attacks.

France has the largest Muslim community in the European Union. Many of them come from Northern Africa, especially Algeria, trying to find jobs. France has not managed to integrate them. Consequently, the vast segments of Muslim population in France are separated, almost entirely, from the rest of society. The surroundings of Paris and Marseille are full of discontented Muslims, who consider themselves to be discriminated by the education system, public sector and social security services.

Great Britain represents a focal point and a fertile territory for Islamic terrorism in Europe, this state being able to reduce its vulnerability solely by prohibiting the ghetto-ization of the Muslim community

In Germany, the most radical Islamic preachers indoctrinate their sympathizers with Salafist convictions (one of the most radical versions of Islam, which calls for the creation of a society by following the model of the Muslim world during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad).

Islamic fundamentalism can also be encountered in Spain where just in 2010, have been organized ten conferences of the Salafi Movement (compared to

the year 2008 when a single conference took place). Spanish officials have warned that in 10% of the 1000 existent mosques in Spain, jihad's messages are promoted, a percent which is considered to be "very concerning".

In Italy, the police from Brescia have arrested six Moroccan citizens, members of the Islamic fundamentalist group Al Adl Wal Ihssane, accused of creating a group with the sole purpose of inciting to discrimination and hatred towards Western culture and traditions, as well as towards other religions than Islam, and calling for violence and Holy Jihad against Christians and Jews.

In Sweden, on December 11th 2010, the suicide bomber Taimur Abdulwahab warned that terrorist attacks will continue as long as Swedish military forces will not retreat from Afghanistan. In this context, law-enforcement officials from Malmø, the third Swedish town in size have publicly acknowledged they can no longer keep under control the violent groups of Muslim immigrants.

Bosnia - Herzegovina is one of the few European states, where Muslims represent the largest ethnic group. The Muslim population in Bosnia is considered to be pro-Western, although Muslims have been the main victims of the 1992-1995 confessional war, a fact which led to a certain radicalization of the Muslim population in Bosnia.

Within the Muslim community there have been certain diverges between the majority, which follows the tolerant local traditions, established during the four century Ottoman rule and a "vocal" minority, educated in Islamic states, which lays emphasis on the fundamentalist side of Islam. Overall, the Muslim community in Bosnia has shown resilience in the face of Wahhabi influence.

The independent state of Kosovo wished to be a signal addressed to the Muslim world which must understand that the war against terrorism is not directed against any faith, but against terrorist groups which promote Islamic fundamentalism.

But the UN project of creating a multiethnic and multicultural Balkan region has proven a total failure in Kosovo. The rift between Muslims and Christians is deeper than ever in Kosovo, even more than in Bosnia.

II. THE RISK OF TERRORISM PROLIFERATION IN THE WIDER BLACK SEA REGION

The Black Sea region represents a central element of a geopolitical and geostrategic system in its full evolution, based on the NATO extension towards Central Asia. Also, the Black Sea plays a crucial part in the counterterrorist war, offering direct access for the international coalition against terrorism to the operation theatres in Central Asia and the extended Middle East region.

Due to this reason, when we talk about the geopolitical importance of the Black Sea we must use the concept of „the Wider Black Sea Region", which includes not only coastal states, but also the Republic of Moldova and the states in the area of South Caucasus, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Since the Black Sea marks the border of Europe, the security of this continent cannot be assured as long as the Black Sea region remains unstable. The challenges to the security of this region and to the security of the European Union

are generated by democratic reconstruction of the coastal states (following the fall of USSR), solving of the „frozen conflicts”, peace-keeping process in the region, securing of the borders, assuring of the security of the energetic resources, fighting against terrorism, weapons and drugs trafficking as well as being aware of the high potential of weapons of mass destruction proliferation.

Including the Wider Black Sea Region into the Euro-Atlantic security strategies leads to the decrease of the threats which could come from the Middle East area and Central Asia. This region will function as a „sanitary belt” which stops the threats emerging from Middle East and Central Asia, to the Western Europe (illegal migration, human beings and drugs trafficking, weapons smuggling and not the last, the threat of terrorism of Islamic fundamentalist or ethnic separatist origin).

A „pacification” of the Middle East can be propagated through the Black Sea region, for which creating a stable geopolitical system is an inherent condition, establishing NATO military bases in the Black Sea coastal states allowing not only a strengthening of the security of these states, but also a quick access to the operation theatres of the international campaign against terrorism in Middle East [1].

Three political and security spaces meet at the Black Sea: NATO and EU, through the member/candidate states: Romania, Bulgaria/Turkey, the region with an uncertain political future of Ukraine and Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan and Russian Federation.

For NATO, the Wider Black Sea Region has become the new demarcation zone of the front against terrorism, weapons, drugs, human beings traffic, etc. In the light of the international campaign against terrorism in Afghanistan and of the extension of NATO attributions in this area (the missile shield), the Wider Black Sea Region becomes a primary element of the Euro-Atlantic strategy.

Concerning the role of Romania as NATO member state and coastal state of the Black Sea, the Romanian officials have highlighted that „the elements which define the role of Romania at the Black Sea are the ones that come from our obligation to have a positive contribution to the EU and NATO security”.

Thus, the defining guidelines of the strategy of Romania in the Wider Black Sea Region are: assuring the security of the region as part of the Euro-Atlantic security by fighting against threats and asymmetric risks and solving of the „frozen conflicts”; supporting the democratic evolution and internal reforms in the states from the extended region of the Black Sea and convincing the Western partners to contribute to the economic development of the region [2].

Assuring the security of the Wider Black Sea Region implies the neutralization of risks and threats such as: transit of the terrorist and organized crime groups members to the Central and Western Europe, through the Black Sea region; illegal migration from Asia and Africa towards Central and Western Europe; immediate vicinity of Caucasus and Balkans, areas characterized by tensions and conflicts; not recognizing, by all states in the region, the instruments of international law needed for peaceful solving of the ethnic-separatist conflicts and the danger that the Black Sea becomes a target on the terrorists' map, due to the participation of the states in the region to the war against terrorism.

III. THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY IN ROMANIA: INDIGENIZATION VS. ISLAMIZATION?

Historically speaking, Muslims came to Romania in the 14th and 15th centuries, following the setting up of the Otoman Empire suzerainty upon the Romanian feudal states. According to the data of the 2002 census, the local Muslim community is composed of 31,118 Turks, 23,641 Tatars, 3,310 Romanians, 805 Roma, and 7,544 people of other ethnic extraction [3].

Similar to other European states, there is a Muslim community in Romania as well, originating in the states of the Middle East and Central Asia. Most of them came here to study before the fall of Communism, in December 1989. Some of these Muslim students married local women and settled down in Romania, others returned in the early post-Communist years in an attempt to make a profit from the new political-economic situation. According to National Trade Register Office of Romania statistics, most Muslim businessmen come from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt, and are concentrated in large cities: Bucharest, Timisoara, Constanta, Cluj-Napoca, Iasi or Brasov.

In the context of the susceptibility of Islam, and the equation of 'immigrants' with potential terrorism and national problems, the definition of Muslims in Romania has become more sensitive. The global context of war against terrorism and Romania's immigration policies have given way to a stream of immigrants from different parts of the world, but especially from the Near East [4].

Unfortunately, some of the Muslims originating in the states of the Middle East and Central Asia, are known to be sympathizers of Islamic fundamentalist groups from their country of origin and are also to be involved in activities on behalf of these groups in Romania, especially in raising funds and proselytism.

Thus, numerous Muslim NGO's have been founded, which behind the apparent promotion of charitable activities, conducted religious activities, while their representatives tried to take control over the Muslim Cult in Romania.

If the Turkish and Tatar community in Dobrogea, share a common history with the majority population, sharing the same socio-political values and facing the same economic problems, at the opposite side, the Muslim immigrants from the Middle East, Northern Africa and Central Asia form heterogeneous communities, were instead of promoting an Islam based on the principle of ethnicity, they promote one which is global and diffuse.

The new Muslim group has not joined the old Muslim community in Romania, the two groups living almost parallel lives. The factor that gives strength to the Dobrogea model is exactly the one that precludes the integration of 'new' Muslims who have found themselves outside this model, promoting a universal Islam, which discursively responds to 'indigenization' by 'islamization'.

In this respect, a lot of Muslim non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have emerged, with the declared purpose of providing charity, while representatives of these organizations started organizing religious activities and tried to take control over the Muslim Cult in Romania.

Regarding the relation between the Muftiat of the Muslim Cult and the Muslim non-governmental organizations in Romania, we must mention that the first

post-Communist Muftis, encouraged the activity of such NGO-s, who have gradually managed to gain proselytes within the Turkish-Tatar community in our country. With the financial and logistic support received from Muslim businessmen in Romania as well as from some of the diplomatic missions of the Arab states based in our country, Muslim NGO-s have come to build mosques, to publish magazines, books and to get involved in all type of charities that are, in fact, acts of proselytism.

As a result, the Synodal Council of the Muslim Cult in Romania has demanded the Muslim NGO-s in Romania – which perform religious activities through which they have attempted to divide the parishioners and limit the decision-making role of the Muftiat – to present their operating code regulations to the Muftiat and the Romanian State Secretary for Cults.

The conflicts between the Muftiat and the Muslim NGO-s became visibly when Iusuf Muurat was chosen the Mufti of the Muslim Cult in Romania. With regard to his mission as a leader of the Muslim Cult in Romania, Iusuf Muurat stated that he didn't want the Muslims in Romania to become an extremist community, underlining the fact they are moderate, with a lifestyle that is very similar to that in many other countries where the Muslim community is a minority [5].

Iusuf Muurat also declared that any cooperation between the Muftiat of the Muslim Cult in Romania and Muslim NGO-s would be analyzed by the Synodal Council. It is nonetheless important to mention that at the level of the Muslim community in Romania it is believed that the conflicts between the two parties are generated by the different interpretations of the Islamic religion (radical in the case of Muslim NGO-s and moderate, with Turkish influences, on the side of the Mufti) [6].

According to Iusuf Muurat, „there is a misunderstanding within the Muslim community in Romania with regard to the attributions of the Muslim Cult and of several Muslim NGO-s with religious activities in Romania. In the future, there is the danger of an expansion of religious extremism in Romania at all levels of the Muslim community"[7].

It is important to mention that all initiatives coming from Romanian authorities aimed at integrating Muslim immigrants in society simply come down to the fulfilment of legal formalities concerning the stay of foreign citizens in Romania, without any special governmental programs being devised for this purpose.

Romania has not developed a special programme for the integration of Muslim communities. The Romanian Immigration Office (a specialized structure of the Ministry of Administration and Interior) seems to be the leading institution actor in the integration of immigrants who were granted a form of protection by the Romanian state. The office has elaborated a program that aims a threefold integration of refugees, asylum seekers, and migrant workers: economic, social and cultural. The partners of ORI are other governmental bodies and non-governmental organizations (among others ARCA – Romanian Forum for Refugees and Migrants,

Save the Children, Romanian National Council for Refugees, Jesuit Service for Refugees, Women Organization for Refugees, ICAR Foundation) [8].

Besides having a limited outreach, the programme uses a particular approach to cultural integration. It focuses on building knowledge about the host country. The programme gives little or no attention to the immigrants' culture and the maintenance of ties with the country of origin.

CONCLUSIONS

European states have adopted different ways of treating Muslim minorities, including aggressive assimilation politics, which often result in the marginalization of the community. Europe has promoted multiculturalism, but presently it appears to change direction. The rejection of multiculturalism is rather an issue of rhetoric and is dependant on the potential of Islamic fundamentalism of remaining a legitimating factor for the perpetration of terrorist attacks.

Therefore, focusing on the cultural conflict among the West and the Muslim world is both necessary and timely, especially in the context of globalization, the main drive of the religious, social, economic and security environment from the beginning of the 21st century, the aim being to identify the social, economic and security risks generated by the failure of multiculturalism in the European space, which has lead to a radicalization of Muslims living in the European Union.

In Romania, while the Turkish or Tatar minority from Dobrogea have a common history with the majority population, sharing the same social-political values and facing the same economic problems, the Muslim immigrants originating from the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia form heterogeneous communities, which do not promote an Islam based on the principle of ethnicity, but on a diffuse, globalizing principle.

In this context, a special emphasis should be laid on the identification of the best practice of preventing the radicalization of Muslim immigrants and the autochthonous Muslim community, as elements of the migrating Muslim community can act in the direction of promoting an Islamic fundamentalist creed, having significant material resources and ideological support from the countries of origin, and by taking advantage of the low income level in Romania.

Taking into consideration the aforementioned, we consider it important to pay attention to the cultural-religious and socio-political factors which can generate significant migration fluxes on the territory of Romania, as well as the factors which would determine Muslims to seek refuge or political asylum in Romania. This endeavour allows the identification of members and sympathizers of Islamic fundamentalist groups and contributes to the elaboration of an action strategy, designed to increase the efficiency of managing the cultural-religious and socio-economic problems of Muslim immigrants coming from the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia, with the purpose of preventing their radicalization and the „import of conflicts among different states, ethnicities or religious creeds”.

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GLOBALISATION AND DEMOGRAPHICS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNITY

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Abstract
The globalisation and demographics are the two main forces that shape up the development of the European societies, creating opportunities and also raising many issues. The globalisation, the local and regional processes and phenomena have led to the internationalisation of the organised crime networks that hold a transborder dimenssion. This reflects over the ethnical and religious extremisms, especially in the terrorism issues. Undebatably, the regional demographic differences do contribute to the occurance of many other conflicts between the more developed countries and the others.
Keywords: demographics, liberalisation, threats, urbanisation, crises, identity.

I. THE GLOBALISED WORLD

The XX-th century world, after being destabilised during the two world wars, has taken the attribute of *global*. The idea of the global world and the *globalisation* concept have been associated with the beginning of XXI-st century and is clearly written in that period's chronicles that deal with the multinational companies and firms.

The living history of has met many manifestations of the globalisation. Commenced with the first evidences of *Homo sapiens sapiens* (the Cro Magnon) and ended in middle Neolitics, the first globalisation has actually meant the process of spreading the primitive tribes all over the living surface of the planet Earth.

Once the polical power and the history emerged, the second form of globalisation outlined itself in the appearance of the notion of border. This was understood as a precisely delimited territory within the physical space, established around a political entity.

The expansion has been upgraded with cultural specific features (symbols, insignia, rituals), and the main interaction grows along the diverse human communities and their relation with the physical environment is a rational one, of intensive exploitation.

The contemporary age has undergone through a vastity of globalisation patterns in different domains: politics, law, governance, military, cultural bonds, human migration, Economics, the environmental assault, etc.

The modernisation of the communicational and transport infrastructures, the unprecented increase of the governmental institutions and the global ruling are the sheer consequence of the globalisation.

Although we may speak of the third type of globalisation, which finds itself in its humble beginning, there are areas that have not yet been finalised in the second stage of globalisation. There are places on Earth where people live in abominable poverty. They are deprived from access to electricity, education, specialised medical assistance. Also, the borders are still some efficient barriers that tie up the populations within their own boundaries and thus they put pressure over the borders. Regional classical wars still occur.

In the lastfew decades, the world has undergone major changes on economical, financial, communicational levels and the truth stating that the population is the core problem of the today's society, has been confirmed.

Nowadays the globalised world is dichotomous: the globalised market enriches some and depletes others more and more. A big whole worsens between those that benefit from the globalisation and those that are kept behind.

The social world lives in a system between two tendencies: the globalised elites are linked to the new values and to the top technologies, but the great mass of people still prefer the nationalism, the ethnocentrism and the freedom against the *rule of globalisation.* As a consequence, we are now facing a tendency of moving the attacks against the globalisation towards an ideological radicalism as the Western countries and the multinational companies are considered as the main beneficiaries of the globalisation, the rest being forced to pay the huge prices for witnssing this process. The excesive addiction towards the USA (be it political, economical, cultural, military, etc,) has degenerated in the increase of the vulnerability of the global world.

The local and regional processes and phenomena have been globalised and led to the internationalisation of the organised crime networks, the trafficking in human beings, drugs, weapons, CBRN, the transfer of ethnic and religious fanatism and especially of terorism. This world is less secure and less stable than before.

The globalisation process assumes a tolerant politics of the state towards the ethnical and religious minorities. Throughout the time, the globalisation proclaimed itself and proved its performances. The issue of governance over the global problems has remained unsolved. It has not created adequated global institutions and did not stated what was the new role of the states, not giving a reasonable answer to the individual and collective identity.

Nowadays, the chnges that occuredin the European societies are dramatic. We reffer to the essence of labour, the modern family life, the woman's position in society and the social mobility. The values are changing and the societies bcome more and more multicultural. The society of abundance has widened the horizons and diversified the options, placing the European countries among the richest countries in the world. At the same time, new forms of poverty and inequity emerge. New problems stem and they affectthe Europeans' health, just to name the increase on the obesity incidence and of other factors with negative impact on the mental health.

The main forces that boost the development of the European societies are the globalisation and the demographics. They both offer opportunities, but also bring up many issues. The demographical tendencies display a longer and healhier life and also bring into discussion topics such as the new expenses for the society that gets older, the equity between generations, the greater importance paid for the upbringing of children and the balance between the carrier and personal life and also the relation between the generations and the new threat of poverty. Together with the new technologies, the globalisation provides a huge potential for development. However, the individuals need to take advantages from these opportunities and to adjust to the situation of no longer existing the traditional industrialised jobs.

The transformations that happen represent real challenges for the European Union, the New open Europe, grounded on the free movement and free trade has led to the creation of jobs and the propagation of prosperity that, finally, depend on the well-being and on the better quality of life. In the past few years a fact has become more and more obvious, namely that many Europeans aske themselves whether the real impact of globalisation, the liberalisation and the quest for a greater competitivity bring anything new to their own well-being.[1]

II.CULTURAL AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

Globalization once started, can no longer be stopped. In these conditions more and more European peoples redefine their cultural and national identity.

By referring to cultural identity, it can be said that we are dealing with a design substantiality, monolithic and static conception, respectively, one of interaction, pluralist and dynamic type. The first trend defines identity as a permanent and unique entity. This starts from fixed, privileged identity supports such as: the language, religion, and the name, cultural traditions, etc.

The current cultural system has an extremely simple task which involves the acquisition of the well-defined values, in fact, of the culture he was born in. In this situation, it is of a paramont importance the history of the group/community the individual belongs to.

The definition of the cultural identity of a member of the group is a process that is done in relationship with the historical source that connects all the members of the group and that is assigned, often, features close to sacrality/holyness. The relationship society-culture is one of identification, of complete overlap.

The current society is characterized by cultural diversity. Social interactions between groups who bear different cultures have led to renegotiation of the meaning of identity. Thus, the passing /change has been made from a conception based on learning and proximity to an inheritance, to a kind of conception of identity type that is built by interaction with the others. This new dimension of identity does not deny the first, but is complementary to it. The perspectives on identity are closely related to the powers conferred to the concept of culture. In the light of an elitist culture, we can conceive culture as appealing to items such as science and art. Thus, we are talking about a cultivated/educated man as a person who has a certain

number of well defined qualities: knowledge/know-how and a particular way of being and behaving.

What defines culture are the artistic and scientific works which correspond to some standards considered to be absolute. These creations are the content of the cultural heritage, which deserves to be transmitted from generation to generation. It must also be taken as a landmark for all members of society and developed by its intellectual elite. From an essentialist perspective, the culture of a community is seen as a result of a set of features and fundamental values have been preserved in the course of the history and are considered as a legacy of that community.

Considered as a fixed list, these features are known to community members, but also by members of other communities with which there are direct contacts. This applies to both traits of personality of the members of community, but also to valuable creations/works of the past, to certain folk creations, to traditions and symbols, to general elements, such as language or religious practices.

Appeared on the stage of social sciences in the second half of the XXth century, the concept of ethnic identity has two dimensions. The first starts from external, fixed element, related to language, religion, territory, institutions, history, traditions, and the second emphasizes the subjective dimension, with special stress on the consciousness of belonging to a certain ethnic group, as a defining element of ethnic identity.

Terms such as national, national belonging, in the literature of the field, are often used as being synonym of the citizenship of a country. This is particularly due to the fact that in most western countries, the national identity was built centred on the idea of a citizen's identity, and the territory of the state has consequently become the fundamental term of reference for the national territory. The old identities are considered to have been exceeded, the ones defined by religion, and a higher level has been reached. However, it is difficult to them to agree on the substance of good life to which we all aspire.

The national identity can be defined as a modern community form of symbolic cultural identity shared by a group of people living in a specific territory. In accordance with contemporary authors opinions, the expresssion *national identity* shows the most appropriate way the connection between identity, community, and modernity. The national identity can have distinctive forms of expression, such as language, culture, religion, the common origin of consciousness/awareness, collective memory of the past.

As a form of collective identity, the nationality also involves a subjective dimension which refers to the identification of individuals with a specific set of national values. If this concept of *national origin* refers to something given, which was inherited by birth, the national identity is the expression of consciousness of belonging to a cultural community which is defined as a political community. A nation is a form of social organization which has its own life and not just a form of classification of individuals. The importance of concepts of territory and population for the national identities are derived especially from the fundamental change which interfered once with the entry into modernity, in the manner of thinking and reporting population to the territory.

At the same time, it is to be taken into account the contradictory nature of the effects that the national homogeneity might have on the status of the individual in society. A society more homogeneous is not a necessity, but one in which human rights are observed in the highest degree.

The communities of reference for individuals were, until recently, limited and clear, for example the family, city, region, country, group of friends, co-workers, religious groups. The modes of participation were determined by the rules or habits of those communities they belonged to, such as: age, profession and socio-economic situation of individuals. The possibilities of individuals to participate were limited, but at the same time clearly structured.

At present, phenomena such as globalisation and European integration urges us to think of larger communities of reference for the future. More and more traditional communities are becoming less stable as a consequence of these changes, such as large migration inside and between countries.

The biological development of man is not independent, but in close relationship with his psychic development, but at the same time in accordance with social environment in which his activity is carried out, based on, undoubtedly, the cultural inheritance. The way of showing off behaviours, the form of response to the requests of the environment is, however, socially determined, dependent on the model designed and imposed by the human collectivity cultural in which the individual lives.

The social collectivity decides which behaviours are desirable or permitted and which are undesirable and not permitted. This pressure of the collectivity regarding the individual way of behaving responds to a better or worse defined social rationalty/reasonableness and is imposed through systems of values and moral, legal, religious, economic, military norms, etc.

It is a concern that a significant number of countries generally considered to be the stable are faced with situations and statuses of instability generated by internal, religious, ethnic conflicts or of a social and economic precarious type and with an ever-increasing number of separatist movements that are trying to break up larger countries into ethnic or religious smaller areas. Some of these conflicts are old and are based on disputes that come from far away, from history, others are recent, as a result of the demographic-ethnic or religious changes, why not, of the policy of decay/integration or globalization. Integrated or global societies vitally contain a variety of cultures or subcultures, based on various ethnic, religious, cultural and ideological components, as a result being the probability of the appearance of some disagreements based on these reasons.

Culture is a kind of second human nature, a secondary nature, arises out of the richness of the prevailing/primordial nature, without however speaking about a radical break between the two realities. They permanently combine in the human being. For man, culture is the specific way of existence. It represents a true system of values. They have been looking for all sorts of definitions and explanations that should establish the sphere in which culture moves as reality or concept.

The material component of culture, which is usually expressed by the term civilization, includes the means and values which ensure the material reproduction of the social life, that is the social existence processes. The spiritual component of

culture includes the systems of values in which are focussed the efforts of knowledge, the attitudes and reactions of the human being in contact with the surrounding environment.

Culture manifests and self defines itself and as a unity in diversity, as a claimed difference and as universality through difference. It aspires to represent in each of its form the humanity, expressing, in fact, as many ways of notoriety. Relativity is more concerned abbot its particular configurations and not just its generating principles.

Muchthesame as races, ethnic groups, communities or individuals are different entities, representing at the same time humanity, in the same way the cultures are distinguished or oppose through langue and language, through the way in which it embodies and represents cultural meanings and values which, in fact, can get them together. Being an expression of the human experience, culture is involved in all the concrete forms of social existence, in all the mechanisms and essential manifestations that define society.

As a result, the rapport between culture and the structures of society is a requirement for understanding its valuable contents and for explanation of its functional mechanisms that assures its historical development. In its evolution, a human community can not exist without culture because culture is the link between society and the surrounding world, ensuring the fulfillment of the human needs and aspirations.

Human diversity has its basis in the endless circuit of the social interactions, with their subjective and objective, differentiated and solidary registers. Different cultures are currently put face-to-face, in a mutual dependency, engaged in a common context which expands to the planetary scale. These entities should be harmonized to contemporaneity, in the ideal space of a co-existence in which the universal and specific do not oppose to each other, but they blend together in the favor of authentic creation.

III. THE EUROPEAN DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION

Once commenced, the globalisation cannot be stopped. More and more peoples reinstate their cultural and national identity.

The individual is the main player of existence, as he is the first reason of the economical, social, environmental and security analysis. By his own existence, through his actions, he determines and influences the pace of things. Any unbalance may implicitedly lead to the weakening of the the security status, no matter the level we refer to. From a cultural point of view, the economical globalisation won't lead to the uniformisation of the societies, but to their inner diversification and the ungrading of the interest towards the ethnical and national identity. *We are living in a transition time and we are heading towards another type of civilisation, still, the tendency is to embrace the pluralism and descentralisation, such as cultural diversity.*[2]

Very much alike a type of Neocolonialism, the new world order, embraced by a few powers, threatens the mutual understandings between the nations, the communication and dialogue between the cultures. The idea of European culture

implies alos the solving of the religious, social, economical and political conflicts. The real life in itself ceases periodically the attempt coming from the European authorities to diminish borders of any kind.

It may as well be a success on a political level, but what is actually important is the reaction of his own people, and, where applicable, maybe the outburst of some street riots.

The intent to impose contemporary reactions instead of some customs and activities, what may actually happen for centuries, is a real attempt, liable to be screened scientifically. It is notable to mention the fact that, all the modern societies are facing the transition process. Some of them are absorbed by the experiment of regional integraton, others have developed modernisation projects. But most of the countries are in a stand-by position. Anyway, nothing outcomes the marginalisation threat in the globalisation process and also the strong will to enter the civilisation and take a good benefit from it.

The regional demographical differences facilitate the appearance of conflicts between the developed countries and the rest, between the industrialised societies that provide for a speedy technological advancement, but with a weak demographical increase and the non-industrialised societies, dependant from a technological point of view, but with a great populational load.

The economical difference is also a political contrast, occuring between the industrialised democracies and the non-democratic countries. In order to understand the essence of the demographical transition, as well as the phenomenon of migration, their content and future evolution it is necessary to historically analyze the objective and subjective determinations, but also from the security point of view.

The urbanisation's consequences have proved to be negative by unrooting the countryside population, by the political and administrative insolvence of most of the countries that could not accordingly manage the necessary resources. All these have led to the transformation of many cities into real poverty centres of social ruins, thus creating real insatisfactions, nuclei of possible riots and social conflicts.

The Hague Programme, adopted within the EU in 2004 was aimed to consolidate the freedom, security and justice. It was stressed that there is a need to better coordinate the integration of national policies and of the social activities based on common fundamental principles. There have been adopted basic principles with regard to the integration policy, and in September 2005 a Common Action Plan over the integration has been adopted, which offers the framework for the integration of third country nationals into the EU.

The starting point for the information exchange and the good practices is the manuals concerning the integration for the decission-making factors and the specialists. These are used under cooperation with the national contact points together with the regional authorities and the targeted non-profit organisations. The first edition (2004) debated over the introduction of the newly arrived immigrants and the recognised refugees, the civic attendance and the indicators. The second edition (2007) concentrated around the essential issues, debated over the fundamental common principles:

- the inclusion and integration infrastructure, the analysis of the used mechanisms for the successful implementation of the integration strategies in all political domains;

- the receiving within an urban environment and the economic integration, releasing the learned lessons in these areas.

A third edition was planned for the year of 2009. The aim of this analysis of the European social realities is to create a consensus over the common issues that the Europeans are dealing with. The role that the European policies should have in offering a proper response to the transformation of the social realities, or the way they should be adapted, still remained an open issue.

As shown by the official data [3], in January 2006 the number of the third country nationals with residence in the EU was aproximately 18, 5 millions, namely 3% out of the total population of almost 493 millions [4].

The immigration still represents the main factor of the demographic increase in the EU. The entry pattern is, still very much different for member states. Countries such as Austria, France, Sweden have received applications for family reassembling and others such as Ireland, Spain, Portugal and UK record many applications for working permits. While Spain recorded many regularizations, France, Germany and The Netherlands performed limited regularizations for certain groups of immigrants. The most numerous groups of third country nationals came from Turkey (2,3 millions), Marocco (1,7 millions), Albania (0,8 millions) Siria (0,6 millions). Thus, many have received the citizenship in the hosting countries.

The integration of this immigrats is a two sided process as the hosting societies need to adjust with the new wave of influences, but the immigrats, too, and is a key factor for understanding the benefits of the immigration.

A new agreement will be based, of course on the experience of the past. If the Rome[5] Treaty stipulated a visionary engagement over the equity between the sexes and the 13th article in the Treaty of Amsterdam attibuted to the EU a legislative competence to fight against any kind of discrimnation, a new agreement will be focused on the past experience.

The creation of the Unions's social agenda in 1980 was aimed to socially counterbalance the Single Market and was focused on the labour protection and the social partnership.

This has been established by the implementation of some regulations over the minimum standards for the working force, health and protection, as well as in securing the transborder rights of social security for mobile workers.

Also, the EU has played an important role in the fostering of the social cohesion for the solving of regional disparities and for offering assistance for adapting to the economic change. To this aspect, we should add the action of the cohesion policy and recent initiatives such as the European Fund for adaptation to globalisation.

There is a great diversity within and between the countries of EU. There are also common problems as demographics, ethnic diversity and the singularisation of values. The EU countries are open societies, influenced by the modern capitalism and the global cultural tendencies.

Some citizens have adapted the global, modern lifestyle, others feel threatened in their traditional communities and values. These have been the analysis starting points for debating and diagnosis and will allow for a mid-term assessment of the social policies agenda.

A 2006 Eurobaromete survey showed that, generally, the European citizens are happy. 86% are relatively content with their personal life and the daily environment, 83% with their life standard, 78% with the travel facilities, 77% with the medical assistance and 71% with the schools from het neighbourhood. 51% think that their social service system have a broad coverance.

Anyway, less than a third trust their state institutions. The main problem they are most concerned with is the unemplyment (36%).

The future demographic Forum debated upon the problem of Europe's population aging. The estimations show that, until 2050 the average of the octogenrian Europeans will triple and those with ages between 65 and 79 will be a quarter of all the EU population.

An example in this respect is the German network for supporting the silver economy [6]. This project aims to improve the life conditions for the elders, to expand the services for the seniors and the mobilisation of the life standards of this segment.

The time laboratory in Italy targets to promote a balance between the career and the personal life. The Sweedish Initiative promotes the healthy life. Meanwhile, the experts analysed the role that the authorities may play in the demographical changes management.

Each state social policy should be permanently posted in the limelight. This policy should obey the diversity of traditions, evolutions, focal points and methods.

The state social system is the outcome of of many poliitical struggles and development. O society is defined in its country's wellbeing, a fact that influences the life and daily culture of its citizens. Each country's priority should be different, given the competivity policies. Only those problems that can not be dealt with at the national level, should be taken out in the European debate and dialogue (subsidiarity). Still, the numberof issues that need an European approach is on the increase.

CONCLUSIONS

The developed countries deal with the fact that their societies are aging. Health, social security and the topic of old persons and the working conditions are social aspects that call for the reshaping of the existent prosperous systems.

In this domain there is an European exchange of experience and information.

The modern information and communication technologies have radically changed the modern societies and transformed them into information based societies.

Another issue emerges as we don't anticipate over the picture of how these societies will look like in the future.What social issues should they raise and what

will be their response in the transformation process, a fact that affects the society in its integrality?

The social challenge that, by far, outcomes the social and political influence sphere of any country, no matter its richness and stability is the global division of labour. The financial globalisation and the use of new technologies will contribute to the new wave of change in thelabour field in the entire Europe.the dynamics of active societies does not justify a common social policy but it makes it absolutely necessary.

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INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS OF EUROPEAN UNION AFFECTING ITS PRESENT AND FUTURE RELATIONS WITH THE BLACK SEA REGIONS

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Abstract
Considering the last 20 years of history in the Black Sea Region and the impact of the actions of the regional and global actors, there is still a large amount of uncertainty regarding its importance on the future strategic map for Europe and for all the Black Sea costal states. The future route and even physical existence of the oil and gas pipelines supplying European Union are still unclear, the relation of Turkey with European Union is still unclear, Russian tanks tracks are still visible on Georgia's soil and there are a plenty of other reasons to see unclear waves on a sea having a fated name: Black sea.
Keywords: European Energy Security, Non-Traditional Security Threats, South Stream Project, National Energy Security

I. EURO-ATLANTIC FACTORS

There were two very important moments in the European Union (EU) existence 2004, May and 2007, January, when twelve European states were admitted into the Union as members. Beside the fact it was a large admission in such a short period of time, another interesting fact put the events into the spot of the global and regional analysts. There were the European states completing the face of EU more closely to the geographical surface of the continent, connecting its ambitions and expectations with the potential and sources of threats posed by its new neighbour, Black Sea. As wanted by the Euro-Atlantic community, the event was doubled by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) largest enlargement, when almost the same countries were admitted in the Alliance. There were two countries, Bulgaria and Romania among the new members having borderlands with Black Sea, and so the story goes.

It seems there were juts facts having impact as result of an economical momentum. Geostrategic spirit of these manoeuvres springs from historic roots, as well as from economical interests.

1.1. European Energy Security vs National Energy Security

As stated in the European Security Strategy - 2003, one of the most important challenges on EU agenda was its own energy security[1], especially its energy dependence on a recalibrated and more and more self-confident Russia, ten years after the end of Cold War. The alternative energy resources gained relevance and importance comparing with the Russian offer. A multiple offer was to put EU in

the position to negotiate and to base its economy on multiple options. The perspective for selective prices increased.

Russian resources was primarily option, once the necessary transport infrastructure was in place or easy to build up. In the same time, the dependence on only one source and the visible intentions of Russians to rise prices urged EU to consider alternatives. Such alternatives were Caspian region and Central Asia, eventually Central Africa, for long terms plans. But both Caspian region and Central Asia options require ensured control over Central and Eastern Europe, before Russia regain its capacity and former area of influence. That was one of the reasons to push both EU and NATO to the largest waves of admission in their entire existence, in spite of obvious unpreparedness of the candidate states. In that way the Black Sea Region, gained more and more importance.

Soon, supported by the economic boom of 2002-2007 period, an important number of gas pipeline projects appeared, being accompanied by tough and long, sometimes too long, and negotiations in place. As the Caspian Region seemed to be the most attractive option as an alternative to Russian gas, European efforts concentrated into this line. Significant steps were made once with the Nabucco Pipeline Project, as it was supposed to cross Caspian Sea and countries, Turkey and there from to extend to all Europe, via Bulgaria and Romania. Unfortunately, there were two reasons to stop this project become true until now. First reason is internal, and is related to the very long negotiation process caused by indecision of EU members in accordance with their national interests. Second reason is external, due to the Russian reaction.

A smart, quick and efficient countermove of Russia was to build a set of two pipelines, designated to dismantle the efforts of a coherent and energetically less dependent EU: South and North Stream. Each of the pipelines was created with a specific purpose and a specific target. The North Stream hit the core of the Union, providing direct and preferentially priced gas to Germany and France. In 2009, when the EU members were barely signing the Nabucco Pipeline Project Accord, the work for North Stream was far advanced. It is not a purely coincidence the fact that the former Chancellor of Deutschland, and global manager of Rothschild Bank is currently the Chairman of the board of North Stream AG. As per 8th of November 2011, in spite of Swedish and Finnish complains, the first of two pipes, which directly connects Russia with Germany was fully operational, disconnecting, by this, the deep involvement of Germany and France for other EU interests.

In 2007, Russia hit again, when launched South Stream Project. With large support of Italy, who was not happy with its benefits on Nabucco Project, Russia negotiated and signed the Accord for South Stream, managing to avoid members of EU as Romania or members of NATO as Turkey. The South Pipe would offer to Central and Southern European countries gas for a chipper participation in construction phase, in comparison with Nabucco, considering that Russia will pay the most of the price. In the same time, even the gas price may be chipper, too, the price paid for missed chance to reduce the dependence level on Russia resources will be much higher, on medium and long term.

1.2. Hard to Cope with Combined Non-Traditional Security Threats

EU defines in its own Security Strategy non-traditional security threats as the trafficking of humans and drugs, other forms of organized crime, weak and failing states and terrorism as its main concerns in security terms. The EU's enlargement to the shores of the Black Sea made the entire region of the Black Sea a source of concern for Europe. By a glance, it can be seen that the entire Black Sea Region is a mixture of high standards and poor conditions of life and a transit zone between these security threats and Europe. And all of these, under the same sky imply challenges and opportunities.

The process of expanding the Euro-Atlantic values and prosperity once with the EU interests fosters en climate of cooperation and dialog. The Wider Black Sea region rose in this spirit. The EU is dealing with the countries of this area bilaterally. In the meantime, all the security issues named before do not make the difference between states and status, often being transnational in nature. That is why EU has to develop a regional concept to deal with these threats, concept designated for all relevant countries, putting aside their standards or their readiness to join in EU or NATO. It is one reason for the European Neighbourhood Policy to not be sufficient for dealing with security issues or moving toward the regional approach in accordance with the EU member's interests. Such concept of Wider Black Sea Region requires a broad but objective and comprehensive approach over the interrelated security issues, so they are correct understood and answered.

In spite of a multidimensional approach, most of the regional political and economic institutions, as the Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SPSEE), the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) and their "children" the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), the Black Sea Forum for Partnership and Dialogue (BSF-PD) and the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB) were initiatives, most of them unsuccessful, due to their limited international support, divergent interests in the area or inefficiency and experience. Following an idea and practical efforts of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, which has played an important role in gathering officials and scholars from the countries of the region as well as from Europe and America to a series of seminars on the Wider Black Sea region,[2] BSEC seemed to be the only solid and effective regional institution, under the initiative of Turkey. The others failed; some of them after their first meeting (see BSF-PD).

The list of security concerns of the Black Sea Region is completed by the frozen conflicts of Moldova and the Caucasus. They are sensitive, enhanced and kept on state of latent crisis by their initiator and ready to be inflamed at the proper moment, when required or uncontrolled. However, "they are to be addressed in a cohesive and coherent manner instead of through unrelated, bilateral ad hoc solutions."[3]

1.3. NATO – Duplicate Effort and Sometimes Different Agenda

One could say that NATO's influence on the topic is distinct than the EU approach once we are speaking about different entities. Actually, there is almost the same state of issues, except of USA position which may be different than the

European states. Most of the times, the opinion is generally shared and accepted among all the North-Atlantic members. But, there are moments when the ideas or interests are different, so the positions of the Europeans and Americans. In these moments, it is visible the USA's approach, touching with bilateral initiatives states in the Black Sea Region in order to impose their will. Plenty of examples are showing the model of the "very good friend and ally of US in Central and eastern Europe", ready to jump out from the European boat or regional initiative in order to support the American interest.

Immediately after 11 of September 2001 events, NATO faced a new historical step ahead: operations out of its area of responsibility as stated in the Washington Treaty. In very short time, operations were run far away from NATO territory and strategic air lift capabilities were strongly challenged by rhythm and intensity of these operations.

There were three aspects which combined gave the clear image over the Black Sea Region and NATO's interest here. Firstly, step by step, after the end of Cold War, the limit of Russian influence was pushed towards east. The collapse of the Soviet Union led Russia into a much smaller territory with a very weak economy and uncontrolled vital resources. In the same its former allies in the Warsaw Pact declared their desire to join NATO via Partnership for Peace. In ten years the new security architecture over Central and Eastern Europe was crystallised, and limit of influence was set in the area of Black Sea, as known.

Once with the terrorist attacks over World Trade Centre buildings in New York, the interest of USA, and USA means NATO to have a lift base to Iraq and Afghanistan as closer as possible to the area, brought the Black Sea Region into the middle of international attention, pointing out its strategic importance. As USA faced the refusal of Turkey, the relocation of such air base in Romania proved the strategic importance of having a desirable level of control over the Black Sea.

But the strategic airlift and specific requirements of the theatres of operations demanded a better access over Central Asia and South Caucasus increased, too. Actually, once with the entire security architecture of Europe dramatically changed, its political geography did so. Expanding of NATO's Cooperation and Partnership programs brought plenty of western investments, US more precisely, in the Black Sea Region, including periodically training of forces and exercises which initiated a basis for further cooperation and collaboration, leading to the new concept of Wider Black Sea Region.

In 2008, once with the first signs of the financial and economic crisis, supplemented by the Russian invasion in Georgia, the entire enthusiasm disappeared and, step by step, most of programs disappeared, too. Now, when NATO itself faces a strong cutting-off Reform process, chances for better financial support decreased dramatically. Considering the efforts in Iraq almost completed and deadlines in Afghanistan getting closer, the interest of the Alliance for the area of Black Sea will be limited for strictly limited purposes.

II. EXTERNAL FACTORS

2.1. Turkey – to Be or not to Be a EU Member

As Turkey is still looking for its membership card, things might keep the Black Sea Region hot and spicy. There plenty of sceptic opinions on that issue, once there is not very strong will for admitting such authoritarian and no completely democratic country. On the other hand, there are strong reasons to see Turkey admission not just a matter of EU desire but also as a Turkey will and capacity to impose it to EU. It is a matter of strong negotiations as both EU and Turkey have strong instruments and golden cards to play on the table. "While these are scheduled to last many years and have generated much scepticism in Europe, the decision was widely understood as a strategic and inclusive move in the definition of the EU's future."[4] Similarly, Turkey is full of surprises, engaging in several ways to the regional and inter regional scene, posing specific reasons for EU consideration. First of all, in spite of the financial and economic crisis shattering the Euro-Atlantic community, Turkey kept its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth on good rates, 9% on 2010 and 8,46% on 2011 [5]. In the same time, the inflation, the volumes of imports and exports has a good score, and the unemployment rate and current account balance looks acceptable. Supported by continuous positive rate of GDP growth in the immediate future, 2,29% this year, 3.16% on 2013, and approx. 4% for next 4 years [6], the picture should be expressive enough to show the economical Turkey's influence.

There are two bilateral relations of Turkey having strong impact on its relations with EU, Turkey-Israel and Turkey-Iran. First, there are some interesting aspects of relations between Turkey and Israel. At a first look it seems there are strong tensions after Mavi Marmara incidents and the following results of UN investigation. At political level the Turkish ambassador from Israel was called back, and the Israeli ambassador was demand an explanation, as the incident could lead to irreparable consequences in bilateral relations. The last two years showed that picture at a glance. Accordingly, the military very good cooperation and training programs cancelled. But, there is an aspect showing a particular form of relation that stood firm and efficient, the economic trade. More precisely, the first Muslim majority country which signed an agreement with Israel, Turkey, imported $1.5 billion in goods and services from Israel and exported $1.8 billion in goods and services to Israel in 2010, being Israel's ninth largest export market. In 2011, the first quarter, it raised to third position, with $0.5 billion, more than China, while Germany, Italy, England and France are behind [7]. The tendency is to improve and increase the economic relations, so where is the crisis between Turkey and Israel?

Second, Turkey and Iran are running a similar show. There is a strong debate and accusations from Iran in relation with Turkey hosting a part of the NATO missile shield. In the same time, Turkish prime-minister supported Iran, saying there is no nuclear weapon in Iran now but Israel, which is also located in our region, possesses nuclear arms. Turkey is the same distance from both of them. What has the international community said against Israel so far? Is this the superiority of law or the law of superiors? [8] The two-way trade was about of $10 billion in 2010, and the short term prognosis is for $20 billion. It is in the intention

of Turkey that 50% of the gas from Iran's South Pars gas field to be re-exported to Europe. In the same time, there are over 1 million of Iranian tourists visiting Turkey every year. These are figures showing close economic and trade relations. Why are these connections important for EU? Israel it is a strategic partner for United States of America (USA) and Iran, in spite of being a marked security threat is still a good alternative source of gas for next 50 years. There will be a permanent pivotal balance between Russia, Caspian and Iranian gas, in terms of negotiations for EU. And that is a card the EU can play against Turkey. It is to remember that either Nabucco or Blue Stream, both are crossing Turkey and that will be exploited accordingly.

In the new conditions posed by the Arab Spring, there are no very clear and good signals for EU. In the most of the North-African countries the situation is still unclear and the perspective is marked by uncertainty. Both of strategic interests of EU in relation with Africa are and will be affected: the straight access to the natural resources in the middle Africa will be much more difficult and the immigration waves from Mediterranean Sea will increase. A short look in the Ottoman Empire History will show us that there are significant hundreds of years when Turkish ruled over the North-African territories, bringing in these areas not only military occupation but also, political and cultural effects on medium and long term. And these effects maybe the key EU needs to open a very important door for its future, as long as Turkey could be the link for a good relation there.

It is to remember that Turkey is not a facile dialog and negotiation partner. It plays its cards up to the last turn and proved it not only once. For instance, even in relation with USA, its strategic partner, Turkey proved intransigence and firmness when needed. In 2003, few months before launching offensive, Turkish Parliament didn't vote for allowing US troops to attack Iraq from Turkey. Nobody expected such reaction, USA pushed in vain, Turkey didn't assign then. Similar tensions are in relation with the very sensitive issue of recognition of Armenian Genocide.

Even it seems to be a disadvantage for Turkey, the EU member status of Greece, one of its traditional adversaries, turns into his favour now days. It is enough to remember the fragile economic position of Greece and the impact this fragility has over the entire Euro Zone. Even a direct conflict with Greece is almost impossible; Turkey will press over Cyprus, considering the new discovered gas resources in Mediterranean Sea, in order to gain advantage over Greece.

There is another form Turkey looks very present and active in relation with EU, the continuous immigration to EU countries, especially to Germany. Following an ascendant trend starting with 1960s, the official number of Turkish people living in Germany is almost 4 million, representing bit less than 5% of the entire population [9]. It is important to remark that the rate of birth is higher comparing with German population, so the tendency is to increase. At a lower scale but with the same tendency the phenomenon happens in many other EU western countries. One day, will be a tough reason on the table of negotiation.

In the same time, the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits gives Turkey advantages in relation with EU. In the same time, puts Turkey in advantage with all the other states in the Black Sea Region, due to its right to

close the Bosphorus and Dardanele Straits for any of its enemy, even during the peace. The provision of the Convention keeping plenty of naval arsenal out of the Black Sea is very welcomed for the entire region, including for the Wider Black Sea Region.

2.2. Georgia and Ukraine: who really wants them?

Another factor connecting EU with the Black Sea Region is Georgia and Ukraine. For a while, there were voices in the entire western community saying they are ready to join Euro-Atlantic structures. These developments have all implied a south-eastern shift in Europe's political and geo-strategic centre of gravity. "For better or for worse they have made the collective and individual security of the EU member states increasingly dependent on an array of issues that hover around what has come to be known as the Wider Black Sea region." [10] But looking in the past, there were enough an economic crisis over the Euro-Atlantic community, a tough position of Russia to cut off gas supply in 2008, and a short but efficient invasion of Russian troops in Georgia to end a such a beautiful dream of EU and NATO. Since 2008, only few and light words about the European future of Ukraine and Georgia were said. In spite of being condemned by the entire western community, no significant facts came to limit the Russia actions or further effects.

CONCLUSIONS

As a conclusion of my paper, the factors which affects now and future relations of EU' with Black Sea Region requires a specific combination of themselves at a proper time, and with some little external help, in order to produce significant effects. It seems that the required specific combination of internal and external factors matched, as long as the internal choice of some EU Members was to join other projects then EU's promoted, in accordance with their own national interests, and lack of experience and power of the others put them in the impossibility to efficiently react. Supplemented by overlapping among institutions belonging to the same community and Russian interest governed actions, EU refuses to accept Turkey as a member, due to doctrinal reasons, looses momentum of gaining Georgia and Ukraine, and by doing so, when Russia is becoming more and more stronger, during a financial and economic crisis, it faces the perfect time, to lose one supportive instrument at disposal: Black Sea Region.

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THE BLACK SEA REGION
AND THE EU EASTERN PARTNERSHIP

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I. WIDER BLACK SEA REGION

Despite the critical events in the Southern Mediterranean neighborhood our attention should not be diverted from the Black Sea region. This region has been subject to the very problem of belonging. In the past, the region was either perceived as the Ottoman-Turkish lake, was dominated by Tsarist Russia or mostly under communist rule during the Cold War Years [1]. At least three primary reasons for such an approach:

1. Black Sea region could become the necessary regional landmark for proving to the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East neighborhood the merits of a democratic and sustainable development;

2. Economic and security trends in the enlarged Black Sea region could reach a positive maturity on a short term, if a new sense of regional responsibility will emerge.

3. The European Union and the Euro/Atlantic community can not afford an unfinished investment. On the contrary, reaching successful stabilization and sustainable development in this complicated, multicultural region will prove that the European and Euro-Atlantic investment is genuine and deliverable.

Wider EU policies such as the **European Neighbourhood Policy, the Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership** prove the effectiveness of EU Support[2]. This geographic area is 'crammed' with more than 20 regional structures, initiatives and programs. A renewed synergy among these initiatives is an urgent priority. Streamlining the initiatives and projects dedicated to the Enlarged Black Sea region will increase the ability to access funding instruments such as: the Structural Funds, the Research and Development Framework Programs, or the Joint Operational Program for Cross-Border Cooperation in the Black Sea Basin (under ENPI)[3]. We were pleased by the remarkable Resolution of the European Parliament on an EU Strategy for the Black Sea area. Romania considers the Strategy will determine EU institutions to adopt a proactive approach to the Black Sea, which actually serves Romania's interest in a more energetic European involvement in the region. With Romania having taken over the BSEC Chairmanship-in-Office and considering the relations this country means to build between the organization the EU, the MFA believes such a Strategy for the Black Sea supports the relevant efforts[4]

1.1.Security

Romania considers the wider Black Sea region as a comprehensive political project. The strategic importance of the wider Black Sea area was reiterated in the NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration. Through the Lisbon Declaration, the allied heads of state and government underline the relevance of security and stability in the Black Sea region for Euro-Atlantic security and encourage the efforts towards consolidating regional cooperation and the readiness to support these efforts, "based on regional priorities and dialogue among the Black Sea states and with the Alliance"[5]. The security and stability in the Black Sea region continue to be a priority for Romania and it is of great significance to be mentioned among the provisions of Summit Declaration in Chicago.

In a Euro-Atlantic context, the Black Sea raises concerns over regional stability. Romania has constantly promoted the peaceful resolution of protracted conflicts, on the basis of international law and taking into consideration the UN and OSCE principles. Time has come for resetting the regional dynamics to a more evolved paradigm of security – including technological advances, energy security, a knowledge-based economy – instead of keeping the Black Sea captive in the logic of spheres of influence or the zero-sum games.

1.2.Economy

Despite the economic crisis, the Black Sea region presents a number of competitive advantages. It is close to the abundant EU markets, has favorable business environments and a high quality of human capital. Widely divergent economies in the region make the prospects for economic integration a difficult case. Poverty affects today almost 19% of the SEE population – and the proportion is probably higher for the Eastern Neighbourhood [6]. The total intra-BSEC trade among the total Trade of the BSEC countries accounts for only 18.3%[7]. The TRACECA and INOGATE programs are the most valuable instruments to date for modernizing infrastructure in the region.

Three priorities could be foreseen:

1) the completion of priority axes towards the Black Sea region, considering also the maritime highways and the Black Sea ring;

2) extending the EU Strategy for the Danube Region towards the Black Sea for increasing the access to the European markets

3) upgrading energy infrastructures for ensuring sustainable interconnections.

EU member states must use in a more creative manner the "smart partnership" skills when approaching the Black Sea.

II. ENERGY SECURITY IN THE REGION

The current events in the Middle East and North Africa have a direct impact on European energy security[8]. Anchoring the Black Sea region to the European ambitions of diversifying energy resources in connection with the Caspian region and Middle East, advancing technological solutions like LNG and multiplying interconnections is **a first source of smart partnership.**

EU goal of having **safe, secure and sustainable energy supplies** at affordable prices is resonant to the **legitimate economic interests of the supplier and transit countries** in the larger Black Sea areal. We highlight in particular Romania's policy with regard to **energy diversification**. Based on the position in the Black Sea basin, Romania's natural choice is to consistently promote the development of the **Southern Corridor** linking the Caspian and Middle East resources to the European market**.** Projects such as **Nabucco, AGRI, the Pan European Oil Pipeline (PEOP)[9]**, the direct transportation of energy resources across the Black Sea, but also the extension of interconnections with neighbouring countries will increase not only Romania's energy security, but the energy security of the whole region.

We look forward to finding the best ways to fructify the existing openness of the **Caspian countries** towards Southern corridor as it was acknowledged on the occasions of the Budapest and Prague energy summits. The successful implementation of the diversification supply strategy depends on our intensified dialogue with Caucasus and Central Asian countries, especially Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan. We also hope that **Egypt and the Iraqi authorities** will become interested to supply with gas the future pipelines towards Europe, pending the appropriate foreign investments. We should also continue to engage with Russia on mutually beneficial projects, the more so since **Europe's dependency on Russia is and will continue to be reciprocal**. Although Russia might be tempted to look for new energy markets in the **Far East**, its main reliable partners will continue to be in the West.

The European and Transatlantic dialogue on energy cooperation in he Black Sea, Caucasus and Middle East needs to consider **Turkey as a key partner[10]**. Romania is a staunch supporter of **expanding the European and Euro-Atlantic agenda with Turkey on energy security**. By helping **Republic of Moldova** to connect its electricity system to the European market will be one of the most valuable supports for a democratic and sustainable development and for its social stability.

A second source of smart partnership is the ability to reach to the social realities in the Black Sea Region. Increasing energy efficiency for *"sustainable energy communities" and alleviating energy poverty* in the Black Sea region could have a tangible social impact and create innovative business. We are talking about a huge space of Eastern and South Eastern Europe, with a market of 355 million energy service consumers. <u>A Bottom – Up Strategy</u> should strengthen managerial capacity in the energy sector at local levels and open access to smart technologies for energy savings. <u>A Top – Down Strategy</u> should aid the Black Sea countries to access tailored European energy efficiency programs promoted by the Central Europe Initiative, the European Clean Energy Fund, or the Assembly of European Regions.

The Renewable Energy Sector (RES) creates immense opportunities as identified by the first edition of the Black Sea Renewable Energy Forum last November in Bucharest **Romania** set a **38% RES target in gross domestic consumption by 2020[11]**.We must work to create in the Black Sea region a

platform for developing Public Private Partnerships in this sector and stable incentives for the RES business.

Visionary approach

We cannot avoid the problem of the technological gap existing today between the Black Sea region and the developed countries in the EU and Euro-Atlantic space. Romania considers it necessary for a **European program** to be launched in support for Energy R&D in the Black Sea region, along two main directions:

1) increasing the capacity to access new technologies and

2) mapping the risks to the maritime environment posed by energy production and transportation.

We have good premises for such a demarche:

- A Black Sea Universities Network is functioning with good results.
- The Black Sea Interconnection project is seeking to establish a regional research and education network.
- The BSEC will soon establish a College of the Black Sea to foster the emergence of regional elite.

CONCLUSIONS

In the Black Sea area, European Union involvement has been wanting, but is still wanted. It could prove its indisputable merits by promoting a new generation of smart investments and tailored partnerships. This is truly a project rooted in the last two decades of expectations building up from what has been a "new deal" meant to bring the countries of the Balkans into the Euro-Atlantic mainstream. It was worthwhile in the Balkans and it will also prove worthy in the larger Black Sea Neighborhood.

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ADMINISTRATIVE INITIATIVES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEW GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES IN THE BLACK SEA REGION AND THE CHALLENGES FROM EU

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Abstract

The geopolitics in the Black Sea region has ever been a challenge both for the politicians and for the historians, each of them trying to explain the events, which were the landmarks of a period of time. Though, the very aspects related to the administrative point of view of the Black Sea geopolitics and the topic regarding the intern measures specific to each country which were taken by their Governments in the context of E.U. pre-accession and post-accession process were little addressed, even if, at this moment, they are marking the whole specter of the bilateral and multilateral relations developed between the countries which are bordering the Black Sea.

Romania's position in this context, even from the time of its E.U. pre-adhering process, was defined by an open diplomatic attitude towards its neighbors, in order to help them and to cooperate with each of them for reaching the common goals. The projects regarding cooperation at the border region, the joint Government sessions or the joint Parliamentary commissions followed by administrative measures taken mutually for the both countries benefit, are only a few examples which allow us to see that the countries from the Black Sea region are trying to accomplish a formal and a "de facto" adherence to the European Union space and values.

Keywords*: the Black Sea geopolitics, administrative initiatives, border cooperation, E.U. accession, European objectives, bilateral relations*

I. BLACK SEA REGION

1.1. Perception, structure

To talk about the Black Sea region and, specifically, about the regional geopolitics of the Black Sea, we first have to refer to a brief history of this region, particularly interesting in terms of the mutual influences and interdependencies of the countries in this area, but also in terms that Black Sea seems to be forgotten by historians, sociologists and politicians, few recent references being found on the subject.

Actually, the well-known professor of political sciences and international relations, Charles King, the tenured of the Romanian studies Department from Georgetown University, refers to this reality in his book the *Black Sea. A history*, saying that: "history and social sciences seem to suffer from seasickness"[1]. Moreover, the author makes clear the fact that the Black Sea has no well sharp form in the imaginary, perfectly true, especially due to the fact that the Black Sea region

has been for quite a long time "a white spot" in the European history, as the costal countries, except Turkey, had been under the communist block influence for a long time, a fact that somehow removed the attention of the Western Europe from this part of Europe.

If we have to refer to the Black Sea region, we may identify and define this geographical area in the narrow sense, highlighting the geography of the region, or, in the extended sense, with accent on geopolitics and the international relations of the countries in the area.

Thus, in the narrow sense, in the Black Sea region we include the littoral states, namely Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine, and in the extended sense we are to define the region including, besides the above mentioned states, countries such Republic of Moldova, the Caucasian countries and even the Danubian[2] countries.

1.2. Short contemporary history. European influences

Currently, the region passes through a long process of geopolitical and strategic reshaping generated by the fall of the former USSR, modern empire that dominated most of this region. The states that were part of it proclaimed their independence and have tried to find out their own way to build their future by their own, both from the economical and from the social point of view. In the same time, *Russia*, that saw its empire falling apart in a very short time, has tried to keep its influence in the area in every way: *political and administrative*, when it tried to maintain the former Soviet states within the Community of the Independent States, *military*, when it tried to impose its force in the region (see the war in Georgia), *economic*, when it generated the gas crisis in Ukraine or when decided to stop wine imports from the Republic of Moldova.

The Republic of Moldova has tried to step to Europe and to the European democratic values, succeeding just this year to choose a president proposed by the pro-European coalition, after almost 3 years when it had no president, the country being practically torn between the sustainers of the communists and the sustainers of the pro-Europeans; we have to mention here that in the Republic of Moldova the president of the country is chosen by the Parliament and not directly by the people.

Georgia was involved in a short military conflict with Russia in 2008, after at the NATO Summit from Bucharest had expressed the interest to adhere to the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance besides Ukraine. Russia opposed to the official invitation of Georgia to adhere to the western military structures and thus, the total result of the Summit was considered at that time by the military annalists as a failure, as the West could not impose its will in front of the Kremlin leader, Vladimir Putin.

Ukraine moved away from the Russian influence with the famous *orange revolution* that brought to power political leaders that were close to the West. Russia has always tried to regain the influence in Ukraine by using its energetic resources, the natural gases Ukraine (but most of Europe) depends upon so much; we have to mention here the gas crisis from 2009 that generated tensions both in Ukraine, and in the rest of the countries that, even situated in the Western Europe,

depended on the same Russian gas that passed through the pipes on Ukraine territory.

The Caucasian countries, after gaining their independence, have tried to come close to the Asian area, to which they feel to be closer both from the geographical and the cultural point of view. The European Union represents a partner for these states that are rich in natural resources, among which Azerbaijan is the closest in terms of geographical distance.

On the other hand, *Romania and Bulgaria*, countries that belonged to the communist block in the Eastern Europe for half a century, have succeeded to adhere to the European Union in 2007, after in 2004 both of them succeeded to be accepted in NATO.

Turkey is somehow, a kind of exception for this region, as it did not belong to the communist block, but, moreover, it has always looked for support in the western part of the Europe. It has to be mentioned that Turkey is a NATO member since 1952 and it constitutes the second force of the Alliance. Turkey played, by its geo-strategic position, an important role during the Cold War.

Currently, Turkey is in the official position of a candidate for adherence to the European Union, being in the preliminary period of opening the negotiation chapters.

Serbia, a Danubian country included by some authors[3] in the extended sense of the Black Sea Region, is in the same situation as an official candidate to EU accession,.

1.3. Romania in the Black Sea Region

Romania has tried, even in the period before acceding to the European Union, to play the role of mediator and regional stabilizer factor, considering its unique geo-strategic position: Romania is a *Danubian country* with *opening to the Black Sea*, *situated at the Eastern extremity of the Union*, having a *historical relation with the Republic of Moldova*, being a *neighbor of Serbia*, neighborhood that has been exploited to help the allied forces during the war from 1999 in the former Yugoslavia and having a *strategic position in the Balkan extended region*.

All this has determined the Romanian political leaders that have succeeded to the leadership of the country to take a series of regional initiatives with the role of catalyzing the process of cooperation and integration of the states from the Black Sea area within the European Structures. These initiatives have gradually decreased in intensity during the period of the negotiations with the European Union, but Romania continued to exercise its influence in the area, both within bilateral relations and as a member of some regional unions of states.

The accession to the European Union of Romania and Bulgaria on the 1st of January 2007 has dramatically changed the regional perspective. Thus, we can speak about a history of the region during the period before the accession and about a history of the region during the post-accession period of these two states. We say this as, after the accession, the Eastern border of the European Union moved to the border between Romania and Moldova, a fact that determined Romania to take some internal administrative measures unprecedented until then: creating the best conditions for having a maximum security at the border with Moldova and Ukraine,

displacing the staff within the Ministry of Administration and Internal Affairs from the Western border on the Eastern border or in other structures of the Public Administration, establishing cooperation programs with Bulgaria with regard to patrolling on the Danube and on the Black Sea.

At the same time, Romania has taken some measures that positively influenced the relations with the Republic of Moldova, namely granting Romanian citizenship after certain criteria to a large number of Moldovan citizens who, by obtaining the Romanian citizenship became citizens of the European Union, having the same rights as the other European citizens. Concurrently, because of Romania entering in the European Union, Moldova has taken the measure of visas elimination for the E.U. member states.

From the administrative point of view, Romania' initiative had a great success, but, at the political level the power from Bucharest has been criticized, internally and externally, because the citizenship granting had taken an electoral offer aspect; moreover, it was seen by Russia as a gesture through which our country started an indirect process of unifying with the Republic of Moldova. The critics of the initiative, especially those from Romania, showed how, in 2009, at the presidential elections, the difference in votes has been done by the Romanian citizens from abroad, among which, the tens of thousands of Moldovan citizens who has been granted the Romanian citizenship during the mandate of the current President. Official figures[4] indicate that annually almost 5000 Moldovan citizens are granted the Romanian citizenship.

Organizing the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008 remains the climax for Romania with regard to its role as a regional leader especially that this reunion of the world's leaders came immediately after the accession of the country to the European Union.

As we shall see in the next chapter, Romania had a series of administrative and cooperation initiatives in the Black Sea Region, both in the pre-accession to the European Union period, and after that, and remained an active and involved partner of all the countries in this area.

II. ADMINISTRATIVE AND DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEW GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES

2.1. Administrative and diplomatic regional and local initiatives in the pre and post accession period of Romania and Bulgaria to the European Union

We have tried, in this short introduction above, to point out certain historical realities that define the relations among the countries in the Black Sea area.

These realities help us understand the basis of the bilateral and multilateral cooperation initiatives at the Black Sea, having as main purpose the strengthening of the regional security and the consolidation of the economic relations among the states in the area.

Hence, the countries in the region have tried to consolidate the relations through administrative initiatives aiming the establishment of some bilateral and multilateral regional organizations, many of them having a precedential role to the accession to the European structures. Some of these initiatives belonged to the U.S.A. and to the

Western powers, interested to make allies in the region or to maintain peace and political and economical stability, other initiatives exclusively belonged to the states in the very area, interested, on one hand, to deepen the diplomatic and economic relations among them, and, on the other hand, interested in increasing the regional security degree.

We shall list and valuate below the role of these initiatives within European and regional context.

- *OSCE – The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe*, organization that includes the countries from the extended region of the Black Sea, which aims to prevent conflicts in the area, to monitor the tensions existent in the area and acts for peace keeping; currently, the organization has missions in Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan, Romania effectively contributing to these activities, demonstrating, on this respect, qualities of a regional main factor for stability and security.

Romania has actively involved in OSCE actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, former F. R. of Yugoslavia, Belarus and Kosovo. Romania also held the position of OSCE mission chief in Chechnya, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Montenegro. Our country also had an important contribution within the process accomplished with the adoption, at OSCE Ministerial Council from Vilnius (December 6-7, 2011) of the decisions regarding the improvement of OSCE capacity in the conflict cycle, respectively, regarding the increase of coordination and coherence within OSCE efforts for managing the problematic of the trans-national threats.

- *SPSEE* – The stability pact for the South-East Europe represents the most important attempt of EU and USA to encourage the cooperation among the states of the South-East Europe and to support the efforts of these countries to accede to the European structures and to the Euro-Atlantic structures. Among the countries from the Black Sea, the Pact has as members Romania, Bulgaria and Moldova. One of the successful structures established within SPSEE is the Regional Center SECI from Bucharest, for the Trans border Criminality Elimination; SECI is a regional cooperation structure with international participation, founded at Romania's official proposal in 1999.

- *RCC – The Regional Cooperation Center*, founded in 2008, aims at the reinstatement of all regional projects on modern bases, taking into account the new geo-political realities, the relations among the member states within regional and sub-regional initiatives. The Council wants to take over the positive experience and the SPSEE results and to continue them, on five main action directions: economic and social development, infrastructure, law and internal affairs, cooperation within the field of security and formation of the human capital.

The coordination of the *South-Eastern Cooperation Process* (*SEECP*) activities with the ones of *RCC* is extremely important, as *SEECP* holds the political role, while *RCC* holds an operational and administrative role. *RCC* has as main object the identification of the cooperation opportunities among the states in the area and the promoting of projects in the benefit of the states in the region.

- *CEI* – The *Central European Initiative*, organization bringing together 18 member states, out of which 3 from the Black Sea region: Romania, Bulgaria and

Moldova. *CEI* activity mainly consists in *reunions of the government chiefs*, through which there are adopted decisions regarding the political and economical cooperation orientations, *reunions of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs*, through which there are taken decisions regarding the political problems of the region, the cooperation fields and forms, the working structures, *ad-hoc sector reunions* of some members of the Prime Ministers cabinets and *reunions of the National Coordinators Committee*.

Romania has acted for the consolidation of the cooperation among the member and non-member states of the EU, in order to facilitate the knowledge exchange and the assistance of non-members in relevant fields for the relation with the EU.

- *DCP* – The *Danube Cooperation Process*, which has been officially launched in Wien in 2002, as a result of a common initiative of Romania, Austria, European Commission and *SPSEE*. In addition to the initiators, among other participants we find the states from the Black Sea region, such as Bulgaria, Moldova and Ukraine.

DCP is designed as a regional cooperation forum, structured on several levels: economy, sustainable development, environment, culture, navigation and tourism.

- *BSEC* – The *Black Sea Economic Cooperation,* established in 1992. Under this initiative, Romania has sustained the need to increase the role of the organization and its visibility in the region. The achievement of the ring highway of the Black Sea and the development of the maritime lines in the area represent two purposes aimed by our country within the said organization.

- *IBSC* – The *Black Sea International Club*, a non-governmental organization, created in 1992 in Odessa, Ukraine, bringing together coastal city ports from 9 countries, among which Romania.

- *BSF* – The *Black Sea Forum for Partnership and Dialogue* launched at Romania's initiative, in Bucharest, 2006. At that moment, our country, as future member of the Union, tried to define its vision regarding the strategy at the Black Sea as the future strategy of the whole European Union, as, up to that moment the E.U. had no distinct plan regarding the regional security in the Black Sea coastal area. Concurrently, this Forum tried to act as a catalyst over the economical development process of the region.

- *BSS* – The Black Sea Synergy, a regional initiative from 2007 of Romania, Bulgaria and Greece has as main objective the consolidation of cooperation in the Black Sea region with the benefit involvement of the E.U. It offers the guidelines for the proposal of some pragmatic projects of cooperation among the states in the region in the fields of: democracy, human rights, good governing, borders' management, conflicts, energy, transports, environment, maritime policy, fishing, trade, migration, development, education and research.

In a Communication of the European Communities Commission to the European Parliament regarding the Black Sea Synergy there was foreseen the potential of this regional initiative, affirming that: *"The scope of actions could extend beyond the region itself, since many activities remain strongly linked to neighbouring regions, notably to the Caspian Sea, to Central Asia and to South-*

Eastern Europe. There would be a close link between the Black Sea approach and an EU Strategy for Central Asia. Black Sea cooperation would thus include substantial interregional elements. It would also take account of other regional cooperation programmes supported by international organisations and third countries."[5]

Looking back to these initiatives, we can say that some of them have shown their usefulness and efficiency with regard to the increasing of the development potential of the countries from the Black Sea, while other projects, unfortunately, are still waiting to demonstrate their real potential.

For that matter, the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cristian Diaconescu, stated in the opening of the conference "European policies at the Black Sea: Consolidation of the regional cooperation", hosted at the end of March this year, in Bucharest: *"There have passed five years since the Black Sea entered the European Union map by Romania and Bulgaria accession. UE has quickly sensed the potential brought by this maritime basin and launched even since 2007, at Romania's initiative and with the support of other member states, the Black Sea Synergy. But, we find out that the process has not fully achieved its potential; there were progresses, but fragmented, and our projects need more energy*".

2.2. Internal administrative measures in the context of the bilateral relations in the Black Sea Region. The Romanian perspective

Romania and Bulgaria

Romania and Bulgaria have started in tandem the negotiations for the E.U. accession, and that consolidated the relations between the two countries. Beyond a strong desire of the two countries to join the E.U., a special effort was needed in the internal administrative plan in order for the two states to successfully close the negotiation chapters. Through the negotiations, between December 11th 1999 when, in Helsinki, the European Council decided to start the negotiations with six candidate states, among which Romania and Bulgaria, and until January the 1st, 2007, date on which the two countries have been effectively accepted in the European Union, the two countries have had to make common administrative decisions that contributed to the closing of the negotiation chapters.

At present, both Romania and Bulgaria want to access the Schengen Space but the perspective is not encouraging: after the two countries had been given the initial accept of the Ministers Council of E.U. to join the Schengen Space in March 2011, they were postponed for a subsequent date, motivating the weak progress in controlling corruption and organized crime.

The countries that blocked Romania's access in Schengen are the Netherlands and Finland, but it has to be mentioned that the governments of both countries are under the pressure of the populist parties with which they form the governing coalitions; the reason is that the populist parties have formulated in the political doctrine some nationalist ideas which oppose to any form of the European Union extension, including the Schengen Space.

Romania absolutely rejected any accusation referring to the failure in observing the obligations undertaken within the accession plan; moreover, Romania started what the local media called "The Tulip War", by the official refuse to allow

the import of flowers from the Netherlands motivating that they were infested with unknown bacterium. The administrative measure regarding the interdiction to import flowers came just a day after finding out the refuse of the Netherlands to vote the acceptance of Romania and Bulgaria in the Schengen Space. Tensions continued and, on 10.04.2012, the Dutch Labour Party asked for explanations from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands in connection with the delay of Romania President in accepting the accreditation letters of the Dutch Ambassador in Bucharest and the situation is frozen even now. Besides, Romania took the decision of withdraw its ambassador from The Netherlands, an unprecedented gesture at E.U. level.

Romania and the Republic of Moldova

Romania has been and remains an active and involved partner in the efforts of Moldova to access the European Space. The bilateral and multilateral partnerships, the common activities of the governments chiefs from Chisinau and Bucharest (the last common meeting of the two governments took place in Iasi in March), the administrative measures taken at the border of the two countries to facilitate the small transit, prove that Romania has a clear intention for this purpose. However, the future raises certain problems on short term with regard to the relations between the two countries, from the perspective of Romania joining the Schengen Space. Thus, there are opinions[6] according to which Romania acceptance in the Schengen Space, which will generate travelling restrictions for the Moldovan citizens, will be seen in the neighboring country as a unilateral measure and not a requirement of Europe in order to increase security at the external borders. Moreover, if the current annual rhythm of granting the Romanian citizenship for the Moldovan citizens is now at a high level 5000 grants, the accession to the Schengen Space will increase the rigors of the granting, fact that will be seen again as a refusal of the Romanian authorities to grant the citizenship. The experience of the states in the Central Europe (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) show a decrease of the visa percentage issued for the non-EU citizens after obtaining the statute of a member of Schengen Space.[7]

Romania and Ukraine

Romania's relations with Ukraine have been marked by two issues that often created blockages at diplomatic level: the Snakes Island and Bîstroe Channel.

If the first issue may have been formally settled, as in 2009 the Court of The Hague ruled in favor of Romania, ending 42 years of litigation between the two states, the Bîstroe Channel issue is far from being settled and negotiations between the officials of the two states are in full evolution. The Romanians requires the Ukrainians the ceasing of the works at the Danube – Black Sea Channel, a project that proves to be the greatest disaster for the Danube Delta[8] ecosystem. On the other hand, Ukraine wants the achievement of the project that would give it regional authority regarding the fluvial traffic, and thus, trying to limit the Romanian control over the access from the Black Sea on the Danube. This is a fact that harms the strategic interests of Romania in the Black Sea area.

In June, 2008 the European Council Parliamentarians, brought together in Strasbourg, required, through a recommendation, the stop of the works at Bîstroe Channel and the establishment of the Black Sea Euro-region[9], but, since then and up

to present the negotiations between the two countries have not lead to renunciation by the Ukraine of the idea of building the Channel.

CONCLUSIONS

The Black Sea region has always been a challenge, not only for the relations among the countries that are part of this area of Europe, but for the partners of these states or for the ones that had somehow a political, strategic or economical interest in the area.

The initiatives at the regional administrative level of the states in the extended area of the Black Sea and the partnerships generated by these initiatives proved, more or less, their efficiency, but they never had long-term coherence and vision. Even the officials of the countries that had such initiatives (see the statement of the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs above) recognized that the initiatives *have not fully realized their potential* and the expression is told under diplomatic terms.

Therefore, we consider that after 2007, when two of the states in the region had access to the European Union, came this moment, 5 years later, when the *European Union should officially involve in the running of the Region*, especially that other states in the area (Moldova, Serbia and even Ukraine) desire to join the European Union, and when we speak about the running of the region, we think about bringing economic prosperity and good neighbouring relations among the states in the area.

A more active involvement of the European Union could reduce the "frozen" conflicts or the diplomatic tensions among the countries in the area, and the most appropriate example here is the situation of Bîstroe Channel.

The European Union could take the initiative by starting a Grand Trans-regional European project, financed from the contribution of all member states. The good running and stability in the Black Sea area would bring peace for the rest of the European Union too, especially from the point of view of securing the Eastern borders, which, once with the acceptation of Moldova in the E.U. would coincide with the West Russian border. Such a project would take over the positive experience and the results obtained at bilateral or sub-regional level and would potentate it by including it within a project financed and coordinated at the Union level, with precise and well-monitored execution terms. Such an administrative decision at European level would lay the bases of a long-term influence of the European Union in the Black Sea area and would help to a quicker integration with fewer risks of the candidate states from the extended region.

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THE BLACK SEA – DYNAMICS AND COMMON STRATEGIES REGARDING THE FUTURE OF THE REGION

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Abstract

The **Black Sea Region** is a contested neighborhood and a subject of intense debate. This reflects the changing dynamics of the region, its complex realities, the interests of outsiders and the region's relations with the rest of the world. Its strategic position, linking north to south and east to west, as well as its oil, gas, transport and trade routes are all important reasons for its increasing relevance. The Black Sea region is increasingly becoming a priority on the international agenda. In fact, a regional approach is gradually developing as actors understand that common problems need to be addressed jointly in order to find effective solutions.

Key words: *The Black Sea, common strategies, security, development, good governance, regionalization*

Fig. 1 The Black Sea Region

I. IMPACT POLICY OF THE BLACK SEA REGION

The Black Sea [1] belongs to the planetary Atlantic basin and is located between the two continents: Europe and Asia. Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Georgia, The Russian Federation and Ukraine are states bordering the sea (Fig. 1). Passing through the Strait of Kerch we can reach Azov Sea, through the Bosporus to the

Marmara Sea and through Dardanelles in the Aegean Sea and then back to the Mediterranean.

The Black Sea is a remnant of the Sarmatian Sea and has certain aspects that are unique in the world. Black Sea links Europe and Asia, two continents full of history and related developments. The border set by the geographers between the two continents on the Caucasus and Bosphorus Strait divides this sea in two unequal parts, the largest being on the European continent. Numerous rivers flow into the Black Sea such as the Danube, Dniester, Bug, Dnieper, Rioni, Kizil-Irmak. The main ports of the Black Sea region are: Constanta, Odessa, Kherson, Tuapse, Novorossiysk, Poti, Batumi, Trabzon, Sinop, Varna, Burgas. The Black Sea is an important balneo-climateric area; along its cost there are several resorts konwn at international level: Mamaia, Eforie, Mangalia, Yalta, Sochi, Sukhumi, Batumi, Varna, etc.

Due to its position the Black Sea is the only main sea whose shores are inhabited by several ancient people who have been living there for centuries. The history of this region is extremely interesting due to the the variety of people and cultures living in the area, that marked and enhanced its strategic and economic importance. The oldest Black Sea nations are the Romanians, Armenians, Gruzins [2] and Abkhaz [3], but also the Greeks, the Slavs, known as Bulgarians, the Turks and other Turkish people (e.g. Gagauz – a turkofon minority from Moldova Republic), Tatars and Mongols (they came in the region in the XIIIth century), Ruthenians [4], Ukrainians, Azeris [5], Russians and others. All these nations have their traditions kept until nowadays, legends and customs related to the Black Sea according to the influences that have dominated the Black Sea area over time.

We know that from ancient times, the Black Sea was a way by which the local population from the Black Sea regions came into contact with the Mycenaean culture, highly evolved since antiquity. Starting with the VIII century B.C. Greek colonists on the shores of the Black Sea (which they called Pontus Euxinus) have established a large number of cities (Phanagoria, Kimmerike, Apolonia Pontica, Mesembria, Odessa, Callatis, Tomis, Histria, Tyras, Olbia, Crimea, Theodosia, Panticapaion, Dioscurias, Phasis, Trebizond, Sinope, Heracleea Pontica, etc.), which had important economic, political and cultural impact in the area.

After the expedition of Pericles in Pontus (437 B.C.) the city of Athens had a leading role in the economic life of the Black Sea basin. Later in the year 88 B.C. the King of Pontus, Mithridates the VIth, Eupator (132-63 B.C.), becomes governor and ally of all tribes and people around the Black Sea region (except Bithynia), representing a serious threat to the Roman influence in the East. At Ist mid-century B.C, Burebista, ruler of the Dacic state enlarged his dominion over the left shore of the Black Sea, between the Dniester and Pontic Apollonia.

Dobrogea was conquered by the Romans and included in Moesia in 46 B.C. The cities lying on the Romanian Black Sea coast (Callatis, Tomis and Histria) entered in the possession of Rome, knowing a new period of economic and cultural prosperity (the Roman period).

The Roman rule in the Black Sea was continued by the Roman-Byzantine one (centuries IV - VII AD), which, in order to maintain dominion over the Black Sea trade routes had to defeat the Iranian Sassanid rivalry state, and then the

Russian Knezes. After the conquest of Constantinople by Western Crusaders (1204), on the Southern Black Sea coast south there was established the Trebizond Empire [6]. During the same period also began the entering of Genoese and Venetian merchants, who until the Turkish conquest had monopol on trade monopoly in the Black Sea.

At the end of XIV and beginning of XV century, the Black Sea was the eastern border with Moldova and the Vallahia. With the fall of Caffa when Crimea was under Turkish suzerainty (1475) and the conquest of Chilia and Cetatea Alba by the Turks (1484), almost the entire Black Sea coast was under the Ottoman Empire. Following the Russian-Turkish wars in the XVIII – XIX centuries, the Turkish rule became more and more limitted, when, after the first Balkan War, in 1912, the rule on the Black Sea by the neighbouring states has begun to have the current configuration.

The first research on the Black Sea coastline date from 1696, and were led by Russian sailors from the Krepost ship. In 1701, during the rulling of the Tsar Peter I (1672-1725) the first Russian map of the Black Sea was drafted; here there are specified the depths around Crimea and Bosphorus. Many political changes, as a result of geographic and strategic interests in the region, have influenced the Black Sea region. They are reflected in the changing dynamics that the Black Sea countries have undergone, the complex realities and the political, economic and social conflicts explain, in large, part of its revival. As one can notice, since ancient times, the region was controlled, in turn, by one or more powers, which have dominated and isolated the area. Between Europe and Asia, the Black Sea connects North and South, East and West. The oil, gas, trade routes, are all crucial in explaining why this region has become so important. After 1949, for 40 years, as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Turkey and Greece have defended the South and Southeast, while the members of the Warsaw Pact (the military alliance of Eastern European countries and Esta as a reaction against NATO), the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Romania, have dominated the rest.

However, despite the fact that the region was divided by the rivalry between East and West, the military policy provided balance and stability although there was a limitation, even political fragmentation and economic blockade. The existence of blocs made impossible communication and cooperation on sea. In the last two decades, however, Black Sea region has changed considerably, witnessing the transformation of former communist society and the impact of globalization.

The fall of communism has produced armed conflicts and historical tensions that led to the dissolution of a superpower and the birth of six new sovereign states even through secessionist movements. The need to replace the post-communist area with regional entities and initiatives that provide new identities and appropriate cooperation also gave way to the external relations and chalenges in the region. The need for cooperation after the Cold War was imposed by the need to escape the negative influences of military and ideological confrontation, as experts in the field state.

The emergence of regionalism after the Cold War was considered a way to overcome the political and economic vacuum. Participation in regional cooperation systems was seen as a step towards economic integration as well as political and

social. These initiatives can contribute to geopolitical stability by facilitating joint actions against new threats. Consequently, there have been launched initiatives and actions between states, especially as a result of the activity of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC), which was founded in 1992. It is the most permissiveand comprehensive regional organization when it comes to its members. Since then the Working Group on the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR), Black Sea Harmony, Black Sea Forum, Organization for Democracy and Development (ODED-GUAM), the Community for a Democratic Choice (CDC), the Commission on the Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution, and other organizations have been established. Although they have different priorities, all support the need for regional cooperation as a basis for stability and security. At the same time, the Black Sea region witnessed an enhanced interest shown by the U.S, pursuing the 9/11 events, the NATO and EU enlargement and the repeated Russian-Ukrainian crises related to gas issues. In August 2008 it experienced the war between Russia and Georgia, the discussions about the Russian fleet of the Black Sea in Sevastopol, the impact of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabah upon the Turkish-Armenian relations, the evolution of the conflict in, the dynamics of the relations between Russia and Turkey and eventually the global economic development and the political environment as a result of the world financial crisis. politic. All these have affected the stability in the region and, at international level, the impact policy.

II. STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE BLACK SEA REGION

The strategic location, between the hydrocarbon reserves in the Caspian Sea and the need for energy in Europe, gives the Black Sea a strategic position.

But while the possibility of transfer of Caspian oil and gas to European markets raises hopes for regional economic development, competition to control pipelines, sea and land transportation routes to ensure economic growth and political influence, not only for the entire region, but on a global scale, increases the risk of conflicts.

In this context, the emergence of new routes at the same time with an increase in bilateral cooperation detrimental to the regional can, at the same time, lead to redundancy as a result of increased capacity and inadequate resources of gas and oil. Since 2000 until the beginning of the economic crisis, the region had one of the fastest growth rates in the world, mainly die to the commercial trade between countries in the region, and this has been a fundamental economic change, ensuring a safe place in the global economic agenda. Thus, in the plenary session of the European Parliament of 20 January 2011, it has been adopted a Resolution on EU Strategy for the Black Sea, given the strategic importance of the Black Sea Region for the European Union and rather limited results of the neighbouring states. This aims to be part of a broader vision of the EU Foreign and Security Policy.

In this respect, among other things, the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) are required to develop a strategy for the Black Sea region, in parallel with the assessment of the European Neighbourhood Policy outlining a comprehensive and integrated approach to address EU challenges and

opportunities in the region, with a detailed plan of action, clear objectives and initiatives, considering that this strategy will enable effective coordination of activities and division of tasks.

The Resolution states that the Black Sea Strategy has to be developed at all regional cooperation levels and welcomes parliamentary cooperation between EU and the countries in the region. The main fields of action are: security, good governance, energy, transportation, environment, economic development and welfare. At the same time an operational programme was requested, common for the Black Sea area in order to fulfill all the objectives mentioned in the strategic document on crossborder cooperation within IEPV for 2007-2013.

Romanian Foreighn Affairs Ministry (MAE) agrees that the strategy will determine a proactive approach of all EU institutions regarding the Black Sea region which is in compliance with Romania' interest in a more active European involvement in the region. With Romania having the presidency of OCEMN [7] and the relations it intends to build between the Organization and EU, MAE considers that this strategy supports these efforts.

The Commission on the Black Sea is a innitiative of the civil society, jointly developed and launched in January 2009 by researchers and politicians who published the report „2020 Vision –A Black Sea Dimension" which refers to the countries in the Black Sea region (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine). The report is the result of a project launched in January 2009 by the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, a project of the German Marshall Fund, Bucharest/Romania; Bertelsman Foundation, Gütersloh/Germany; Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), Ankara/Turkey and International Centre for Black Sea Studies Athens/Greeece, aiming at developing regional solutions for regional issues, based on cooperation, policied oriented towards research on the challenges and opportunities in the Black Sea region, generating way to ensure peace and prosperity in the region, an increased sense of security, enhanced political stability, efforts to solve long term conflicts without the use of force.

The activity of the Commission has been supported by individuals from different countries that wish to remain anonimous due to their affiliation or personal reasons. The report does not represent a point of view of the states, governments, organizations or institutions they are affiliated with. Among the members of the Black Sea Commission ther are former vice prime inisters, former ministers, former and current MPs, intellectuals, researchers from all over the region, EU and U.S.

The Black Sea Commission believes that a review of the Region, its challenges and priorities, is urgent, and the emergence of a peaceful area of cooperation in the Black Sea region would be beneficial for all. In this regard, the Commission presents a first image that focuses on four areas: peace and security, economic development and welfare, democratic institutions and good governance and regional cooperation, containing policy recommendations for all stakeholders. By discussing all these four important issues the Commission wants to contribute to a common vision and strategy. At the same time, the existing research tends to focus on specific areas such as energy, transport and environment, and the Commission hopes to redress this balance by conducting a joint study involving all

stakeholders. The aim is to present not only the particular interests of stakeholders on the short term, but also to provide input for a new long-term vision and strategy.

In the Black Sea Commission Report, the terms Black Sea region, Black Sea area and Black Sea are used interchangeably. Commission considers the following countries as part of the region: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. They are regional countries. The other key players involved are the EU and NATO, both present in the Black Sea area and the United States. All have expressed their interest in the region and have formulated policies accordingly.

In geopolitical terms, lying at the border between the EU and NATO, as well as being involved in the U.S. global war against terrorism, the region has acquired a new meaning, taking part in transporting energy resources and being an attractive economic area. The Black Sea region gradually evolved geopolitically. It has become an interesting area for great powers, Russia and the U.S. and to a certain level for the EU, which have developed their own policies: Global Approach to Migration and Partnership with Countries of Origin and Transit (mobility partnerships), the Enlarged Black Sea Region, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) [8], Black Sea Synergy [9] Eastern Partnership, Stability and Cooperation Platform, the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum [10]. It is to be expected that the involvement of the international actors in the region' affairs will become even more intense in the years to come. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and a new security policy, as well as negotiations over new agreements with Russia, the EU will play a ore assertive role, like NATO, which is working on a new strategic concept.

The existing issues are complex and the Report recommends an all level approach because the paradoxes in the field of global security have spread within the Black Sea system as well. There are considered here the following aspects[11]:
-    while the Black Sea has become a new strategic area for the EU, Russia and the United States in terms of energy security, conflicts, trade and migration – the advanteges for regional cooperation are clear;
-    the economic data and socio-economic indicators, at least until the onset of the economic financial crisis demonstrated that this was one of the fastest developing regions in the world, although disparities between the states still remain;
-    despite the economic disparities in the region the prosperity of certain states has led to higher military expenditure, which is contrary to the principle that economic prosperity is not enough to prevent armed conflicts;
-    in the energy sector, the possibilities for division or union are extremely high, the correlation between the energy suppliers, competition for trade routes, security of pipes and the political and economic influence groups generate conflicts in the region;
-    while, in general terms, the EU supports regional initiatives, in favour of the integration, prosperity and stability, the economic and political attractions operate in relation to individual countries rather than to region as a whole;

As a result, regional stakeholders prefer bilateral relations with the EU to the detriment of cooperation. The EU policies on regional cooperation have not become strategies yet. The recent debates regarding instruments and resources for

the ENP, the Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership are cases in point [12]. While the EU wishes a stable climate in the region, the Member Sates have diverging interests and policies, especially in relation with Russia and influence the development of a EU policy.

- the notion of *neighbourhood*, which should be understood within a positive context related to regional development based on economic and political support systems has become a major enigma, because all key players have started to develop their own neighbourhoods so that in the future create further divisions;

- while regional cooperations is sought by most stakeholders, its institutionalization has proved difficult since some of the players preferred bilateral agreements;

- the most challenging paradox has to do with the conflict between gobalization and nationalism, deeply rooted in the region, which is one of the world's most multipolar regions.

Having a holistic approach, the Commission tried to promote strategies, taking into account the needs, priorities and interests of all stakeholders in order to redefine the image of the Black Sea. Therefore, the Commission made a concerted effort to listen to all stakeholders, including civil society. The meetings were held in Istanbul, Moscow and Berlin, and the Commission members have researched and wrote four political reports to get a perspective as broad as possible for the future (they can be accessed on our website: www. blackseacom.eu). The reason behind developing this report has been increased political volatility in the region, which proved once again that unsolved issues can lead to open conflict. These conflicts delay economic development and have potential to break into wider conflagration, with impact on regional stability. The Black Sea policy, specifies the Commission report on the Black Sea, will work better if the approach is regional. States concerned should seek regional solutions to regional problems and the Black Sea already has the necessary institutional means to address these challenges. Considering all these, the stakeholders should be able to address these issues together and allow players who are not representatives of state, such as businessmen, NGOs and civil society have a real role in finding solutions.

Thus, the Commission recommends:
- ✓ 2020 Vision – A black Sea Dimension;
- ✓ Enhance the profile of Black Sea regionalism;
- ✓ Solving the conflicts;
- ✓ Focus on economic issues to meet common challenges and real needs;
- ✓ Promote and coordinate regional cooperation systems at all levels;
- ✓ Promote intercultural dialogue;
- ✓ Promote targeted training for professional groups;
- ✓ Promote good governance, civil society and social dialogue.

Given the geopolitical and economic reality, the Commission members believe that innovative policies and their implementation through political dialogue can resolve conflicts by peaceful means in favor of cooperation and stability in the area. Furthermore, players at regional level and the outside powers redefine their policies on the Black Sea, and members of the Commission believe that a

multidisciplinary and multi-level approach accompanied by a practical politicy of stakeholders influence deliberations and thus the region's future.

CONCLUSIONS

The increasing importance of the region need to involve all parties to benefit from the potential of the region. The Black Sea region offers opportunities and challenges that require coordinated action at regional level. These include key sectors such as energy, transport, environment, movement and security. The objective of enhanced regional cooperation is not to deal directly with long-standing conflicts in the region but could lead to greater mutual trust and, in time, could help remove some obstacles. Given the confluence of cultures in the Black Sea region, greater regional cooperation could have beneficial effects beyond the region.

Given that the border between Romania and Bulgaria on the Black Sea became the external border of the European Union [13] and that this border will become a Schengen external border, control rules will apply in accordance with Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and the provisions of the "Catalogue of best practices and recommendations for proper implementation of the Schengen acquis", Chapter "maritime borders".

Border surveillance is to prevent unauthorized border crossings, to combat crossborder crime and to apprehend or take other measures against those who have crossed the border illegally. Border surveillance should be effective in preventing and discouraging people from circumventing the checks at the border crossing points and in detecting the unauthorized crossings of external borders. FRONTEX (European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the European Union) is responsible for coordination of operational cooperation between Member States to facilitate the application of the Union law, including border surveillance.

Additional rules are necessary in terms of border surveillance activities carried out by the sea and air units of a Member State at the maritime border with other Member States in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by the Agency to further strengthen such cooperation in the European security and defense policy. As EU Member States and future Schengen states, Romania and Bulgaria have developed **integrated systems for traffic monitoring at the Black Sea** such **SCOMAR** (Romania) and **SIGNALIS** (Bulgaria). The European systems of surveillance and control of the maritime and land external borders are designed to improve their security and enhance the response of Member States in combating illegal immigration and border crime in order to maintain internal security. The Black Sea policy will work best if the approach will be regional. States concerned should be encouraged to identify solutions for the future to achieve an area of freedom, security and justice, involving governments, agencies, organizations, civil society, giving a new dimension to the Black Sea region.

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[1] The ancient Greeks called it first Skythikos Pontos (Sea Scythian), and the Scythians, people speaking Iranian language, called it Axaina (unfriendly). The Greeks initially understood the word as unfriendly but later, when they knew better, they called it Pontos (the stretch of water) Euxeinos (welcoming). The Romans called it Pontus Euxinus and later Euxinus Caecili (closed). In the Middle Ages, it appears on the Genoese and Venetian maps and in the chronicles of Villehardouin and Wavrin and as the Great Maggiore which corresponds to the name of the Great Sea in the documents of Mircea cel Batran. It covers an area of 413,490 km², average depth is 1.282m, the maximum is 2.245m (below sea level near the Yalta), the maximum length of 1148 km (between the Gulf of Burgas and Ingur river), and maximum width is 606 km (between Ukraine and Turkey).

[2] Georgians, Caucasians.

[3] Abkhazia is an autonomous republic in Georgia, which declared its independence, situated between the Black Sea coast and the western Caucasus, established on March 4, 1921.

[4] Ruthenians are inhabitants of Central Eastern Europe, north and south of the Carpathians. Home territory, known as Subcarpathian Russia stretches into neighboring parts of Ukraine, Slovakia and Poland. The names under which they are known are multiple: Carpathian Russians, Carpathians russions, Ukrainian russions, Ruthenians, Transcarpathian Ruthenians.

[5] Azers – the ethnic group living mainly in Azerbaidjan and Northern Iran.

[6] The emperors from Trapezunt were named Megas Comnen and at the beginning they were also called „kings of the romans", because they thought they were descending from the Byzantine emperors, but this title was given to the emperor from Constantinopole, and the title of those from Trapezunt was replaced with „Emperor and Tyrant over the whole East", over Iberia (sus,) and Transmarine provinces. The state was also named „ Comnenid Empire", after the dynasty that reigned in Trapezunt.

[7] ORGANIZATION OF THE BLACK SEA ECONOMIC COOPERATION, Black Sea Economic Cooperation was launched pursuing the signing of the Istanbul Declaration in June 25, 1992. BSEC founding members are: Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and three Caucasus countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia). BSEC region extends, in size, from the Adriatic to the Pacific Ocean and its area comprises eight seas (Black Sea, Azov Sea, Marmara Sea, Aegean Sea, the Caspian Sea, Ionian Sea, Adriatic and Mediterranean Sea).

[8] European Neighbourhood Policy is a new approach within the relations between the EU and its neighbours, an approach that goes beyond the traditional one based on cooperation. This policy is a framework to strengthen the neighbourhood relations and to enhance cooperation with neighbouring EU states to create an area of prosperity and good vecinity, a circle of friends at the Union' borders. The main objective of the ENP is sharing the benefits of EU enlargement in 2004 with its neighbouring countries. Another objective is set by the 2003 European Security Strategy, namely to increase security in the vicinity of the enlarged Union.

[9] This represents a new EU cooperation innitiative for the Black Sea region within the European neighbourhood policy which aims to enhance cooperation in the Black Sea region and between this region and the EU.

[10] This way the importance of a balanced and global approach has been acknowledged, regarding the promotion of the binomial migration-development and a long term action on the profound causes of forced migration, namely poverty and insecurity.

[11] Commission Report A 2020 VISION FOR THE BLACK SEA REGION.

[12] The European Union has already made considerable efforts to stimulate the democratic and economic reforms, to promote stability and to support development in the Black Sea region through extensive cooperation programmes. There are three European policies relevant in this context: Pre – accession process for Turkey, European neighbourhood policy (five Eastern partners of PEV are actively involved in the cooperation process in the Black Sea region) and the Strategis Partnership with the Russian Federation. Furthermore, the EC has contributed to a whole range of sectoral initiatives of regional interest. The Black Sea Synergy is intended as a flexible framework to ensure greater coherence and policy guidance. In assessing the usefulness of Community support initiatives, a key criterion should be the active involvement of states and regional bodies directly concerned, including financing - Commission Communication to the Council and European Parliament the Black Sea Synergy - A new Regional Cooperation Initiative (Brussels, 11/04/2007).

[13] Once Romania has become a EU Member State, our country has become full member of Frontex through the Romanian border Police. Thus, a Partnership Agreement was signed on 13.06.2007 between The Ministry of Administration and Interior and Frontex. A new Partnership Agreement was signed on 12.10.2009 at Warshaw.

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EUROPEAN UNION ATTITUDE
TOWARDS THE WIDER BLACK SEA AREA

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Abstract

In September 2010, the European Council discussed for the first time the European Union's (EU) strategic partnerships, which was intended as a foreign policy concept.

In order to apply the principles of the so-called strategic partnerships and to successfully cope with the actual and the coming multipolar, globalised and interconnected world, the European Union needs to invest energy and resources in terms of time, money and manpower in its relationships with great and emerging powers in specific areas of interest.

Russia is a country European Union is interested in not only because it is an emergent country but also, simply, because it cannot be disregarded.

In this context, the interest and the priorities of the European Union on the Black Sea Area Region become even greater.

This paper concludes that the European Union should project a clear strategic vision within the Wider Black Sea area through its strategic partnership concept.

Key words: *Wider Black Sea area, region, security*

INTRODUCTION

The Black Sea area has become a critical crossroad in the context of eastward expansion of Europe, whose geo-strategic description is given by the impressive list of regional actors. Here we find Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Balkans and the Caucasus. The region accumulates some of the most important challenges outlining current and future security climate of Europe – from environmental degradation, illegal migration and safeguarding of energy resources to drugs and weapons trafficking or "frozen conflicts". Of equally relevance is the fact that The Black Sea area is at the confluence of civilizations, at the borderline between Orthodox religion, the Muslim religion and social and political Western cultures, which are in full ascension.

The last two decades registered the beginning of cooperation in the region, but without recording outstanding achievements, designated to increase the optimism of states and organizations in favor of progress in the area. The Black Sea stakeholders were more concerned by issues that threaten vital national interests – from the open conflict in the North Caucasus (Chechnya) to "frozen conflicts" in the South Caucasus (South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh) and Moldova (Transnistria) – than by vague prospects of a potential model for regional cooperation. In addition, unsolved bilateral conflicts, such as those between Turkey and Armenia, between

Turkey and Greece and between Russia and former Soviet states, have prevented the Black Sea area states to develop bold regional scale plans.

As a result, the limited pan-Black Sea cooperation was more focused on "soft" non-military activities. This is exemplified by the establishment in 1992 of The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC), which was intended as a forum on common interests. Subsequently, over the years, the shortcomings of the institutions became increasingly obvious, excessive bureaucracy and strained bilateral relations being among the causes that led to a not very constructive evolution. The Black Sea area's regional interdependence, however, is evolving and acts as a motor for the sustained development of Europe.

I. EUROPEAN UNION – RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP

The relationships between Russia and the European Union are rooted in the development of European Union's Strategy on Russia in 1999, on which Moscow has based its policy regarding European Union / Western European Union in general, and regarding Union enlargement process, in particular. Entitled "the Medium-Term Strategy for Development of Relations Between the Russian Federation and the European Union" [1], the document has 20 pages, and, except for one paragraph that refers to the security aspects of Russia- European Union cooperation, is dedicated to cover areas such as financial cooperation, trade market and Union's enlargement process.

In the context described above, the European Union can be considered a regional player, although the Black Sea area was not considered as a priority back in 1990 and the European Union did not have a coherent foreign policy in the region. The European Union not only lacks the overall strategic vision, but also the resources to follow a traditional foreign policy. The European Union's priorities revolve around its member's priorities and thus the Black Sea region, as a whole, was of marginal interest. However, the area became more attractive in the early 2000s. In 2003, the European Security Strategy - ESS was the first official document certifying that the southern Caucasus were part of the Black Sea region, which required special attention. At the time of SES emergence, European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) were giving more importance to the area. The European Union's expansion process resulted in a greater involvement in the area. This occurred due to "the European Neighborhood Policy", European Union's cardinal plan for activities in the region, and due to "A Synergy for Black Sea" document, which in 2007 became the most concrete indicator of European Union interests in the area. The Black Sea area Synergy could be seen as an intermediary step towards a strategic vision of the European Union in the region, which resulted in the completion of the "European Neighborhood Policy" (ENP), a European Union-Russian strategic partnership, and in the negotiations package with Turkey [2]. The significance of the Black Sea area Synergy had had two faces. On the one hand, it had established the key areas in which the promotion of regional cooperation would have been possible. On the other hand, it had sought to stimulate reform in different spheres of policy and economic sectors for countries in the region, in order to support stability, to stimulate growth and to select feasible projects that require

practical work in the region, creating thus an environment capable to lead to the settlement of ongoing regional conflicts.

In March 2009, the European Union launched the "Eastern Partnership", which was difficult to apply after the war in August 2008. It focuses on deepening bilateral cooperation and greater alignment with the EU. In addition, the role of agent in the ceasefire agreement between Georgia and Russia, by sending observers in Georgia and the European Union's involvement in Geneva peace process, were factors that had improved its profile in the region.

Despite these initiatives, which are meant to increase the European Union's presence in the region, the international community (including Russia) tends to treat the EU as an actor with a limited ability in taking collective decisions and with a low impact on the security structure in region. Taking advantages of economic opportunities and neutralizing the threats coming from this region by the European Union, requires more active involvement in solving frozen conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, which are now dormant but can reignite at any time, destabilizing the whole region.

The relationship with Russia is of strategic importance for European Union. Statistics shows that in the following decade, natural gas and oil imports into European Union will soar. It is expected that Russia will become more important for European Union's countries, in regard for safeguarding of their energy security, while the Union's interest is to diversify supply sources, counting not only for the volatile Middle East.

European Union may become the intraregional integration engine in the Wider Black Sea area. The collaboration with the Union may take various forms, starting with the launching of joint economic reconstruction projects or communication and transport infrastructure modernization, ending with cooperation for effective border control, by introducing new computerized technologies and exchange of information between competent services in providing border security. The European and transatlantic organizations should develop complementary policies for solving frozen conflicts and consolidating democratic values in Ukraine and Moldova. Thus, it would be proven that the organizations have understood the importance of commitment and, therefore, constructively respond to these security challenges. By luring U.S. involvement in energy security realm, European Union seeks to use its influence to counteract the growing influence of Moscow. Russia refuses to ratify the Energy Charter promoted by European Union because it considers that the Charter has an adverse effect on its potential profits. In a U.S. Congress memoir from March 2006, it is stated that there is indeed an energy problem that can be also treated as a security issue. In the same document it is stipulated that there are two ways of approaching and solving this matter: first, a "market solution", in terms of European Union standpoint, and, second, a possible "ally concern" according to NATO point of view, based on the fact that many European Union member states are also NATO member states [3]. Being the world's second largest oil producer, Russia relies on energy resources, especially oil and natural gas, and consistently pursues its objective to achieve a position of dependency that has the necessary weight to ensure major economic development, from which to impose in all worlds' disputes and to ensure its own

security. It is obvious that Russia is dependent on incomes generated by energy exports. By taking advantage of these resources, Moscow enforces itself on the international political scene, and it is using these as real weapons, with more and more visible effects.

The establishment of Gazprom was a decisive step in Russia's efforts to take control over the energy sector, thereby gaining profits and regional influence. From Moscow's point of view, there are strong economic reasons for its consolidation. Energy market is more attractive today. A recent World Bank study shows that the Russia's profit, in energy sector, has increased by 36% in oil and by 64% in natural gas.

According to BBC, Gazprom's growing power reflects, at the same time, the important geopolitical influence, which Russia exerts toward the former Soviet space. Currently, 75% of natural gas and 80% of the oil reserves purchased by new European Union's members comes from Russia [4]. In the same time, Russia strives to strengthen its internal market.

Reducing addiction on incomes from energy exports and supporting the budget's demands with other incomes offered by a reviving economic is another strategic objective for Russia. For 18 years, Moscow has diligently pursuit the goal of being accepted in the World Trade Organization, which would have allowed it to participate on equal rights with other world economies in global transactions, without any restrictions imposed by its non-member status. [5]. In December 2011, at a meeting in Geneva, the World Trade Organization (WTO) approved formal membership for Russia.

With European Union's promises to offer Russia greater access to European energy market by allowing Gazprom access to energy markets in France, Spain and other Western countries, which so far remain relatively under the monopoly of domestic producers, most European Union Member States are promoting an appeasement political towards Moscow, advocating for political and economic level solutions to the energy issue. This arrangement is being regarded with suspicion and apprehension by Moscow, although Russia is continues to show its assets, which are mainly powered by Europeans' fears.

Their concerns are going in two directions. Firstly, there is the fear of addiction to the ever larger Russian energy sources (EU currently provides about 50% of its energy needs from the Russian market, but it is estimated that this proportion will increase to 70% in the next two decades), which can be translated into increased influence of Moscow over Europe – because Europeans fear that Russia will use energy for political influence as it did in Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia cases. Here, the ace up the sleeve for the Europeans would be their relationships U.S. and NATO.

Secondly, Europeans fear that Russia could always limit or even stop the supply to Europe, which would seriously endanger the security of European states, experiencing, thus, their serious shortages.

Another concern for European chancelleries is that Moscow may try to use this "semi-monopoly" on the entire European energy market for financial profits by raising prices arbitrarily or by extending its control over the oil and gas distribution and transportation networks in Europe. This scenario would give Moscow an

important strategic advantage over Europe by denying Europeans the possibility of using gas and oil or by charging arbitrary fees or use transit. Basically, we are taking about integrating the energy market on European Union level, on the one hand, which promises to be a sensitive issue, and, on the other hand, broadening of the European market to foreign competitors, which displeases the domestic producers that risk losing monopoly over their markets. This justifies the increased pressure from Union's national governments to prevent excessive openness to Russia.

Just judging by the concentration of Russian forces in the Black Sea area, particularly in energy space, we can see that Russia's intention to broaden the area of influence becomes more obvious. Russia will have revenged, after European Union's attempts to have it banned from the Balkans, after gaining control of Southeastern Europe's energy space, followed by the occupation of the European Union, a region where Russia has gained ground in the recent two decades.

Russia's expansion is not only perceived at the geo-economic level. According to one of the main laws of geopolitics, made by H. Mackinder, "whoever controls Eastern Europe, masters the Heartland (territory of Ural and Pamir, Volga and Iantzi), whoever controls the Heartland controls the World Island (Eurasia), whoever controls the World Island, masters the whole world "[6].

The forecasts that Russia will return to the status of the world's most important decision-maker, formulated in many theories, is beginning to be more feasible. In the year 2000, came the accession to power of Vladimir Putin, who tidied up the country and resumed the actions that have indicated Russia's intention to return to world's great power status. However, as the Cold War methods could not be used anymore, it to had find other ways to ensure accession to the statute.

II.EUROPEAN UNION'S PRIORITIES AND INTERESTS IN THE WIDER BLACK SEA AREA

The Wider Black Sea Area may represent to some western European just a vast territory on the outskirts of the continent and a source of threat from Eurasia. Yet for the countries adjacent to the Black Sea, it is a factor of integration in the Euro-Atlantic community.

The European Union enlargement, by receiving Bulgaria and Romania among its members in 2007, has transformed the Wider Black Sea area in a region of the Union. Turkey also is in the process of negotiations for European Union accession. Ukraine and Moldova have already announced their interest in becoming new member states. Clearly, Russia and Belarus are interested in EU, while the Caucasian countries - Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are not currently on the European Union agenda, although they can be invited to participate in the accession process.

EU signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, which has come into effectiveness mostly since 1998 and 1999. Albania and Serbia have established relations with European Union within the Stabilization and Association Process, which has undertaken the main responsibilities in the Balkans, opening the prospect

of including countries in the region within the expansion processes, giving a new dimension to the endeavors of crystallizing the European Union's foreign policy, as a substantial component of sub-regional security.

The Black Sea has become, therefore, an important area of the European Union, where various forms of cooperation have been established or are being established.

The experts' opinion is that with the last round of enlargement, the European Union has reached the limit-planned boundaries. Ending or slowing down the process requires new creative policies for non-member states, which should not be given the feeling of abandonment.

Without conferring membership to these countries, European Union seeks to strengthen relations, especially

With Russia, and to extend it in as many areas, despite the fact that traditionally, since the days of the Tsarist Empire, the Russian's policy struggled to keep away the western powers from The Black Sea area.

The cooperation between the European Union and the Wider Black Sea area is focused on three realms -the energy, regional and security.

Currently, the Black Sea area is at the crossroads of European and Asian energy markets so that the pipeline networks carrying Caspian oil to Western Europe can play a decisive role in ensuring European Union's energy security for decades, avoiding its dependence on Russian oil. Given the old continent's addiction on oil and gas resources from Middle East and Russia, safe supply of Caspian Basin resources becomes crucial.

The lack of clarification for the status of the Caspian Sea, competition between countries in the region on hosting oil and gas pipelines and internal instability in most countries of the region are factors that affect European energy security. Due to its oil and gas reserves, Azerbaijan has a key role in providing energy to the Black Sea area and to European Union.

This is where the Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) comes into play, with vision and clear European orientation combined with high potential for deepening relations with European Union.

In the perspective of regional cooperation, BSEC's structures work most directly with counterparts from the European Union, creating thus, the framework for strengthening their bounds.

In 1999 was signed a BSEC-EU cooperation Platform, which enabled European Commission to acquire the observer status in BSEC. However, the European Union prefers to cooperate with each country than to make agreements with regional institutions in the area.

Individually or as part of certain groups, states from Wider Black Sea area have established various relationships with European Union. Greece has been an old European Union member since 1981. Romania and Bulgaria joined European Union in 2004.

Turkey has established special relations with European Union with the Association Agreement in 1963 and the customers Union in 1995, its intention of joining European Union having not only economic but also security grounds. Turkish armed forces are more numerous than any other western country.

European Union has assumed an important role in promoting stability in the Black Sea area, which however remains at risk of potential conflicts.

Identifying, together with European Union, of mechanisms for crisis management is one of the most effective ways of solving regional security problems.

The European integration of The Black Sea area market is an obvious advantage, in economic terms.

Beyond this, threats to the stability of Black Sea region would affect European economies, denying commercial advantages and this motivates the European Union to show its increased interest in solving the problems in the area.

The integrated cooperation in the Wider Black Sea area has already created a positive environment, in respect for conflict solving.

European Union's involvement in Black Sea area was strictly limited to energy, though the Union has funded numerous projects in the area. Political and strategic dimensions were almost absent from this relationship.

European Union does not have a systematic approach in developing a common policy for the entire Wider Black Sea area.

Since the Cold War, European Union has always encouraged cooperation with its neighbors, which reflected in establishing new organizations in the Baltic and Black Sea under the Northern Dimension, in bringing the Mediterranean countries to Barcelona process or in creating the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, which included all the Balkan states.

It is easy to see that The Black Sea area is missing from this picture, although as already mentioned, the European Union has established good relations with its nearby countries through the European Neighborhood Policy, but without having a regional approach on cooperation in this area. In accordance with its new strategy, the European Union seeks to develop cooperation between Black Sea countries and EU, and to improve cooperation within the region.

The European Union faces a series of problems, because of pressure exercised by some neighbor countries that seek acceptance into the Union or because of its own internal concept of integration for the future Europe.

The European Union could play a dominant role in regional cooperation especially via BSEC countries, which, before glancing at EU, should be paying more attention to this regional organization. As the European Union is approaching a new round of enlargement, the topics on the Black Sea area must be on its agenda. From this perspective, not adopting a comprehensive approach in recruitment and interaction with the countries of the Wider Black Sea area is not an encouraging sign. A common regional policy in The Black Sea area would allow the European Union to successfully solve issues related to its regional enlargement from the Balkans to the Caspian Sea.

The European Union knows that considering the Wider Black Sea area only in terms of security is a very important factor but is not enough. Hidden tensions and their causes must be addressed directly. The countries in the region, except Russia, seem to be attracted towards the European Union project, although a way to realize it is not detected and clearly expressed.

The European Union enlargement introduces a new factor of a strategic nature in the region by including three Black Sea costal states in the prosperity area of a common market and in future arrangements on foreign policy, security and defense policy. The approval of the conceptual framework of European Union relations with eastern neighbors participating in the BSEC is a clear indication of increasing European interest in The Black Sea area region.

The economic potential of Wider Black Sea area is shaping it as a transit area in the economic flow between the European Union and Eastern Europe and as a necessary connection to energy sources and to growing markets of Central Asia and Middle East.

In this context, a development of cooperation in the Danube river basin is expected. This would result in revitalization of river communication and would transform it into a genuine European waterway that capitalize the sea and river transport routes across the Black Sea area and connects with the Caspian Sea basin, through the Volga-Don network.

The Black Sea is a great challenge for the European Union. The risks and threats listed in the European Union Security Strategy, launched in June 2003, are located entirely in the Black Sea area. On the other hand, the Wider Black Sea area has a positive potential by being a market for European Union's products and by facilitating transportation of oil and natural gas from the Caspian Sea to Europe. Mastering the Black Sea area would diversify imports of natural resources for European countries, and this is a real asset for the Union.

CONCLUSIONS

The European Union's membership for some adjacent countries (Bulgaria, Romania), as well as its interest in Turkey, a country which is, as already mentioned, on the list of potential members, inherently requires European Union's involvement in The Black Sea area. In this region, there are three European Union's policies involved – enlargement to the south-east Europe and Turkey, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), for Ukraine, Moldova and the three South Caucasus states – Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan and the European Union – Russian relationships, moving towards a "strategic partnership".

However, these initiatives provide only a partial picture of the contribution wanted by the European Union in the region. When we are dealing with cross-border threats and challenges such as migration, crime prevention, infrastructure or pollution, bilateral mechanisms are effective only up to a certain limit. Doubtlessly, each of these three processes include wider regional considerations, taking into account that the European Commission encourages partners to engage in regional formats or to adjust to existing obligations under various multilateral arrangements within the United Nation, European Council or OSCE.

Furthermore, the European Union has sponsored several regional programs to The Black Sea area in different fields as environment, transport and energy.

What is missing from this impressive range of instruments is an overall strategic approach. There may be several reasons for this: common feeling of "over stretching" that followed the 2004 enlargement, the differential approach towards

Russia of several states located in a region that Moscow refers to as "foreign neighborhood" and – unlike the Baltic or Mediterranean Sea examples – the absence of lobbying in Brussels towards the Black Sea area.

Launching and promoting of initiatives in its area of responsibility is not new in European Union's policy. Therefore, the European Union is promoting regional cooperation as a logical extension of Union's judgment on integration and control of resources, by coordinating actions and building confidence through increased cross border cooperation.

The way that the European Union had promoted regionalization varied largely depending on the specific circumstances and the type of actors present in each region. Schematically, we can identify two regional models – an outside to inside model and an inside to outside model.

The European Union's favorite was the outside to inside model, by which, under EU's guidance, several regional initiatives were launched and coordinated. This is the case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe [7]. Here, there was no regional mechanism, and the European Union had to deal mostly with strategic, conceptual and managerial aspects. The Stability Pact also applies to several categories of actors - non-EU countries (Canada, Japan, Norway, Russia, Sweden, Turkey and the United States of America), international financial institutions and other UN agencies and various regional organizations (e.g.: Cooperation Initiative in South-Eastern Europe, etc.).

There are many other reasons why the European Union should rethink the region more systematically. With the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, which, as members, "have gained the status of equal partners of all other states, both in rights and obligations" [8], the European Union expanded to the Black Sea coast and will have to ensure a long-term perspective in a region vital for its security and its foreign policy ambitions. In addition, Russia's pressure on some countries in the region may have an impact on some strategic interests of the enlarged Union. More practically, the existence of several regional initiatives that have overlapped, led to dispersion of resources and to the distortion of The Black Sea area's image. In particular, by launching the ENP, the European Union is now able to contribute to the systematization and the revival of what has been built in the past 15 years.

To conclude with, there is no clear European Union strategy to approach the Wider Black Sea Area as a whlole. The European Union has rather developed a special partnership with Russia, "regulated by just a few of core documents and political continuous dialogue" [9].

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HAZARDS, RISKS AND SECURITY THREATS INTO THE WIDER BLACK SEA AREA

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Abstract
     The Wider Black Sea area has captured the interest of great actors (states, international organizations, transnational companies) due to as position and multiple economic incentives as well as the manifestation due to of specific risks and threats. The security environment of the area is the subject to changes in two major aspects: the impact of NATO enlargement and the European Union on the region and develop cooperation between riparian states. The approach of the wider Black Sea through the security perspective aims to highlight the importance of the region in maintaining the regional and international security. In this regard, it is intended to analyze the dynamics of security in this area within several dimensions: political, military, social and security.
     Keywords: *security, risks, threats, dimensions, challenges*

INTRODUCTION

     The early of XXI century once again says, in the geopolitical and geostrategic parameters of a new international order, the importance and the complex significance of the Wider Black Sea Area in the globalization process. The historical region of the Black Sea extended under the geostrategic pressure of the geopolitical interests of the major global actors, has become more intense interaction space of the geopolitical and geostrategic obvious globally.
     Black Sea and the Wider Black Sea came into geopolitical and geostrategic equation of the XXI century in the context in which the most famous regional, continental or transcontinental mutations are part of globalization. Beyond the region's historic character, played by the great powers, the Wider Black Sea has always proven to be a geopolitical and geostrategic configuration with global meanings.
     The end of the Cold War and the beginning of XXI century gave to the Black Sea area, through changes into the Euro Atlantic geopolitics and geo-strategy, the characteristics of space proximity of NATO and the EU, a space, where, in the procedural context of globalization, we find, naturally, global players, global trends, global interdependencies, risks and threats, also with determination and potentially the global assertion.[13]
     The literature, the agendas of states and international organizations have experienced a new concept: the Wider Black Sea; concept presented in a study published in June 2004 on Policy Review Magazine by researchers Ronald D.

Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson [5]. This area include marine and terrestrial areas of Eastern and South-East, Caucasus and Middle East as an intersection area of the strategic directions and the routes that provide the connections between West and East and the competition or cooperation between various international actors.

On the Wider Black Sea Area "scene" rather we encounter important international actors and among them are [11]: Russian Federation, Belarus, Ukraine, Romania, Moldova, Bulgaria, Turkey, Caucasus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Azeris in Iran, North Caucasus, U.S., NATO, European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, World Bank and International Monetary Fund. These actors are added: GUUAM, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe Cooperation Process the States in South-East Europe (SEECP), Initiative for Cooperation in South East Europe (SECI), European Defense Ministers Conference South East (SEDM), Council of Europe, the United Nations, World Trade Organization.

The threats to national security are given by capabilities, strategies, intentions, plans that enhances a threat to fundamental attributes or existential qualities of the Romanian state, of the economic base of society, constitutional order, fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens. This is reflected by attitudes, gestures, acts, facts which creates imbalances situations and instability, and, generates danger conditions to the fundamental values and / or to the national interests, with impact on national security.

The threats, as an indicator for assessing of the threat or imminent harm to national security are identified in relation to (political, economic, military, social, environmental) nature, form (attitude, gestures, acts, facts, events, phenomena, actions human), stage (latent, possible, probable, imminent) and, according to the type of actions envisaged (overt, covert, mixed, violent, nonviolent). It is necessary the dissociation of the basic threat, the development and, modes of operation multiplication by which the threat materializes and, is organized according to defense security system.

The Member efforts to satisfy their security needs without aggressive intentions lead to an increase of insecurity for other states, which they interpret as the potential threats, although these efforts are purely defensive. The end of the Cold War allowed for the company to enter into a complex processuality transition from an order based on forces balance at a different order which must be founded on the principles of democratic values, human rights and respect for cultures and, of world civilizations This period of transition to a new order is named "chaos" and, shall be subject to other laws than those of the consolidated company. Security environment has become fluid and flexible, are possible all kinds of construction, organization and, reorganization according to prevailing trends, according to impact of these trends, but also in relation to the dynamics interests and esthetic changes at the level of power poles.

In these conditions, we can appreciate that there is only one certainty: the future world will not be a homogeneous one, with an equal distribution of power, riches, resources and, capacity, risks and threats one, but a highly fragmented, which will however try a partial interested fragmentation and a reconstruction of her around of power poles completely defined: global superpower, major global

powers, large regional powers, international organizations, sources and resources, economic cultural and military alliances, demimonde.

At this stage, is intensifying the dialogue between international actors and in the globalization process of information and, economy, there is an unilateral transfer of technology from the developed countries to the less developed, while increasing the influence of norms and values of Western civilization on the other, on the background of the existence and amplification of universal values exchanges

And in the coming years, insecurity`s tendencies will be included in the area of confrontations between candidates for the supremacy powers and resources, therefore, can, equally, to stabilize the international situation on the value systems of Western civilization (which will attract for this purpose, or share the their countries, areas and even international bodies) and the actions against human values, democracy, coming in especially from the sphere of terrorism, crime, economy, drugs and human beings and from the struggle between forced and unexpected globalization supporters and, those of maintaining national sovereignty, individuality and independence of state entities

The wider Black Sea area, like other similar concepts emerged after 1990 and the developments from its security environment, is an important topic that is debated by international organizations The reason is that there is "a region with a distinct identity and a voice in the European security equation and represented from ancient times an area of maximum importance in the efforts to ensure the security of European states and Black Sea area as an entire"[6]. The frozen conflicts and, the not very large distance to the theaters of military actions in Central Asia, Lebanon, Iraq and, the Palestinian territories brings more into attention to the international organizations the issue of security, economic cooperation and development of this region Along with Euro-Atlantic integration of Central European and Eastern European the economic development problems and security from the Wider Black Sea during the last decade of the twentieth century were ignored or constituted the object of marginal interest, can not be lightly dismissed

Movement of device towards the east of the continent European NATO by including the Romania and Bulgaria, places for the first time the Black Sea states in a position of numerical parity: three littoral states are NATO members (Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey) to the south and west, and other three Black Sea littoral states, non-NATO countries (Georgia, Ukraine and Russian Federation) to the north and east. In these conditions, the status of the Black Sea being a sea located exclusively under the influence of in former Soviet countries ceases, the presence of international organizations in the region is not only symbolic, but also shows the demarcation of new geo-strategic dimension

After the Cold War, the Wider Black Sea has returned to center-border activities in a positive sense (trade, tourism and transportation of energy resources), but also in a negative sense (intersection point of supply and demand for various illicit trafficking) Adding the negative cross-border activities, frozen conflicts, terrorism, the radicalization of secessionist autonomy movements, organized crime realized that the region knows major challenges at their own security

The economic development and population welfare from the Wider Black Sea is often directly dependent on richness controlled resources [3]. Therefore the special attention is not surprising of which this region enjoys today.

I. THE STAKEHOLDERS IN IDENTIFYING AND STRUCTURING THE RISKS, DANGERS AND THREATS COMPLEX

In identifying and imminent structuring of risks, dangers and threats complex being in the potential state into the Wider Black Sea it will make a brief presentation of their categories, depending on the intrinsic nature of their way to assert itself.

Economic factors are the economic differences between regional states and the implementation and promotion of the area or the implementation and promotion of strategies for economic development inappropriate strategies, the vast economic stake committed by the operation and the transport of oil through the Black Sea, which would lead to either relieve stress states and potential conflicts or, on the contrary, the aggravation and diversification of their actions; avoiding of small states rights in the area, to dispose of their own natural resources or, by the ones from exclusive economic zone.

The extension of local mafia networks to the West endangers without saying more, the EU economy and stability The government from Moscow, Kiev and Ankara seems unwilling, however, to firmly combat the organized crime into their areas of authority. An analysis of EU Observer from April 2009 highlighted that the "black market" was in East, in average, between 30-40% of real GDP In Georgia, the "black market" reached the level of 68% and Ukraine 57% of real GDP [14].

In addition to the types of threats which characterize the Black Sea area it should also adding: the consolidation delay of the new independent states, the geopolitical heterogeneity of the frozen conflicts, the accumulation, in the area, of the large amounts of weapons, ammunition and radioactive materials, insecure controlled, the presence of Russian forces, despite the CFE Treaty and of the Istanbul commitments (OSCE), unprotected exposure at the globalization market competition, the possibility quite often asserted, to take unruly protests, revolutions, violent internal unrest, coups, exacerbation of nationalism.[8]

For the risks and threats with openness character from the Wider Black Sea they are not founded effective and pragmatic solutions to deal only if the correct diagnosis recourse to sources of instability and at attentive and laborious knowledge of the characteristics of the international security environment in the end the context of bipolarity and the reorganization of power centers.[10]

II. CHALLENGES OF UNSOLVED CONFLICTS IN THE WIDER BLACK SEA

This section presents the security situation in the wider Black Sea in terms of traditional security threats and institutional mechanisms to tackle the security threats in the region. As such, it focuses mainly on the unresolved conflicts, which is undoubtedly the main threat to security in the region, and also they are directly

linked to easier security issues such as organized crime. This section also discusses about the evolution of NATO's role in the wider Black Sea, given its role as dominant security institution in Europe.

The Wider Black Sea area was seriously affected by the persistence of unsolved conflicts, which are all an inheritance of the Soviet Union split. Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, Moldova and Transnistria, all, withdrawing to from the former soviet republics to which belonged to the early 1990s. The conflicts remain unresolved across the insecure ceasefire lines. The violence has returned more than once through the conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and even though, the Nagorno-Karabakh and also Transnistria has not been so far for it, a relapse of the war remains a particular opportunity.

Europe, and elsewhere, was confronted with a growing number of conflicts, many of these were unexpected, the escalation of them exceeding even their projections and conferring them an "international" scale.

Presently, in the foreign policy and security sphere as well as media the conflicts of "enlarged Black Sea area" (Transinistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh) appear as "frozen conflicts". Aside from somewhat confusing character, these conflicts are mentioned in all strategic documents, security and foreign policy of the regional countries and sometimes in ones of the EU and NATO. For example, according to the National Security Strategy, "Black Sea region is the richest part of Europe and probably one of the densest in the world, in separatist conflicts, disputes or tense situations" that "pose serious threats to the security region and creates the triggering danger of the violent confrontations [15]. All these documents say, more or less explicitly, that the presence of these conflicts in the neighborhood of strategic EU and NATO constitutes a threat to European security and NATO.

The term "frozen conflict" means an acute conflict situation, but without recourse to armed violence widespread, due to the mutual exhaustion of the combatants in the previous phase of the military conflict and/or discouraging exercised by the presence of a big regional powers or any powers outside the system. The parties see themselves as further in the situation to have the incompatible goals and the stakes are "zero-sum game", therefore the primary concern of each is to accumulate power (as the economic and internal political consolidation, the arms as well as by the possible alliance with other states) and to improve their position relative to the opponents. The final resolution of the conflict is postponed voluntarily, pending a favorable conjuncture when the opponent will be convinced or compelled to give up [4].

From the liberal-institutionalist perspective, the frozen conflicts constitute a deviation from the correct standard inter-state behavior, namely the security through cooperation. Their existence prevents the security environment evolution to "tamed" shape of the systemic anarchy, to the international security regimes and later to the "security community".[1]

In the Black Sea the existence of unconsolidated states, with weak administrative capacity, poverty and economic disparities, with a not insignificant phenomenon of corruption and criminal networks active enough determines the

reconsideration of NATO and EU position to security policy in the region. NATO and EU enlargement "until the Black Sea borders, and especially the global aspirations of these organizations determines the Black Sea exit from the shadow periphery of Europe and the affirmation of a new geopolitical realities, of interface with other areas, Central Asia and the Middle East".

During 2006-2008, it is found the maintenance of frozen conflict outbreaks "inherited" from the 90 - Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh - and the inability to arrive at a negotiated multilateral solution that should satisfy stakeholders and lead to lasting peace. Although external actors such as EU, U.S., or the UN and OSCE institutions, were involved in negotiating structures with countries like Russia, Ukraine and direct stakeholders (Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia that separatist entities) not have been achieved real results. Moreover, the outbreak of a conventional military conflict between Georgia and Russia led to the proclamation of independence by South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which difficult dealt a blow to European territorial order as it was established in Helsinki in 1975 (Ionescu, 2009).

The South Ossetia and Abkhazia, helped massively and decisively by Russia proclaimed their independence in 2008, which shows that the transformation of a conflict "frozen" in the conflict "active" may have more serious effects than the maintenance of it into its original state. Nothing could discourage the Russia from a military intervention, even contrary to international law. A serious consequence of this short and bloody military conflict is the large number of refugees: according to UNHCR, about 192,000 civilians were displaced by war in August 2008, of which more than 35,000 are not returned to their homes, in December 2008.

Immediately after the war ended, Georgia announced that it will leave CSI This fact creates a precedent, after the Baltic states. Ukraine has also radicalized its stand on Russia the President Yushchenko adopting measures to reduce the freedom of movement of the Russian fleet in Sevastopol, confining her right to cross the border to Ukraine; measures which, however, were rejected. In addition, encouraged by the "treatment" applied by Russian to Georgia, other separatist entities have increased their political actions designed to allow them gaining the independence or the unification to Russia. Georgia had hoped, generally, that its integration into the NATO then in the EU will lead to economic prosperity and the Ossetia and Abkhazia will be convinced that it is more profitable to returning to Georgia state. In addition, Russia has threatened on several occasions the Tbilisi that NATO integration efforts will only lead to bloodshed and conflict in those areas.[7]

The events of 2008 determined the development of a growing interest of international actors for the wider Black Sea, Caucasus and Central Asia. The wider Black Sea States - Caucasus - Central Asia have a double hypostasis: viewed from Brussels, they are part of the EU's eastern neighborhood, but seen from the Kremlin, they are part of the "near abroad" of Russia. Therefore, each of them looks like chess pieces on the table waiting to be moved. The issues that the area raises are countless - ethnic conflicts, religious mosaic, frozen conflicts, instability, the presence of democratic institutions, the collapse of some states, economic backwardness, authoritarian regimes.[9]

The new security environment of the early XXI century is becoming more complex and dynamic. He signals the increase and diversification the type of security actors (from one-two to five and perhaps the diversification will continue) [2] by emergence of a new security state actors, with globalist ambitions, to which, simultaneously, they add: organization and existing international security bodies - the UN, NATO, OSCE, EU, etc.., NGOs with concerns of a different nature (humanitarian, anti-globalization, environmental) security transnational actors such as religious and ethnic movements, terrorist groups, drug cartels or different sects and various other groups in national or international.

With major implications in the new security environment, in the European security,, regional and Euro-Atlantic stability and are part as it was stated, also the two processes of great complexity and scale: the transformation and expansion of NATO and EU, two processes which will continue to challenge the geopolitical and geostrategic significant changes and in other world regions out of the Wider Black Sea, such as: Central Asia, Middle East or in transatlantic relations plan.

CONCLUSIONS

Looking ahead, it is evident that the Wider Black Sea region has a considerable potential for further development, of regional cooperation, in the major advantage of the states in this part of Europe and of entire continent. The European Union, through the member countries of the region - Bulgaria, Greece and Romania - and its initiatives in the Black Sea may also contribute in a substantial degree at the entry of all states from this space on the trajectory of political, economic, democratic values and of european security.

A significant contribution to stability and security of the region, and particularly at the consolidation of democratic reforms and at the efforts of peaceful settlement of conflicts and disputes from this part of Europe, returns to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CoE). In their capacity as member states of the two organizations, all the nations of the Black Sea region have subscribed to the principles and values of the OSCE and EC and, therefore, at the duty to observe and of their transposition to life. In the same spirit, the NATO, through its members of the Black Sea - Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Turkey - and through the Alliance promoted partnerships with the Russian Federation, Ukraine and other countries in the region, is in the position to make a vital contribution at stability and security of this area, in the common interest of all states in the area, of the entire Europe, of the U.S. and of universal peace.

EU should analyze the opportunity to launch a police civilian mission in Transnistria, what would constitute a first ESDP mission in the former Soviet space. Following the model of EU mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to this mission could attend the EU countries - including Romania, as the Union State external border as well as third countries with direct interests in the area, such Russian Federation and Ukraine.

Romania can use its triple status as member state of NATO and EU and the host country of the U.S. military forces for maintaining Transnistria`s issue on the

agenda of foreign policy and security of the main actors of international politics and also, to support the strategic objective of the EU`s and U.S. decisive involvement, as the full members in the conflict mediation mechanism.

Finally, the United Nations (UN), through the increasing attention which they attribute to the extension of regional cooperation in various parts of the world and through the BSEC observer status at UN, represents a significant support in goodwill of the multilateral deepening cooperation in the Wider Black Sea.

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A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH ON MOLDAVIA'S SECURITY

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Abstract

Because of its position at the borders of the European Union and the Russian Federation, the Republic of Moldavia continues to be a focal point of interest for all international relations scholars. The aim of this study is to provide an integrated security analysis on Moldavia, on the model proposed by Barry Buzan and the Copenhagen School of International Relations. Therefore, we will not only address the military dimension of security, but also the political, economic, societal and environmental sectors, in the attempt to discover whether the issues which have currently found their place on the public agenda as security issues deserve to be there, or whether we are witnessing at least in certain areas a phenomenon of over-securitization or misplaced securitization.

Keywords: Republic of Moldavia, constructivism, securitization, Copenhagen School, analysis

INTRODUCTION

In the view of the Copenhagen School, the securitization of an issue takes place in two easily identifiable stages. The first stage occurs when key actors, within a state resort to a particular type of discourse, embedded with concepts such as threat, risk and vulnerability in key sectors. However, a problem is securitized only in a second stage, when the public accepts this rhetoric as real.

This study attempts to provide a comprehensive analysis of Moldavia's security by following the path of securitization for key issues in all the five sectors, identified by Buzan: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. As public acceptance of securitization is inherently a vague concept, we have decided, for the benefit of this study to assimilate it to inclusion of an issue in a national strategic document.

Therefore, we have selected a set of strategies from various fields, formulated by Moldavian authorities, which we analyzed with the purpose of identifying the issues described in terms of securitization. We have decided to focus on the period between 2009 and 2011, because this is the moment when Moldavia experienced a significant regime change, from a pro-Russian government to a pro-European one. As securitization is closely connected with the regime type, is it clear that using a larger time frame would have given rise to analysis inconsistencies because of the difference in ideology.

Although, a comparison between the 2008 National Security Strategy and the 2011 version of the document would have shown many similarities on the

surface (common threats), the interpretation of each problem is significantly different.

Moreover, the methodological framework of analysis proposed by the Copenhagen School has been adapted, because some of the threats mentioned in Moldavian strategic documents affect more than one sector, and thus they must be analyzed separately. The study focuses on both threats and risks, because both of them are subject to securitization, whether in the present of in the future and enable political actors to use extraordinary measures to combat them.

In parallel this paper attempts to provide an answer for three fundamental questions: who are the actors engaged in securitization, what are the objects/domains securitized and whether the choice for securitization is supported by reality or not.

I. CONSTRUCTIVIST SECURITY ANALYSIS

1.1. Military

In the military sector, the object of reference (what needs to be protected) is general the nation-state, although other political entities could become a target as well. There are many types of threats included in this category beside war, such as the use of violence by an opponent, blockades and limited bombardments. In such circumstances states, can develop several response strategies, starting from the identification of potential enemies to institutional measures aimed at increasing the defence budget, the size and quality of the armed forces, as well as strengthening the relations between the army and the rest of the society and joining military alliances.

According to Buzan, when the military security refers to domestic threats, it is concerned with the elites' ability to preserve the peace and territorial integrity. This type of securitization can be encountered in the Moldavian 2011 National Security Strategy, which mentions the frozen conflict in Transdniester as a direct threat to the country's security. The object of reference here is the Moldavian state, mainly its territorial integrity, while the actor of securitization is the Moldavian authorities. In this case, the functional actors are both the Russian Federation, which is interested in preserving the status-quo and implicitly the frozen conflict and the European Union, the United States and OSCE, which consider the conflict in Transdniester a threat to regional security and a source of regional instability and have been offering Moldavian authorities their support in finding a peaceful solution for the problem.

The discourse of securitization concerning Transdniester is not new in Moldavia, the same rhetoric being visible in the 2008 National Security Strategy. In spite of this apparent similarity, the manner in which the problem was framed then is completely different. In the 2011 Strategy the conflict in Transdniester is closely connected with the presence of foreign troops on the territory of Moldavia, both issues forming the threat to Moldavian military strategy. However, in the 2008 document, this element was completely missing, Russian military presence not being considered a threat at the time. This change is a direct proof of how a change

in government and ideology leads to a significant rethinking of the securitization process.

Assessing whether a process of securitization is based on a matter-of-fact perception of reality or on a distorted/subjected to foreign influence one can be done by analyzing the evolution of the problem in time. In the case of the Transdniester conflict there is sufficient evidence to consider the Moldavian securitization of the issue as necessary and justified. The presence of foreign military troops on Moldavian territory (without the consent of the authorities), clearly poses a direct threat to the country's national security. Moreover, the aggressive rhetoric used by Transdniester's political leaders aimed at gaining international recognition as an independent state, together with the creation of parallel state institutions (elections, national and local governmental entities) are threats to Moldavian territorial integrity.

Furthermore, this violent discourse was put into practice generating diplomatic conflict between Moldavian and Transdniester authorities, like in the case of the arrest of Moldavian journalist Ernest Vărdărean accused of espionage activities or the death of Vadim Pisari, a young Moldavian shot by Russian troops at the border between Moldavia and Transdniester.

1.2. Political

Political security refers to the organizational stability of the political order, focusing on non-military threats to national sovereignty. The Copenhagen School divides political threats into two main categories: targeting the international legitimacy of the political entity – deep ideological cleavages dividing the society, lack of legitimacy of political institutions, pressures with which authorities cannot cope and targeting the foreign recognition of the state [1].

Another dimension of political security is the protection of human rights and liberties and all aspects concerning individual security. The objects of reference for political security are the nation-state, supra-national entities, such as the European Union, societal groups without a state structure and transnational entities. The securitization actors are, in comparison to other sectors, easily identifiable in the person of the government and the political elite [2].

The Moldavian 2011 National Security Strategy mentions among the threats to political security the following issues: corruption, foreign coercion, organized crime, terrorism, low securitization of national borders, political instability, and proliferation of WMDs.

In the case of corruption, the actors of securitization are both the Moldavian government and international organizations such as the European Union and NATO. We have chosen to include EU and NATO in the category of securitization actors and not functional actors, because by explicitly including the fight against corruption among the fundamental requirements for Moldavia's accession to these organizations, they have presses Moldavian authorities into securitizing this issue. In the category of functional actors we may include strong lobby groups such as Transparency International, which through their periodical reports can influence the political decision-process.

The securitization of corruption appears to be reality-based if we take into consideration the studies and reports made by various organization, both from inside and outside Moldavia concerning the scale of this phenomenon. For example the Corruption Perceptions Index calculated annually by Transparency International presents Moldavia as a country where corruption is very common. In the last 12 years the value of this index, calculated on a scale from 0 to 10, where the small values indicate a larger spread of corruption has fluctuated between 2,1 and 3,3 (for 2010 it was 2,9) [3].

The Worldwide Governance Indicators, calculated annually by the World Bank, include the control over corruption among the other fields addressed. The value of this indicator for Moldavia has been decreasing constantly between 1999 and 2004, from 55% to 16%. Between 2005 and 2007 it has experienced a slow growth from 31% to 35%, followed by a decline in the course of the following years, reaching in 2009 the value of 26%. A similar situation is presented by the Index of Economic Freedom, calculated annually by the Heritage Foundation, which shows an improvement of economic freedom in Moldavia between 2005 and 2007 followed by a decline in the next years [4].

The second threat to political security is foreign coercion, which refers to outside pressures applied on Moldavian authorities of an economic or political nature, including here the penetration of Moldavian intelligence services by the intelligence services of other countries. The object of reference here is the Moldavian state, while the actor of securitization is the Moldavian government. However, in this case, because of the special nature of the threat and the lack of open source information on the subject we cannot measure the degree in which this securitization is based on real facts.

Organized crime is the third threat to Moldavian political security mentioned in its strategic documents. The Moldavian state is the object of reference and the government together with international organizations are actors of securitization. Available statistics in the field appear to show that securitization of organized crime is legitimate. Most documents addressing the issue of organized crime networks in Europe consider Moldavia a source of human trafficking. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that the headquarters of most Moldavian organized crime networks are located in Transdniester. The need for securitizing this issue is briefly explained in section two of the National Strategy for Preventing and Combating Organized Crime, which mentions a rise in the number of crimes from 34 in 2008 to 60 in 2010 [5]. Furthermore, reports issued by the US Department of State mention that the Government of Moldova does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking, although efforts have been conducted in the field. Nevertheless, the same document acknowledges the fact that "organized criminal (OC) activity, both local and transnational in nature, exists in Moldova but is limited" [6].

The international perception on the scale of organized crime activity in Moldavia could be distorted by the fact that usually this analysis focus only on criminal networks led and composed of Moldavian citizens, disregarding other organized crime groups active on Moldavian territory but including residents of foreign countries.

Terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs is another political security concern included in the risk category by the Moldavian National Security Strategy. The object of reference is the Moldavian state, but the actor of securitization in not the Moldavian government but international institutions. After 9/11 all European countries members or non-members of NATO and EU included terrorism and the proliferation of WMD among the threats to their national security. Therefore, this is not so much the case of a governmental choice as it is an alignment to the international trend in the field. As to whether the securitization of terrorism and WMD proliferation is grounded in reality, it is hard to provide a full answer. Although Moldavia is not currently facing a visible terrorist threat or WMD proliferation problem, the securitization of such an issue cannot be considered misplaced as its geographical position at the Eastern border of the EU and the existence of the frozen conflict in Transdniester could become potential sources for such threats in the future.

Political stability, considered a risk to national security is securitized by the Moldavian government, the object of reference being the rule of law. The NGOs concerned with preserving the rule of law and insuring the democratic transition of Moldavia can be included in the category of functional actors.

According to the Moldavian National Security Strategy, political instability refers to the high frequency of electoral cycles and the political gridlock generated by the lack of consensus between the country's elites. Assessments of research institutes in the field, such as Freedom House Country Report [7] or Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index place Moldova on the right path after the 2009 regime change, although it still has to face certain obstacles [8]. Although the securitization of political instability is not completely justified, it can be explained by the short democratic tradition of Moldavian institutions and legislation in the field. We must remember that the Moldavian electoral law and most state institutions have undergone a significant transformation after 2010.

1.3. Economic

According to the Copenhagen School, economic security may address a wide variety of issues such as: the capacity of states of preserving independent capabilities for producing military equipment, the possibility of exploiting the economic dependences on the world market for political purposes, the fear that the global market will deepen the existing cleavages between rich and poor, fear of the dark side of capitalism, mainly of the illicit trade and of trade with military equipments (weapons of mass destruction), the pressure generated by the spread of mass production and consumption and fear of international economic and financial crises [9].

The economic sector comprises multiple objects of reference, ranging from individuals to social classes, the state, abstract and complex systems of the world market, while the actors of securitization are the state, international organizations, large corporations and other economic entities. The role of functional actors is played in this sector mainly by companies who have interest in influencing the decision-making process [10].

The issues securitized in the 2011 Moldavian National Security Strategy are: poverty, economic underdevelopment, energy dependence, instability of the financial system, the health and education system, demographic security, food insecurity and the global financial crisis.

In what concerns poverty the object of reference is the national economy, while the actor of securitization is the Moldavian government. Securitization in this field is grounded in reality as available statistics on Moldavian economy show a very high threshold of poverty. For example, in 2011 the unemployment rate was 6, 2% in 2011, while the percentage of population living below the poverty line was 26, 3% in 2009. Moldavia is among the poorest countries in the region, occupying the 163 place in the world at GDP per capita. At regional level, Moldavia has managed to outclass at GDP per capita only Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan [11].

For economic underdevelopment, the object of reference is the national economy and the actors of securitization are the Moldavian government and the European Union. There is sufficient evidence supporting this type of securitization, as almost one-third of the labour force works in the agriculture sector [12], while another third works abroad [13], the inflation rate was 7, 6% in 2011 and the economy is highly dependent on imports [14].

In the case of energy dependence, the object of securitization is the national economy, while the actor of securitization is the Moldavian Government. Here, the European Union acts as a functional actor, having an interest in supporting Moldavia's efforts for gaining energy independence. Factual evidence on Moldavian energy security supports the idea of a credible securitization. Thus, almost 98% of all primary energy resources in Moldavia are imported, the countries being dependent of the energy resources provided by Russia and Ukraine [15]. The situation further dwindles because of the non-uniform location of electricity generation capacity on the territory of the Republic of Moldova and the advanced level of decay of the equipment (about 60-70%) of power stations, high voltage power lines and distribution networks.

Additionally, the Moldavian energy dependence gave rise to strains in the country's relations with Ukraine and the Russian Federation. A recent example was the electricity crisis from April 2012, when the Ukrainian authorities stopped the electricity supply to Moldavia, as a means to exert pressure on Moldavian authorities, forcing them to agree to an increase in the cost of the kilowatt [16]. We encounter a similar situation in the relation between the Republic of Moldavia, SA "Moldovagaz" (national energy provider) and "Gazprom" (Russian energy provider). In December 31st 2011, "Moldovagaz" owned "Gazprom" over 3 billion and 150 million dollars, from which 350 million represented the debt from the right side of the Dniester, while 2 billion and 800 million was the debt from the left bank [17].

Therefore, the issue of energy security is closely connected with the frozen conflict in Transdniester as almost 80% of all facilities generating electricity are situated on the left bank of the Dniester river [18].

The health and demographic problems were subjected to a common securitization in the 2011 Moldavian National Security Strategy. The object of

reference here is both the national economy and the state as a whole. The actor of securitization is the Moldavian government, while the functional actors are international organizations active in the field, such as the European Union and the United Nations. The statistics included in the 2011 Moldavian Demographic Strategy offer significant evidence in support of the securitization. According to it, the Moldavian population is experiencing a constant decrease of 8000 individuals annually, the birth rate has sharply decreased, while the level of mortality, remains elevated in comparison to more developed countries. Life expectancy has gradually increased, but there are still significant disparities between rural and urban areas, and between men and women. Contrary to global trends, Moldavia is experiencing a process of rustication. In addition, the number of young people is continuously decreasing in comparison to the elderly, as they experience a process of accelerated demographic ageing. All these have led to a decline of the percentage of active population from the total population, from 60% to 44, 8% [19]. In addition there are certain factors, such as alcoholism, smoking, drug-use, the spread of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis [20], which further aggravate matters, which is why Moldavian authorities have included them among the possible risks to national security [21].

The securitization of the education system was done in close connection to the demographic issue. In this case, the object of reference is the Moldavian state, the actor of securitization is the government and functional actors are the European Union and other organizations active in the field. The main problem of the education system is the sharp decrease in the number of school children, with 31, 9% less in 2009, than in 2001 for the 5-9 age group and 33, 3% for the 10-14 age group. This trend will have negative consequences for the future, as it will lead to the cutback of several thousand teaching jobs, an inefficient use of financial resources (schools will have an insufficient number of pupils), an increase in the number of people under the threshold of poverty (studies indicate that poverty and the educational level are directly connected) [22].

The global financial crisis is another of the issues securitized in the economic sector. As in the previous cases the object of reference is the national economy and the actor of securitization, the Moldavian government. The negative impact of the crisis on Moldavian economy appears to support the need for securitization of this issue. Starting with the outbreak of the crisis in 2009, foreign investment decreased from 11, 4 % of the GDP to 2%, the export of goods and services decreased with 22%, and the imports decreased with more than 35%. The combination of these factors led to a decline in performance of the GDP with 9% in real terms. At the end of 2009, there were 73,900 unemployed persons, more than double compared to the same period in 2008 [23]. Due to the crisis, pressures on the national currency increased and at the end of 2009 the Moldovan Leu was devalued and reserves of the National Bank Moldova (NBM) were used to counter the consequences of the crisis and to stabilize the exchange rate. In 2010, however, monetary policy was tightened again in order not to miss the 5% target for inflation [24]. The crisis, also affected budgetary revenues, which decreased in the first part of 2009 with 6, 9% generating an unprecedented budgetary deficit of over 2,5 billion Lei. This deficit is 8, 6% higher than the level reached in the same period of 2008. Moreover, in 2008 for the first time in the last three years the level of

absolute poverty in Moldavia has increased with 0, 6% and the level of extreme poverty with 0, 4% [25].

In regard to food insecurity, the object of reference is again the national economy and the actor of securitization, the Moldavian authorities. The studies elaborated by the Institute of Economy, Finance and Statistics within the Moldavian Academy of Science seem to support the idea of a legitimate securitization of this issue. The food security indicators show that in the Republic of Moldavia the level of consumption of food products per inhabitant has stabilized in the last years. Nevertheless, the current level of consumption is much lower than in neighboring countries, such as Romania or Ukraine. The low level of consumption of the main food products in comparison to other countries can be partially explained both by the reduction and instability of production in this field. Thus, compared to 1995, meat production has decreased with 42%, milk with 9%, potatoes with 31% and vegetables with 7%. This negative tendency is believed to continue in the following years, because of the Moldavian economy's dependence on climate conditions and the instability of prices as a result of the global financial crisis [26].

1.4. Societal

The most important concept when referring to societal security is that of identity. Societal insecurity occurs when different types of communities perceive a certain evolution of events or situation as a threat to their survival as a group. Therefore, societal security does not address security at the level of the individual, but it is concerned with collective identities and the means of preserving these identities [27].

Although the agenda of societal security has undergone significant changes throughout the years, the most common threats in the field are the following: migration, horizontal competition and vertical competition. A fourth threat identified by Buzan is depopulation as a result of disease, war, famine, natural disasters or extermination policies. The object of reference for this sector can be any type of large groups who can glibly argue that their identity is threatened. Currently, the most important objects of reference are tribes, clans, nations, civilizations, religion and race.

The 2011 National Security Strategy securitized migration with the object of securitization being the Moldavian people and the actor of securitization the government. A brief analysis of the subject reveals the existence of sufficient factual evidence as to legitimize the movement of securitization. Thus, after gaining its independence the Republic of Moldavia experienced rising phenomena of permanent and temporary migration. In both cases the net migration rate was negative, emphasizing the fact that the number of persons permanently or temporarily leaving the country is higher than the number of persons coming to Moldavia. The main problems associated with this type of migration are the brain drain (there has been in the last years a constant increase of the number of migrants with higher or middle education leaving Moldavia to find work abroad) and the sharp decrease in the number of active population working inside the country. In 2009 the number of temporary migrants working abroad was 296,000, which represents ¼ of Moldavian labour force. Moreover, the absence of bilateral

agreements regarding the mutual recognition of diplomas together with the illegal status of Moldavian citizens working abroad does not allow Moldavian migrants to find jobs in accordance with their competences and level of education [28].

1.5. Environmental

Environmental security is a combination of two agendas: a scientific and a political one. The main issues identified as being of relevance for this field are: ecosystem disturbance, energy problems, population problems, food problems, economic problems and civil conflicts [29]. There are two main objects of reference for this sector: the environment as such and the interdependence between human civilization and the environment. Because of its characteristics, there several types of actors involved in the process of securitization: main actors [30], veto actors [31] and veto coalitions [32]. Similarly to the military domain, the environmental sector is rich in functional actors. A large percentage of them is represented by economic actors, governments and public agencies in the field [33].

Buzan identifies three main categories of threats to the environmental sector: threats to human civilization from the part of the environment, which are not generated by human actions; threats generated by human actions on the environment, which appear to have the potential of threatening the survival of human civilization; threats generated by human actions on the environment, which do not seem to have the potential of affecting the survival of human civilization [34].

Environmental issues are securitized as a whole in the 2011 Moldavian National Security Strategy, which mentions all three types of threats identified by the representatives of the Copenhagen School. Albeit there is no official strategies in the field, Moldavian authorities are currently in the process of elaborating such a document. The actors involved in securitization are the government, NGO's but also economic actors who may act as veto actors or veto coalitions. In addition, there is a large number of functional actors, including here the European Union, UN agencies and other organizations active in the field. Assessing the level of validity of this movement of securitization can be very difficult, if we take into consideration the fact that environment issues have been securitized in the last years by most governments in Europe and elsewhere as part of an international initiative.

CONCLUSIONS

Starting from the international relations theoretical framework developed by the Copenhagen School, the aim of this study was to provide a five-sector security analysis of the Republic of Moldavia. The goal was to find the answer for three key questions regarding securitization: who are the actors involved in the movement of securitization? Which are the objects of reference and is the movement of securitization justified?

Because securitization is a two-stage process, requiring also the public acceptance of the movement of securitization, we have used in our research strategic documents, elaborated in the course of the last years by the Moldavian government. Thus, we based our analysis on the supposition that securitizing an

issue in official documents adopted by political actors could be equalled with a public acceptance of the securitization.

The study of this document led us to two important conclusions. The first was that the Moldavian government employs a wider interpretation of the concept of security. Its 2011 National Security Strategy reveals the Moldavian government's desire to engage in a multi-sector reform process, aimed at enhancing the country's security. In this respect, Moldavian authorities follow an international trend in this field, which explains why they have chosen to securitize issues, such as terrorism, which have not yet proven to be real threats to the country's survival.

The second conclusion concerns the risk associated with such a complex and inclusive securitization. According to Buzan, the securitization of an issue enables the actor of securitization to take extraordinary measures in order to insure the survival of the object of reference. Moldavia is not currently a consolidated democracy and will not be so in the near future [35]. Thus, a securitization process so complex as that illustrated by Moldavian strategic documents, in a country lacking a democratic tradition, can give the governing political elites an incentive to abuse their power with the purpose of consolidating their position or hasten the rhythm of reforms.

This risk is further enhanced by the ambiguity surrounding certain issues which are securitized. For example, Moldavian authorities have decided to securitize both political and societal instability. Both issues lack a clear definition, therefore being subject to interpretation and possibility to abuse. Moreover, no other European country has securitized such problems, as their place is not within a national security strategy, but in a sectorial reformation plan, as they are not a threat to the survival of the Moldavian state.

However, foresight in this field is not possible as there are too many blind spots, which should be taken into consideration. For example we cannot measure with accuracy the determination of Moldavian elites to follow the path of European integration or the level of public acceptance in accepting extraordinary measures, perceived as being unjustified or undemocratic.

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[27] Buzan, B., Waever, O., de Wilde, J., *op.cit.,* Page 172

[28] Republic of Moldavia's 2011 Strategy for the Management of Migration and Asylum (Strategia în domeniul Managementului Migrației și Azilului din Republica Moldova 2011)

[29] Buzan, B., Waever, O., de Wilde, J., *op.cit*., Page 114

[30] Are those actors who display a strong interest for efficient international actions on environmental issues

[31] Actors such as NGO's, companies, states who play role in national/international debates on environmental issues.

[32] Buzan, B., Waever, O., de Wilde, J., *op.cit*., Page 117.

[33] *Ibid*, Pages 119-120.

[34] *Ibid*, p. 121.

[35] Democratization theories hold that for a country to be considered a consolidated democracy, several electoral cycles must pass in which elites with different ideological orientations succeed one another.

THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND THE 2008 WAR BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND GEORGIA

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Abstract

   This article explores from a responsibility to protect (R2P) perspective the 2008 armed conflict between the Russian Federation and Georgia. After a brief account of the five-day war and its background, the paper presents the justifications provided by the Russian side, considering in detail its contention that the use of force was consistent with the R2P concept enshrined in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. Further on, the views on the R2P advanced by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change are compared with the political understanding of this concept within the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document in order to asses the criticism of the use of R2P language by the Russian Federation putted forward by Gareth Evans, International Crisis Group, Roy Allison, Donald Steinberg and Thomas G. Weiss and Cristina G. Badescu. The article concludes that all these criticism are fallacious and that they indicate that a new understanding of the R2P concept has already emerged.

   Keywords: *responsibility to protect, Russian-Georgian war, 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, protection of nationals abroad*

I. THE 2008 RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN WAR

1.1. Overview of the war and its background

   When Georgia declared its independence from the Soviet Union on 9 April 1991, the central government was already involved in a civil war in the breakaway province of South Ossetia [1]. After a few failed attempts to extend its authority over the entire province and confronted with separatist claims in the province of Abkhazia, the Georgian Government signed on 24 June 1992 a ceasefire agreement known as the Sochi Agreement. According to this document, the control over a part of South Ossetia was granted to the separatists and a Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF) made up of Georgian, Russian and Ossetian units and placed under Russian command was established.

   For twelve years the re-emergence of the armed conflict was avoided, but after Mikhail Saakashvili became the President of Georgia, in January 2004, the situation began to deteriorate and military confrontations erupted again in the night of 10-11 August 2004 but ended two days later when a ceasefire was signed [2]. After these events, the confidence between the rival parties constantly diminished, an important contributive factor being the so-called "passportisation " policy of the

Russian Federation which started in 2002 and represented a mass-conferral of Russian nationality on residents of South Osseti and its overall effect was that until August 2008 the overwhelming majority of the Ossetians had acquired Russian nationality[3].

From July 2008, the violent incidents intensified in South Ossetia and became alarmingly severe in the first week of August. On 7 August both sides used mortars and artillery and, after inconclusive negotiations at the JPKS Headquarters during morning, Mr. Saakashvili announced at 19.00 hours a unilateral ceasefire that was respected by the belligerents until 22.00 hours when the separatists resumed their attacks. The Georgian forces responded at 23.50 by shelling the Ossetian positions from Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. At 1.00 on 8 August, Georgian forces launched a large-scale ground offensive against Tskhinvali, forcing the separatists to pull-back so that by the afternoon of 8 August the Georgians controlled a large part of the town and some villages around it [4]. The same day Russian armored vehicles units entered Georgia through the Roki tunnel and engaged the Georgian forces [5]. In the morning of 8 August, the Russian air forces started to attack targets located outside South Ossetia and sent more troops in the province, obliging the Georgian forces to withdrew in the evening from most of Tskhinvali. The next day, the Georgians tried to recapture the town but were repelled while Russia intensified its pressure by sending warships from the Black Sea Fleet into the Georgian territorial waters in order to set up a maritime security zone. On 10 August, the Russian Federation enhanced its military presence in South Ossetia and began to sent troops also in Abkhazia which late in the evening started to move deep into the Georgian territory. The Russian air raids went on and the Russian warships tightened their control over Georgian ports. Overwhelmed, Georgin forces began to retreat towards the city of Gori, most of them being out of South Ossetia by midnight. On 11 August, Russian forces continued to advance from Abkhazia and also, pursuing Georgians, crossed the administrative boundaries of South Ossetia and headed towards Gori. On 12 August the Russian troops, supported by aviation, managed to occupy important Georgian towns and destroyed their military facilities. The same day, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy, also acting in the name of the European Union, mediated a six-point ceasefire agreed by both the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili.

1.2. Russian justifications for the use of force

According to Roy Allison [6], the Russian Federation putted forward three types of justifications for its military intervention in Georgia, namely self defence, peace enforcement and the responsibility to protect (R2P). The self-defence was invoked with respect to the Russian peacekeeping contingent to the JPKF and to the Russian own territory. Thus, in a letter to the UN Security Council on 13 August 2008, the Russian Federation argued that it had acted under article 51 of the UN Charter, given that its peacekeeping contingent had been illegally attacked by Georgia. Besides this argument provided by Alison, one could mention the official statement from 8 August of Dmitry Medvedev when he declared that "Last night, Georgia troops committed what amounts to an act of aggression against Russian

peacekeepers" [8]. Also, Allison mentions that at the meeting with the members of the Valdai Club on 11 September 2008, Vladimir Putin, the then Russian Prime Minister, said "What did you want us to do? (…) when an aggressor comes into your territory, you need to punch him in the face – an aggressor needs to be punished" [8]. The peace enforcement justification portrayed the use of force as the fulfillment of the Russian peacekeeping mandate in South Ossetia. Allison indicates that on 10 August 2008, the then Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin declared that "Russia in difficult battles is now conducting a peace coercion operation" [9].

The responsibility to protect justification, as Allison mentions, was advanced by Sergey Lavrov, the then Russian Foreign Minister, in an interview for BBC on 9 August 2008 when he argued that "According to our constitution there is also responsibility to protect – the term which is very widely used in the UN when people see some trouble in Africa or in any remote part of other regions. But this is not Africa to us, this is next door. This is the area where Russian citizens live. So the constitution of the Russian Federation, the laws of the Russian Federation make it absolutely unavoidable to us to exercise responsibility to protect" [10]. It is to be mentioned that on 8 August, hours after the armed conflict had broken out, the Russian President mentioned the responsibility to protect in an official statement but did not equate it with the UN term: "as President of the Russian Federation it is my duty to protect the lives and dignity of the Russian citizens wherever they may be" [11]. But Sergey Lavrov, in the mentioned interview, maintained that, for Medvedev, the two terms were identical and, consequently, that his position was in line with that of the Russian President. Lavrov did not qualified under international law the acts committed by the Georgian authorities against Ossetians, maintaining only that 15 hundred civilians, mostly Russian citizens, had been killed by the Georgians. The same day, Vladimir Putin accused Georgia of genocide saying that "what`s happening in South Ossetia is a genocide of the Ossetian people" [12]. On 10 August, both Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin made allegations of genocide [13] against Georgia forces, the former declaring that " the action of the Georgian side cannot be called anything other than genocide" and the latter that "I believe there were elements of genocide" [14] Despite these accusations formulated against the Georgian authorities, neither Medvedev, nor Putin explicitly endorse in official declarations the contention of Lavrov that the Russian Federation acted according to the UN doctrine of the R2P. It is also to be remarked that the Russian ambassador to the UN at the time of the war, Vitaly Churkin never mentioned this UN doctrine during the meetings of the UN Security Council that took place during the armed conflict [15]. Equally, Lavrov himself, in his address at the 63rd Session of the UN General Assembly, on 27 September 2008 avoided to identify the Russian constitutional responsibility to protect with the UN doctrine of the responsibility to protect, stating only that "Russia helped South Ossetia to repel aggression, and carried out its duty to protect its citizens and fulfill its peacekeeping commitments" [16]. Moreover, in July 2009, during the UN General Assembly formal debate on the responsibility to protect, the Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, replied to the accusations formulated by the Georgian representative, declaring that "Russia, acting on the basis of article 51 of the Charter of the United

Nations, in exercise of its right to self-defence against Georgian troops firing directly on its peacekeepers, never sought to position its actions within the framework of the inchoate concept of the responsibility to protect"[17]. All these facts suggest that the justification provided by Lavrov was not seriously embraced by the Russian authorities that, in the end, openly rejected it.

In order to understand the last type of justification putted forward by the Russian authorities and the controversies it latter generated, it is necessary for the concept of the responsibility to protect to be specified, a problem that is addressed in the next chapter.

II. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT–FROM A DISTINGUISHED IDEA TO A POLITICAL COMMITMENT

The concept of the responsibility to protect was introduced in 2001 by the report, *The Responsibility to Protect*, of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty [18] and the R2P language was endorsed by the UN General Assembly in a resolution from September 2005 [19], a remarkable achievement [20] that was made possible largely by the 2004 report, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change [21] and by the report, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All,* presented in March 2005 by the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan [22]. In what follows I shall comparatively explore the perspectives on the guidelines for the use of force under the R2P advanced in these documents.

2.1.The report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)

ICISS was established by the Canadian Government [23] in September 2000 with the mandate to reconcile in a political viable way the state sovereignty with humanitarian intervention and it released its report in December 2001. ICISS consisted of 12 Commissioners and was co-chaired by Gareth Evans, the then President of the International Crisis Group, and by Mohamed Sahnoun, the then Special Advisor to the UN Secretary General.

According to ICISS findings, it is incumbent upon each state to protect its population and this responsibility informs the state sovereignty which therefore has to be called *sovereignty as responsibility.* ICISS also maintains that when a state fails to discharge its responsibility to protect, it devolves on the international community which has to exercise it along a continuum of three distinct types of responsibilities, namely the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild.

The use of force is available to the international community under the responsibility to react and it is regulated by six guidelines: *just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means, reasonable prospects* and *right authority* [24]. The *just cause* criterion requires the military intervention to be carried out when large-scale loss of live is occurring or is imminently likely to occur, mainly as a result of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, mass starvation and overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, but also when large-scale

ethnic cleansing is unfolding or is imminently likely to happen. If the victims of any of these two situations are foreign nationals, ICISS maintains that their own state is not provided with a *just cause* for a military intervention under the responsibility to protect but only with a *just cause* under the right to self-defence which is recognized by the UN Charter in article 51. ICISS also maintains that in the situations encompassed by this criterion "the element of threat to international peace and security (…) will be usually found to exist" [25]. The *right intention* criterion demands the intervenients to act primary out of the motive of stopping or averting the situations covered by the *just cause*. The *last resort* requires the military force to be used only after the measures short of military action have been exhausted but ICISS argues that this condition is satisfied even when not absolutely every such measure have been applied, if there are good reasons to believe that those measures left out could not be successful. The *proportional means* criterion exacts that the scale, duration and intensity of the military intervention should be the minimum necessary to stop or avert the situations covered by the *just cause*. The *reasonable prospects* guideline requires the military intervention to have reasonable chances of success at an acceptable cost. As for the *right authority* criterion, ICISS maintains that the legal authorization for the use of force under the responsibility to protect could be given only by the UN Security Council. Legitimate authorization could be issued by the UN General Assembly, acting according to the Uniting for Peace resolution, and by regional or sub-regional organizations with a comprehensive membership.

2.2. The report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (HLP)

HLP was commissioned in 2003 by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan who appointed among its 16 members Gareth Evans, the former co-chair of ICISS, and in its report, published in December 2004, it carefully considered the R2P concept.

Similar to ICISS, HLP maintains that each state has the responsibility to protect its population and that when it fails to fulfill it, this responsibility passes on the international community which disposes of a continuum of actions beginning with prevention, continuing with response to violence and ending with the rebuilding of societies. When the international community has to respond to violence by means of military force, HLP argues that a six set guidelines for the use of force must be observed [26]. These guidelines, unlike those developed by ICISS, are designed to regulate any recourse to military force at international level and differ, in a certain degree, from the ICISS criteria with respect to both their names and their content. These guidelines are: *seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means, balance of consequences* and *source of authority*. The *seriousness of threat*, which I consider here exclusively from the viewpoint of the R2P, and the *just cause* criterion of the ICISS both refer to the threshold for the use of force but their scope differs. According to HLP, this criterion demands the military intervention to be undertaken when there is large-scale ongoing or imminently likely to occur loss of life (resulting from killing), ethnic cleansing or violations of international humanitarian law. Alex J Bellamy rightly observes that,

compared to the ICISS reading of it "The panel subtly broadened the just cause thresholds by adding "serious violations of humanitarian law" to the list of genocide, mass murder and ethnic cleansing"[27]. One could add that its scope is also broadened by the fact that it includes these crimes even when committed against foreign nationals. However, it is to be observed that HLP also narrows the scope of the threshold because it excludes large-scale loss of life resulting from mass starvation or overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes. Also unlike ICISS, HLP argues that the situations encompassed by the first criterion always represent a threat to international peace and security. In this context, it is to be remarked that HLP maintains [28] that the military force could be also used to address latent but non-imminent threats to international security which means that under the R2P the *seriousness of threat* covers the three types of situations even when they have only a latent character. But, despite its logical force, this idea is absent from the description of this criterion which is confined to actual and imminent threats [29]. The *proper purpose* has the same content as the ICISS *right intention* criterion and the content of the *last resort* is identical to the ICISS criterion that has the same name. Also, the content of the *balance of consequences* does not differ from the content of the ICISS *proportional means* criterion. As for the *source of authority*, it refers, similar to ICISS *right authority* guideline, to the authority entitled to sanction the use of force at international level but their essence is not identical since the former one does not indicate possible sources of legitimate authorization for the use of force.

Because ICISS was the first to coin a terminology for the criteria governing the use of force under the R2P, in this article I shall give it precedence to latter developed terminologies

2.3. The report of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan

The view on the responsibility to protect putted forward by HLP was endorsed by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in the report he presented to the UN General Assembly in March 2005 [30].However, Annan does not strictly follow the HLP terminology in the case of the guidelines which refer to the exhaustion of peaceful means, to the adequacy of the scale, duration and intensity of the military operations to the humanitarian aim and to the chances of the military operation to succeed [31].

2.4. The 2005 World Summit Outcome resolution of the UN General Assembly

In September 2005 more than 150 heads of state and governments attended the World Summit and adopted the Outcome Document which was later endorsed by the UN General Assembly as resolution A/60/1 [32]. The World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD) maintains that each state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and that when a state fails to fulfill it the international community has the responsibility to "help protect" its population from these dangers with the help of non-military means and also that the international community "is prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case bases and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate

and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" [33].

Gareth Evans argues [34] that no criteria for the use of force, including under R2P, are advanced in this resolution, a point of view that is supported by Alex J. Bellamy who explains [35] their absence as a result of the strong opposition of the United States, China and Russian Federation. In my view, the paragraph 139 of the WSOD contains three criteria for the use of force which I shall designate, for reasons outlined above, using the ICISS terminology, as *just cause, last resort* and *right authority*. The *just cause* manifestly requires the military intervention to be carried out in face of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The wording of the paragraph places outside the scope of this criterion the non-imminent such situations since it is rejected the use of force against a state that does not "manifestly fail" in its protective responsibility. Also, the language of the paragraph under scrutiny does not contain the term *large-scale,* an absence that could be conducing to the idea that the military intervention is not depending on the number of the victims. But this reading is misleading because the document indicates that the force has to be used "to maintain and restore international peace and security"[36] and only when committed on a large-scale, genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity could amount to a threat to the international peace and security. It is equally important to stress that the provisions of the paragraph 139 do not exclude from the *just cause* any of the four crimes when committed against foreign nationals. According to these observations, the *just cause* could be plausibly restated as follows: military intervention is required when large-scale genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity are committed or is imminently likely to be committed, irrespective of who the victims are. The WSOD guideline differs from ICISS *just cause* because its scope excludes large-scale loss of life resulting from mass starvation or overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes and because it includes crimes whose victims are foreign nationals; it also differs from the HLP guideline since it excludes large-scale loss of life caused by whatever killing and since it equally excludes the potential but non-imminent crimes.

The *last resort* demands the peaceful means to be exhausted before undertaking a military intervention and the wording of the paragraph 139, which makes use of the term *inadequate,* suggest that not every available peaceful mean should be first tried but only those ones which, upon thoughtful consideration, are considered capable to produce the desired outcome. It follows that this criterion has an identical content to the *last resort* criterion putted forward by both ICISS and HLP. As for the *right authority,* the WSOD reaffirms "the authority of the Security Council to mandate coercive action to maintain and restore international peace and security" and mentions "the role of the General Assembly relating to the maintenance of international peace and security" [37]. As a consequence, the use of force could be legally authorized only by the UN Security Council, but the document seems to suggest that it could also be legitimately authorized by the UN General Assembly [38]. It could be argued that this last criterion differs from the *right authority* guideline advanced by ICISS because it denies that regional organizations are entitled to issue legitimate authorization for the use of force and

also seems to differ from the *right authority* criterion putted forward by HLP since it accepts that a military intervention could be legitimately authorized.

2.5. The blue-ribbon concepts of the responsibility to protect and the UN concept of the responsibility to protect

The comparative analysis of the criteria for the use of force under R2P advanced by ICISS, HLP, Kofi Annan and in the WSOD unveils the existence of three distinct approaches to them and, consequently, to the R2P concept, namely the one devised by ICISS, the one putted forward by HLP and the one formulated in the WSOD. Because the first two of them have been advanced by blue-ribbon experts and the last one by world politicians within the framework of the United Nations, one could rightly call the ICISS and the HLP perspectives on R2P "blue-ribbon concepts of the R2P" and the perspective agreed at the 2005 World Summit "UN concept of the R2P".

III. CRITICISMS OF THE RUSSIAN JUSTIFICATION IN R2P TERMS OF ITS MILITARY INTERVENTION IN GEORGIA

The contention of the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that the military intervention in Georgia was consistent with the WSOD provisions concerning the R2P prompted sharp criticism on the part of the R2P supporters such as Gareth Evans [39], the experts from the International Crisis Group [40] Roy Allison [41], Donald Steinberg [42] and Thomas G. Weiss and Cristina G. Badescu [43]. This chapter examines their objections by comparing the R2P concept entailed by each of them with the UN concept of the R2P.

3.1.The criticism of Gareth Evans and of the experts from the International Crisis Group

Evans grounds his criticism on six criteria for the use of the force under the R2P, namely *seriousness of threat, primary purpose, last resort, proportionality of response, more good than harm from the intervention* and an unnamed one.

The *seriousness of threat,* like the *just cause* criterion of the UN concept of the R2P, refers to the threshold for the military intervention but the scope of the two criteria differs with respect to the protection of foreign nationals. The *seriousness of threat* requires the force to be used when genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity are already committed or is imminently likely to be committed on a large-scale against people who are not foreign nationals. He argues that the protection of foreign nationals provides their own state with a just cause under the right to self-defence. The *primary purpose* has the same content as the *right intention* criterion of the blue-ribbon concepts of the R2P and the *last resort* is identical to the criterion of the UN concept of the R2P that has the same name. *Proportionality of response* and the *proportional means* of the blue-ribbon concepts of the R2P have both the same content and the *more good than harm from the intervention* does not differ with respect to its meaning from the *reasonable prospects* criterion belonging to the blue-ribbon concepts of the R2P. The unnamed criterion, similar to the *right authority* criterion of the UN concept of the R2P, refers to the authority entitled to sanction the use of force, so that one could rightly

give it the same name. Evans mentions that this criterion requires the legal authorization for the use of force to be issued only by the UN Security Council and implies [44] that the use of force could be also legitimately authorized without indicating by what entity. However, it is reasonable to suppose that this source is either the UN General Assembly or some regional or sub-regional organization or both of them. The imprecise description of this last criterion makes impossible to conclude that its content is identical to or different from the content of the *UN concept of R2P*.

International Crisis Group, whose president Gareth Evans was back in 2008, advanced the same criticism of the Russian military intervention in Georgia, albeit using a slightly different terminology from the one advanced by Evans because it calls *proportionality* Evans`s *proportionality of response* and *balance of consequence* his *more good than harm from the intervention*. The same ambiguity persist with respect the right authority criterion, which equally is unnamed. Using the ICISS terminology one could conclude that the six set criteria advanced by both Gareth Evans and the International Crisis Group combines a criterion (*last resort*) that is shared by the UN concept of the R2P and by the blue-ribbon concepts of the R2P*,* with three criteria (*right intention, reasonable prospects and proportional means*) of the blue-ribbon concepts of the R2P and also with one criteria (*just cause*) that brings together elements from both the UN concept of the R2P and the blue-ribbon concepts of the R2P and a criterion (*right authority*) which could belong either to the UN concept of the R2P or to the ICISS concept of the R2P or could combine elements of the ICISS concept of the R2P.

According to Evans and to the International Crisis Group the Russian military intervention in Georgia was clearly not a case of the R2P since it failed to comply with all six guidelines they put forward for the use of force.

It is to be remarked that both Evans and the International Crisis Group maintain that their criticism is developed from the perspective of the UN concept of the R2P and they consequently seem to imply that all six criteria belong to this type of concept. In the case of Evans, this view sharply differs from his contention that no guidelines for the use of force exist in the WSOD

3.2. The criticism of Roy Allison

Roy Allison advances a criticism which proceeds from four guidelines for the use of force under the R2P: *seriousness of threat, proportionality of response, serious humanitarian concerns* and an unnamed criterion. The first criterion and the *just cause* criterion of the *UN concept of the R2P* both refers to the threshold for the military intervention but their contents are not identical. Allison`s criterion demands the military force to be used when genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity are ongoing or are imminently likely to occur on a large-scale but it does not cover any of these situations when they are committed against foreign nationals. In this latter case, Allison maintains that the state whose nationals the victims are has to use force under the right to self-defence. The *proportionality of response* has the same content as the *proportional means* criterion of the blue-ribbon concepts of the R2P and *serious humanitarian concerns* is just another name for the *right intention* criterion of the blue-ribbon concepts of the R2P. The

unnamed criterion refers, similar to the *right authority* criterion of the UN concept of the R2P, to the source of the authorization for the use of force and thus could bear the same name. According to Allison, this last criterion requires the legal authorization for the use of force to be issued only by the UN Security Council but apparently it does not rule out the possibility for the military intervention to be legitimately sanctioned. Assuming that Allison accepts the existence of the legitimate authorization, it is reasonable to suppose that he recognizes as its source either all or one of the sources encompassed by the ICISS *right authority* criterion. Because the legitimate authorization of the use of force is not clearly stated, one could not say that the content of this criterion is identical to or differs from the *right authority* criterion of the UN concept of the R2P.

Using the ICISS terminology, one could rightly state that Allison`s four set criteria combines two criteria (*proportional means, right intention*) of the blue-ribbon concept of the R2P, with a criterion (*just cause*) that brings together elements of the UN concept of the R2P and of the blue-ribbon concepts of the R2P and finally with a criterion (*right authority*) that could be identical to the right authority criterion of the UN concept of the R2P, or to the ICISS concept of the R2P, or to the HLP concept of the R2P or could combine different elements of them.

Allison concludes that the Russian military intervention in Georgia was not an R2P case since it violated all four criteria for the use of force. It is to be remarked that Allison implies that all four criteria belong the UN concept of the R2P.

3.3. The criticism of Donald Steinberg

Donald Steinberg develops his criticism around four guidelines for the use of force under the R2P that he implicitly names, using the HLP terminology, *seriousness of threat, proper purpose, proportional means* and *source of authority*.

The first criterion, similar to the *just cause* criterion of the UN concept of the R2P refers to the threshold for the use of force, but the content of the two criteria is not identical. Steinberg`s criterion demands the military intervention to be carried out when genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity are occurring or are imminently likely to occur on a large-scale and their actual or potential victims are not foreign nationals. The protection of the latter by their own state is justified only under the right to self-defence. The *proper purpose* displays the same content as the *right intention* criterion of the blue-ribbon concepts of the R2P and the *proportional means* proves to be identical to the guideline of the blue-ribbon concepts of the R2P that has the same name. As for the last criterion, like the *right authority* criterion of the UN concept of the R2P, it refers to the authority that could sanction the use of force at international level, but their contents could differ. Steinberg argues that *right authority* requires the use of force to be legally authorized exclusively by the UN Security Council and also admits that the use of force could be legitimately authorized by regional organizations, without explicitly rejecting that such a function could not be exercised equally by the UN General Assembly. Given that the sources of legitimate authorization for the use of force are not clearly identified, one could not conclude that the content of this criterion is

identical to or different from the *right authority* criterion of the UN concept of the R2P.

Based on the ICISS terminology, one could say that his four set criteria for the use of force under the R2P combine two criteria (*right intention, proportional means*) of the blue-ribbon concepts of *R2P* with a criterion (*just cause)* which contains elements from the UN concept of the R2P and from the ICISS concept of the R2P and finally with a criterion (*right authority*) that could belong either to the UN concept of the R2P or to the ICISS concept of the R2P or could combine elements of the latter concept.

For Steinberg, the Russian military intervention in Georgia was certainly not an exercise of its R2P because it violated all four criteria for the use of force he advanced. It is to be observed that Steinberg explicitly argues that the first and the last criteria are to be found in the WSOD.

3.4. The criticism of Cristina G. Badescu and Thomas G Weiss

Cristina G. Badescu [45] and Thomas G. Weiss putted forward a criticism based on three criteria for the use of force under the R2P: *gravity of the threat, appropriate scope* and *intensity of response*. The first criterion, like the *just cause* criterion of the UN concept of the R2P bear on the threshold for the military intervention but they display different contents. The *gravity of the threat* requires the use of force to be reserved exclusively for ongoing or imminently likely to occur large-scale genocide, ethic cleansing, war crimes or crimes against humanity. The two scholars argue that when these crimes are directed against foreign nationals they are no more covered by this criterion, their own state being entitled to use force for their protection under its right to self-defence. The *appropriate scope* has an identical content to the content of the *right intention* criterion of the blue-ribbon concepts of the R2P and the *intensity of response* has an identical content to the *proportional means* criterion of the blue-ribbon concepts of the R2P. Their three set criteria for the use of force under the R2P combines two criteria (*right intention, proportional means*) of the blue-ribbon concepts of the R2P and a criterion (*just cause*) which is made up from different elements of the UN concept of the R2P and of the blue-ribbon concepts of the R2P.

Badescu and Weiss argue that Russian intervention in Georgia was certainly not in line with the R2P because it contradicted all three guidelines. It is to be noticed that the two authors explicitly include in the UN concept of the R2P only the first criterion.

3.5. Assessment of the five criticisms

A common flaw of the above five criticisms is that they do not judge the Russian military intervention in Georgia exclusively through the lens of the guidelines for the use of force of the UN concept of the R2P, as they logically should do since this concept was the only one invoked by Sergey Lavrov and, moreover, since it was the sole concept embraced by virtually all states. It is obviously misleading to evaluate Russian intervention using criteria belonging to other concepts of the R2P and then to conclude that Lavrov`s contention is false. It is like criticizing a person playing lawn tennis for not observing the rules of the

table tennis, given the resemblance between the two games with respect to some of their rules.

CONCLUSIONS

There are three significant findings of this article. The first one is that all five criticisms of the Russian intervention in Georgia analysed here are fallacious because are not grounded on the UN concept of the R2P. The second finding is that there is an emerging concept of the R2P which combines guidelines for the use of force belonging to the blue-ribbon concepts of the R2P with guidelines containing elements taken from both UN concept of the R2P and the ICISS concept of the R2P. This hybrid concept contains at least three guidelines for the use of force (*just cause, right intention, proportional means)* which are used with an identical meaning in all five examined criticisms. The third finding is that the Russian Federation ascribed little importance to the justification of its intervention in Georgia in terms of the R2P and, consequently, that the relevance of the criticism of this justification for the Russian –Georgian war is relatively reduced.

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[29] "Seriousness of threat (…) In the case of internal threats, does it involve genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law, actual or imminently apprehended?" (para. 207)

[30]The guidelines are considered in section III, Freedom from Fear, subsection E, Use of Force (paras. 122-126)

[31] "When considering whether to authorise or endorse the use of military force, the Council should come to a common view on how to weight the seriousness of the threat; the proper purpose of the proposed military action; whether means short of the use of force might plausibly succeed in stopping the threat; whether the military option is proportional to the threat at hand; and whether there is a reasonable chance of success" (para. 126)

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EUROPEAN ANTI-FRAUD OFFICE - AS ONE OF THE MAJOR INSTITUTIONS TO PREVENT AND COMBAT THE PHENOMENON OF TAX EVASION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

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Abstract

Tax evasion has spread not only nationally, but also internationally because of the strengthening of international economic cooperation and development of relations between states with different tax systems and different level of taxation. As a consequence of the continuous growth at world level, prevention and the fight against this phenomenon, a constant concern of UE experts, have been hardened because of the limited competencies of judicial institutions, also at national borders, and because of different legal regulations of tax evasion deeds. The aim of this paper is to outline both the importance and gravity of this phenomenon, as well as the European Anti-Fraud Office's role in the fight against evasion, institution that performs tasks on conducting administrative investigations independently, assisting Member States by organizing close and regular cooperation between their competent authorities and on the participation in drafting the European Commission anti-fraud strategy. Also, in this area, following the evolution of activities undertaken by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), we notice the legal initiatives developed by the European Commission in order to strengthen the protection of EU financial interests.

Keywords: the European Anti-Fraud Office, Tax evasion, the protection of EU financial interests, the preventing and combating of tax evasion

INTRODUCTION

As the issue of collecting taxes and duties is, presently, in an equal manner in the attention of all the countries in the world, but also of the various bodies and supra-state institutions, perfecting the modalities (legal, principally) of directing the public financial resources- directly into the "budgetary baskets"- as well as the multitude of the tightening of the means of fighting tax fraud[1] presents an increasing importance in the context of constant growth- at the planetary level- of the tax evasion phenomenon.[2]

In the conditions of the modern world, the activity sphere of certain natural and/or legal persons the majority of time manages to extend beyond the border of a country; thus, the natural persons that are self-employed, the various individual companies or commercial societies achieve incomes or keep in their property

different goods on the territory of other states. Due to this fact, *the issue of stabilizing the competent public authority to proceed to the taxation of the revenues* and wealth made, respectively owned by the natural and/or legal persons of a state on the territory of another state is raised.

I. PREVENTING AND FIGHTING THE PHENOMENON OF FISCAL EVASION

1.1. Theoretical aspects

The phenomenon of fiscal evasion, having extremely negative consequences upon the state economy, constitutes a preoccupation matter both for technicians as well as for theoreticians. The subject is not exhausted, and the controversies on behalf of it are far from being over.

In a definition accepted by the specialized literature[3], *the phenomenon of tax evasion* is defined as representing *the totality of licit or illicit procedures with the help of which the contributors or other interested persons manage to completely or partially avoid the impossible matter of their obligations established by means of fiscal laws.*

Inside the tax evasion phenomenon we distinguish between *evasionist facts from illicit taxation* (which are not sanctioned by law) and *evasionist facts from illicit taxation* (which are sanctioned by law). The phenomenon has two forms of manifestation, *licit fiscal evasion and illicit fiscal evasion* (*fiscal fraud*). In the specialized literature[4] the idea in conformity to which between the legal and illegal does not present a rupture, but a continuation is retained, as the successive attempts to profit from the gaps of the law lead the contributable from legal to fraud, resulting in the classification of "*the three contributor families*". One, belonging to the ones fundamentally honest (*white*), the other, belonging to the fundamentally dishonest (*black*), and, *the grey one*, represented by those who avoid taxation, whether legitimately by their ability, or illegitimately by tricks or law abuse.

To the extent of the depthening of international economic cooperation and development- on multiple plans- of the relations between states with different fiscal systems and a different fiscality level, *tax evasion does not only manifest as a national internal phenomenon, but as one that has become international* [5]. The tax evasion phenomenon, thus, comprises *an international dimension* as we may speak of international tax evasion, and the most famous method of committing this act is to use, *tax heavens* – countries where fiscality is reduced or even inexistent – where *the contributors seek a more beneficial fiscal treatment.* Moreover, under this aspect, international tax evasion is *a form of legal tax evasion*, and the tax heaven is a form of solution achieved that seems equally legal[6].

However, over the years, tax heavens have, thus, become *real "collecting channels" of large amounts of money* resulted from methods, more or less fraudulent, of avoiding taxes; these offer *a series of advantages for the economical and financial criminality:* the use of fictive loans granted to false corporations, the fraudulent over-evaluation of certain investment, the creating of documentary evidence which actually support inexistent investments[7].

As a result, the multitude of obligations that the fiscal laws impose to the contributors as well as, or especially, the burden of those obligations has stimulated, over time, the ingenuity of the contributors in the invention of various methods to avoid fiscal liabilities. In this connection, tax evasion has always been especially active and ingenious due to the fact that the taxation authority affects the individuals' wealth, and thus brings harm to their sensible interest: monetary interest[8].The subject of this paper imposes on us to present the meaning of *fraud* within the laws of the European Union, thus, in conformity with article 1 paragraph 1 from the Convention regarding the protection of the financial interest of the European Union constitutes *fraud that affects the financial interests of the European Union*.

(a) *in matter of expenses*, any action or intended omission regarding:

- the use or presentation of declarations or false documents, incorrect or incomplete which result in the illegal collection or retention of funds that come from the general budget of the European union or from the budgets managed by the European union on behalf of it;

- retaining information by breaching the respective obligation, resulting in the same effect;

- diverting funds in other purposes than those for which they were initially granted, resulting in the same effect;

(b) *in matter of income*, any action or intended omission regarding:

- the use or presentation of declarations or false documents, incorrect or incomplete which result in the illegal collection or retention of funds that come from the general budget of the European union or from the budgets managed by the European union on behalf of it;

- retaining information by breaching the respective obligation, resulting in the same effect;

- diverting an advantage legally obtained, having the same result.

Moreover, inconformity with the Convention, each member state must take the necessary and adequate measures as to transpose in the internal criminal law, the dispositions of paragraph 1 as the behaviour mentioned be sanctioned as criminal acts (par.2 art.1 from the Convention).

As a consequence, *fraud*, in the definition of the EU legislation and in the opinion of the authors, represents *a specific action of fiscal evasion against the financial interest of the European Union.*

We must observe, as well as retain in the specialized literature[9], *two types of fraud* used by the state members at the level of the European Union, thus we may mention:

Income fraud – is registered especially for the first two categories of own budgetary resources. Principally, there are two fraud "techniques"[10].

Thus, the first is represented by *breaching the preferential agreements*: the goods are introduced in an European member state illegally or in an avoided manner as to evade the payment of normal laws (which are normally and respectively due). And, the second is represented, by *the deliberate erroneous (incorrect) classification of goods as being in transit:* a series of goods (wearing the specific

label of goods placed in transit) originating from extra-communitary countries are consumed inside the European union, in this manner avoiding the import payment of customs duties. *Expenses fraud* – this principally consists in: receiving and acceptance by some state members of assistance which were not, actually entitled; illegal achievement (by the use of fraudulent manoeuvres) of funds from the general budget of the European union or the change, without respecting the legal dispositions, of the destination of funds received from the same budget etc.[11]

II. ASPECTS OF HISTORICAL ORDER IN THE MATTER OF MEASURES ADOPTED REGARDING THE PREVENTION AND FIGHT AGAINST THE PHENOMENON OF FISCAL EVASION AT THE EU LEVEL

Being confronted with the phenomenon of fiscal evasion, the European union has proven to be vulnerable due to the circumstances that, although it permits and even supports a free and large circulation of persons, goods, services and capitals in the entire geographical space covered, *in matter of taxes*, except certain norms adopted by the communitary institutions, *the legal regulations embody a national character and thus, the applicability is limited in space.* Nevertheless, the European Union continues to fight against tax evasion and fraud, adopting the most various forms.[12]

Thus, in the same time being a difficult and sensible issue of the European Union, fraud, which is frequently used by certain state members of the European Union as to protect or represent an advantage to it own institutions or its own citizens.[13] As a consequence, the EU fight against fiscal evasion is very broad, and *among the first forms of control*, we must mention[14]:

- *Programme of Action* adopted by the European Commission in 1975 which proposed: achievement of mutual exchange of information between Member States, carrying out checks, investigation, expertise in a Member State, at the request of another Member State;

- *The Council Resolution*[15] adopted on the 10th of February 1975 regarding the measures which must be taken by the Community as to *fighting fraud and international tax evasion* – some regarding the means for ensuring the harmonization and improvement of the activity of control bodies and the competent ones with the collection of taxes and duties, others regarding the facilitation of the cooperation between the public administration, the exchange of information, the participation of state employees to the investigations performed in another member state;

- *The memorandum*[16] presented by the *European Commission* in the year 1984 regarding the communitary actions performed against fraud and international fiscal evasion, document which contains the measures that the European Community must apply: improving, enhancing, strengthening cooperation between tax administrations, identifying and keeping under surveillance refuge states, monitoring transfers of funds between companies the same group etc. The evolution of activities performed as to reduce and eliminate fraud is marked by *three important stages*[17], namely:

- *Creating a Court of Auditors;*

The creation of a Court of Auditors was performed at the request of the European Parliament. From a legal point of view, The European Union Court of Auditors was founded only in the year 1975, based on the art.206 from the Rome treaty, but it started to practically function only in June 1977. Having the general mission to support the Parliament and the Council to exercise their control function upon the execution of the general budget of the European Union, the Court of Auditors is *an administrative body* charged with *the control of legality and regularity of the budgetary operations in view of ensuring a good management of the financial resources.*

        - *The creation of a coordination unit of the fight against fraud (UCLAF);*

At the initiative of Jacques Delors, in the year 1988, this unit was founded - UCLAF, composed of European employees, and directly subordinated to the president of the European commission. However, as to strengthen the available means to fight fraud, with the observance of the principle of autonomy of each institution's internal organization, the Committee founded, in its departments, by means of the Decision 1999/352/CE, CECO, Euratom, the European Anti-Fraud Office (hereinafter OLAF), having the responsibility to perform administrative investigations in full independence regarding fraud.

        - *Enforcement of the new legal mechanisms.*

Thus, for example, a *Anti-fraud Advisory Committee (COCOLAF) was created*, composed of representatives from all the member states. The Committee, taking into account the new jurisprudence of the European Union Court of Justice, has decided from October 1995 that the person who defrauds the general budget will be systematically excluded from the benefit of communitary assistance.[18]

From the year 1997, the ECOFIN Council adopted a *Code of Conduct on business taxation*[19], by which, actually, important initiatives in matter of fiscal harmonizing at the European level were proposed, as well as measures for fighting the negative fiscal competition. In conformity with the Code of conduct, those legislative measures that lead to an inferior taxation level compared to the one generally applied in the state member in cause are considered potentially negative and thus, repressed. An evaluation procedure of the susceptible fiscal regimes of entering in the field of the application of the Code was adopted, according to which the fiscal facilities granted in the aim of stimulating economic improvement from certain regions must be analyzed and, possibly accepted only if they are proportionate with the objectives aimed.

III. THE ANTI-FRAUD OFFICE – THE ROLE AND TASKS OF OLAF IN THE PROCESS OF PROTECTION OF THE FINANCIAL INTERESTS OF THE EU

3.1. Preliminary considerations

As the prevent the perpetration of frauds each member state must take the necessary measures as to permit that the persons in charge from within the framework of economic agants or any any persons which detain power to control or decide from within this framework to be declared penable liable according to the principles defined by the internal law, in case of committing fraudulent acts in the

prejudice of financial interest belonging to the European Union (Art. 3 from the Convention regarding the protection of the financial interests of the Convention). Moreover, each member state must take the necessary measures as to establish its competence regarding this type of acts incriminated by the internal laws (Art. 4 from the Convention).

Thus, *the protection of financial interests belonging to the UE and the fight against fraud constitute domain of joint liability of the European union and the state members.* As a consequence, for the intensification of fightinh fraud, corruption and any ither illegal activities which affect the financial interests of the European Union, the European Committee founded in combaterii fraudei, a corupţiei si a oricăror alte activităţi ilegale care afectează interesele 1999 within its departments, the *Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF),* which manifests itself *as being one of the main institutions of the Union for fighting against the tax evasion phenomenon, its main task being to fight fraid and other illegal activities developed in the detriment of the EU budget.*

Commencing from the dispositions of art 325 TFUE (ex – art.280 TCE), which eatblishes *the basic legal framework of fighting fraud in te European Union,* OLAF has been founded by means of the Decision 1999/352/CE, CECO, Euratom[20] of the Committee, and along with its founding, the Office replaced the Operative group for the combat of fraud and took over its duties.Moreover, the Office exercits the prerogatives in an independent manner regarding the investigation attributions conferred to the Committee by the regulations of the Union and the agreements in force in the domain of the protection of financial interests of the EU and the fight against fraud.

The OLAF legal framework is concretely constituted by the *Regulation (EC) no.1073/1999 regarding the investigations performed by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)*[21]*,* regulation whose dispositions do not reduce by any means the competences and responsibilities of the state members in taking measures as to fight fraud which affects the financial of the Union, an aspect which has been stipulated within the regulation. Although, the application of this regulation is based on a tight bilateral cooperation between OLAF and the competent national authorities.

The Office comproses approximately 500 employees, and the annual expenses rise to about 50 million euros. Nearly 75 % of the staff is operational, in the sense that it either performs investigations, or grants support, in both the two directions described.

Moreover, in view of accomplishing it final mission– the protection of the financial interests of the EU – the Office performs ceratin activities based on the competences offered by the regulation. Thus, OLAF is responsible for a series of activities that include the organisation of administrative investigations as to fight fraud, grant assistance to the state members in preventing fraud and collecting data analysis.

The activities that represent the study object of the following sections from the present paper.

3.2. Performing administrative investigations in complete independence *(art.1 par.1 Regulation no.1073 from 1999, art.2 par.1 the Decision 1999/352/EC, CECO, Euratom)*

In conformity with the jurisprudence of the Court of justice, for opening a case it is *necessary a „sufficiently grave suspicion"*[22]. this means that OLAF is not authorised to develop investigation activities based exclusively on risk evaluations, without affecting the grave suspicion levels.

The cases are classified by the office in the following categories:

(a) *Investigations*:

- internal investigations (investigations accomplished in the framework of institutions and EU bodies);

- external investigations (investigation at the level of economic operators where EU fonds are implicated).

(b) *Coordonation and assitance operations*:

- the coordonation of member states within the investigations that interest several countries ;

- assistance granted to national legal authorities in the context of procedures of a criminal nature.

The main stages of the investigations are:

(a) OLAF receives claims from within and outside the EU bodies.

(b) OLAF evaluates the initial information and the manager decides whether to open or not a case.

(c) The OLAF investigators collect evidence, for example by means of interviews and controls performed on the spot.

(d) The investigators report to the executive Committe the results obtained following the investigation activities.

The manager decides regarding the subsequent pursuit action which should be initiated, if it is the case. The subsequent pursuit action may include data transmission regarding the case to the national authorities or the competent UE in view of initiatinglegal or disciplinary procedures or in view of recovering the fonds in cause.

(e) OLAF verifies whether the liable authorities have given effect to the subsequent requested pursuit action.

The result of the OLAF activity may embody the form of four types of subsequent pursuit: financial, administrative, legal and disciplinary.

The manager is responsible for the manner in which the investigations are developed, thus he is entitled to perform an investigation on his own account. He should- taking into consideration that the director is the one performing the investigations be liable to directly transmit to the legal authorities of the respective state member the information collected by the Office in the course of internal investigations regarding situations which may result in a penal pursuit.

In view of *a periodic monitoring* of the manner in which OLAF performs this task, the *monitoring Committee* was founded, composed of five independent persons from outside the EU institutions, with high qualifications in the activity domain of OLAF.

Regarding the internal investigations, they can be performed only if access is granted to the Office in all the buildings of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and too all the data and documents held.

Spot checks and inspections represent one of the most powerful instruments the Committee disposes of by means of OLAF as to perform administrative investigations outside the institutions and EU bodies as to achieve the target of fighting fraud and other illegal activities which undermine the financial interests of the EU[23].

A spot check control is an inspection performed in the headquarters of an economic agent. Subsequent to the preparation stages of the inspection, the effective implication of teh competent national authorities that are present and the assistance offered to the OLAF investigators if the economic agent does not cooperate are essential for guaranteeing the succes of the inspection. In view of a *tight bilateral cooperation between OLAF and the national competent authorities*, the participation of the investigation authorities from the state members is deseired, as they facilitate and increase the efficiency of controls and inspections, especially in case of the opposition of economic agents, when mandatory measures of internal law are possible emergency procedures are applied.

Cooperation is vital, beginning with the pre-operational stage of the inspection, when the national competent authority must be informed by OLAF regarding the obeject, aim and legal basis of the control that OLAF intends to perform. In this purpose, OLAF must correctly identify the competent national authority, this proving to be sometimes an issue, especially in the domain of direct expenses. In accordance with art. 7 from the Regulation no. 2185/1996, the inspectors of the Committee have access to all the information and documents regarding the operations in cause in the same conditions as the national administrative inspectors. In many of the member states, the national inspectors have the authority to seize and retain original documents relevant for control, in justified cases, where there is the risk of hiding or destroying the documents or because the original documents must be retained for a subsequent analysis (BE, IE, EL, FR, CY, HU, MT, AT, PT, RO, LU, SI, SK, FI, UK)[24]. The investigations must be performed with the observance of the fundamental human rights and liberties, principally with the observance of the Investigaţiile trebuie să fie efectuate cu respectarea drepturilor si libertăţilor fundamentale ale omului, în principal cu respectarea equity principle – the right of the persons involved to express their opinion upon the facts that interest them, and the principle in confromity to which the conclusions of an investigation may be exclusively based on the elements with probational value.

3.3. Granting assistance to member states by organising a tight and periodic cooperation between the competent authorities *(art.1 par.2 Regulation no.1073 from 1999, art.2 par.2 Decision 1999/352/EC, CECO, Euratom)*

The protection of financial interests and the fight against fraud and corruption are taska undertaken by the European Union which extend beyond its borders and whic must, as a result be refected in theinternational agreements the Union concludes with third countries or in multilaterla conventions to which it

represents a signatory party. As to efficiently combat fraud, corruption, cigarette smuggling and other illegal activities in the disadvantage of its financial interests, EU, *on behalf of itself and of the member states, negociates anti-fraud agreements with third countries and takes part in agreements or multilateral conventions.*

Ensuring a successful cooperation between the Office, state members and institutions, bodies, offices and relevant agencies, includes the organisation of a mutual exchange of information. For example, in many cases in which national information must be verified in relation with the external bodies, the members states and the authorities of third countries, OLAF depends upon its external partners as to immediately respond and depends on their goodwill and cooperation. Thus, *cooperation* represents a un *complementary principle in the fight of the state members against fraud and corruption, principle which is found in multiple international legal instruments aiming at fighting economic and financial criminality,* such as the Convention on corruption (Strasbourg, January 1999), the relative Convention to legal assistance in penal matter between member states of the European Union (Bruxelles, mai 2000).

The Commission, by means of OLAF, develops various negociation processes,regarding agreement of cooperation and partnership, as well as association agreements regarding the financial cooperation and the protection of the financial interests of the European Union and of the member states.

OLAF should consolidate its cooperation and partnership mechanisms with Eurojust which, according to art. 85 TFUE, has the task of coordinating the penal reseraches and pursuits referring to crimes that affect the financial interests of the Union. This cooperation is ensured by the connection team OLAF – Eurojust, who meet periodically. Moreover, OLAF and Eurojust organise periodical exchange visits as to improve the taks that they share.

3.4. The participation to the elaboration of the regulating activity and of the anti-fraud strategy of the Committee *(art.1 par.2, thesis 2 Regulation no.1073 from 1999; art.2 par. 4 Decision 1999/352/EC, CECO, Euratom)*

The harmonization of the legislation – being a combat modality against fraud– consists of the reduction, elaboration and adoption of Conventions and other legal international instruments with applicability in the domain, of the most imprtant differences between the national norms of each member state of tehe EU, but without imposing identical rules from a formal point of view. [25]

The fight at the EU level in this domain also includes and is supported by the existence of certain plans of action. This type of action plan may regard[26]:

- a global anti-fraud legislative policy: the device of the development towards effective and consistent regulation;

- a new cooperation perspective: participation an understanding of national authorities and of the European Union;

- an institutional approach to prevent and combat corruption;

- the improvement of the legal-penal dimension: adaptation of the legal and penal framework for the protection of the financial interests of the European Union.

OLAF contributed and must *continue to contribute to the elaboration of politics and the anti-fraud of the Committe strategy*. The activities of OLAF in

matter of anti-fraud politics *benefit from its experience in the domain of investigations and vice-versa*.

CONCLUSIONS

We conclude as it is mentioned in the specialised literature[27] that the activity of fighting and prevention of these acts is extremely difficult and demanding because of the limited competences of the legal authorities, which is also reduced at the national borders as well as due to the differences of legal regulation of the acts of tax evasion, especially of the actions by which the budget of teh European Union is being frauded.

We must not omit to illustrate once again that the general ojjective of OLAF is the protection of the financial interests of teh EU. The number of cases solutioned by the latter foes not constitute an adequate parameter by which the performance of OLAF can be evaluated. Considering that the OLAF policy is to concentrate on more serios and complex cases and the fact that the number and period of the investigations are relatively stable, should be considered an achievement in itself.

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[9] M.St. Minea, C.F. Costas, D.M. Ionescu, *op. cit.,* p. 193

[10]M.St. Minea, C.F. Costas, D.M. Ionescu, *op. cit.,* p. 193

[11]Thus, considering for example, the fact that in the domain of agricultural assistance, a series of bonuses are granted based on a simple declaration, it can be easily imagined how certain states of the European Union created benefits for themselves in connection with others and in the detriment of the community, thus being the situation, the organization of a systematic and rigorous control is imposed by the institutions of the European Union by which this phenomenon can be stopped. M.St. Minea, C.F. Costas, D.M. Ionescu, *op. cit.,* pp.193-194.

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PROLEGOMENA OF THE ROMANIAN GEOPOLITICAL CONCEPT OF THE BLACK SEA REGION

Cristina PĂIUSAN NUICĂ, Theodora STĂNESCU-STANCIU

"We live here at crossroads, at a crossroads of cultures and unfortunately, at a crossroads of conquests and empires. We cannot be separated from the entire geographical compound, which as you shall see sets our borders and destiny in between the two elements that define it: the mountains and the sea."

Gh. I. Brătianu

Abstract

Definition of Black Sea region in interwar Romanian perspective. Tracing the main coordinates, of historically point of view, for this geographical area of great geostrategic and geopolitical importance. Highlighting the contribution of Gheorghe I. Bratianu and Romanian journal Geopolitica si Geoistoria. Revistă română pentru sud-estul european (Geopolitic and Geohistory. Romanian journal for south-eastern Europe).

Key words *Black Sea; geopolitic; Gheorghe I. Bratianu; interwar Romania*

INTRODUCTION

Black Sea region[1] – a concept of variable definition. The unique history of this region make the use of traditional definitions difficult. A concept that, over time, was born and involved the idea of crossroad [2] – geographical, political and cultural crossroad. A concept with multiple interpretation: work in progress; conflict, coexistence and cooperation; a region living in past and future; a nascent transforming process; a potentially explosive area... Quite recent Charles King's work, *The Black Sea: A History* (Oxford University Press, 2006) has demonstrated without denial.

DEBATS

But actually clear, in the course of history, the Black Sea has been a geographical area of great geostrategic and geopolitical importance [3], first, determined by his position between. Between Europe and Asia in the nineteenth century [4]; between South Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Middle East, down to Mediterranean and North Africa, in the XXI century – "a strategic bridge connecting Europe with the Caspian Sea area, Central Asia and the Middle East" [5]. Between "the steppe and the sown" – "the european core" or the european

periphery. "The areas that lies between these two landscapes – emphasize Alexander A. Bauer – this is the large body of water known as the Black Sea, a region largely considered marginal to those surrounding it. The reasons for this *marginality* are numerous, the first being the fact that, following the boundary conventions between modern states, archaeological boundaries assigned to past inland cultures are often assumed to extend to the coast, with bodies of water such as the Black Sea then acting as dividing lines. When the cultures of peoples located along these coasts differ from that of their inland counterparts, as they often do, these differences are usually explained as *peripheral variants*. A second reason for the marginal treatment of the Black Sea is due to its geopolitical situation: throughout almost the entire history of archaeology as a discipline, a series of political standoffs has made the Black Sea a physical and intellectual boundary line between the regions surrounding it. A third reason may be attributed to the biases of scholarship: there is a tendency for archaeologists and historians to regard the Black Sea as a backwater of the Mediterranean" [6]. Between civilisation or barbarism.[7]

But, as expressed at a time, and romanian analyst Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu: "the Sea should not be perceived as a *separation* area between Europe, Central Asia, and Middle East, but as an area of *cooperation*.

The British historian Norman Davies in his volume *Europe. A History* (1996) described the Black Sea as follows: «The Black Sea – first known to the ancients as the *Axenos* or inhospitable, later as the *Euxine* or hospitable and then as Pontus – is the Mediterranean Siamese twin» – but a twin sister that lacks a historical reflex of cooperation alongside all its shores. Since I have mentioned the origins of the Black Sea name, please allow me to quote Professor Tunc Aybak, who in his volume of 2001 *Politics of the Black Sea: dynamics of cooperation and conflict*, pointed out that *Axenos* and *Euxine* are two metaphors that «summarize, in a way, the history of the Black Sea». Professor Charles King, in his well-known work *The Black Sea. A History* (2004), perceived the change of the name as ironical, be it «intentional or a reflection of desire» [8]. A region that has become (together with its hinterlands) a commonplace of European affairs, especially if there is any crisis developing [9]. For centuries, a site of contention and confrontation [10]. A region whose borders have fluctuated over time. A region often analyzed in tandem with much disputed concepts like the Balkans [11] – demonstrating common risks and challenges, shared history of violent conflict, unconsolidated democratisation and economic underdevelopment. "From a pure geopolitical perspective, the Black Sea region is a relatively small and closed area, crossed, throughout history by conflicts between the North-Eastern forces (Russia, via Ukraine and/or Georgia), South (Turkey) and West (Romania, Bulgaria, and the European powers such as France Germany, Austria, Great Britain). A *great salty lake*, the area of the Black Sea has been, for centuries, a place of confrontation between the Russian (orthodox) world, the Turkish (Muslim) one and the western (catholic and protestant) one. The wider Black Sea area, geographically situated at the crossroads of the European, Eurasian and Middle East security spaces, is, from a geopolitical standpoint, in the proximity of the *Heartland*, the control of which causes a complex geopolitical, diplomatic and economic-military game" (Liviu Bogdan Vlad, Gheorghe Hurduzeu, Andrei Josan)[12].

One of the most circulated scientific thesis was aimed at effective unit area. Historically, as stressed and Charles King[13], there has been no evident form of social and economic unity in the Black Sea region [14]. "Even though the Black Sea Basin is not a political, cultural or religious unit, it nevertheless represents a cross-road of European-Asian migrations, the place where European, Asian and Arab civilisations, cultures and religions meet, also presenting hotbeds of tension in which conflicts are going to evolve, e.g. the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea area, and the conflicts in Central Asia and in the Arab states do have an influence"[15].

Even the Black Sea region is an more recent invention, in interwar period, an romanian historian focused for the first time on the Black Sea as a unit for historical investigation. Gh. I. Bratianu [16] suggested that one historical event – migratory invasions (especially Mongolian invasion) determined certain stability in the Black Sea area.

For Bratianu, the Black Sea was the actual area of interwar Romania's security [17]. In his capital work, *Black Sea. From its origins to the Ottoman conque* [18], he was concerned about highlighting the role of the Black Sea countries and political evolution of the Romanian state and Romanian later. Historian says what considerations had in mind when he started to write his monograph as: "(...) I find it necessary to collect a work conceived in terms of a unitary material usually dispersed in a number of different studies, some of which are difficult to reach. We find, moreover, that the theater offered the Black Sea favors more than others, exceeding regional issues and considerations relate to the forces acting on the field history universal"[19]. And in a speech a few months after the end of the Second World War, Bratianu stressing that: „Who could now doubt the value and significance of the study of world history in any country, especially at this place the crossroads where the country is Romania [...]?Without leaving the specifics of national life, which increases the breath of freedom, particularly the genius of each people, there is nevertheless a great looming planetary unit that can be done in one day as the fruit difficult birth, but powerful, of so many sacrifices and so much suffering. A search in the people past the factors each unit of universal life, multiple threads that weave through many wars in both meanings of the word canvas unitary human development, is now not only a concern for historians, but an explanation for the political leader and guidance for the statesman" [20].

But a few years before, Bratianu outlined the main geopolitical and geostrategic coordinates of the Black Sea via first Romania specialized publications Geopolitica si Geoistoria. Revistă română pentru sud-estul european (Geopolitic and Geohistory. Romanian journal for south-eastern Europe), which was published between 1941-1944 [21]. Since event the title, the new publication attempting to define a new situation and, especially, a new perspective. As defined in the foreword of the first issue of the journal, "geopolitics is nothing only, this largely geohistory (by geohistory must understand as history, Romanian or any other, how much can be explained by geography)". And "geopolitics comes, in part, from its, and only in geographic light, geopolitic may clear enough".

According to Gh I. Bratianu, geopolitics was still considered "young and old science, like the world they investigate"[22]. It "strengthens our belief that nothing is lost, as long as we keep, unbroken, eternal consciousness link between

this nation and its land, while it will find a voice to claim strongly, in the nation and history, rights can not prescribe, which may cover temporary adverse circumstances, but not prevent the triumph of justice, which often delays, but never missing" [23].

Europe, at the end of the 1930's, found itself face to face with political, ideological, national and territorial shock waves that were to mark the beginning of the Second World War (September 1, 1939). And in that background, Europe, especially Central and South-East area, faces to the fragility of Parliamentary systems, the decline of the electorate's belief in the democratic political game, extraordonary economic crises, as well to the abusive extension of politics into every sphere of social life. Fundamental changes in the political structure of Central and South-Eastern European states occured during the War. After the fall of Czechoslovakia, Poland disapperead and Yugoslavia was dismembered. New states appeared: Slovakia and Croatia; some state-political structures were imposed (by Germany: the Governership General of Poland; the Czech and Moravian Protectorates). In this turbulent and agitated context, the role and place of the new science of geopolitics became increasingly crucial. And so, to the pioneers of Romanian geopolitics, geopolitical definition of the state became the main activity. For geographer Simion Mehedinti, it is dependent on four pillars: Ponto-Baltic Isthmus [24]; straits; the Danube and the Carpathians. In one of his most representative works in the field, *Le pays et le peuple roumain* (The country and Romanian people) [25], especially in terms of conclusions, Mehedinti pronounced on economic prospects and political geography in relation to the Danube basin. Roman geographer stressed that Romania is situated diagonally across most major urban areas of the old world and the most direct shipping lines, air, rail, holding such a favorable geo-economic position. In addition, he warns against geopolitical Black Sea straits, derived from secular intention of Russia to reach warm seas. Romania is part of a very sensitive area of geopolitical friction, from a vast buffer-area, between two Europe – german and western Europe and russian and eastern Europe [26]. In his perspective, in the Foreword of the first issue of Geopolitica si Geoistoria, Gheorghe I. Bratianu insist of basic coordinated on the Black Sea region: Europeanism: frontier between East and West; key position... "We are what Nicolae Iorga named: a state of emergency in Europe. Relying on the city over the Danube Delta Carpathians and watching, guarding here the name and interests of all Europe behind it, even further – that Romania is called our lives speaks not only for her own. Our State is, therefore, the attention of East and West, North and South alike - and at all times. It has, as has been said, truly a key position, and this attention, the other for you, be careful and sympathetic, can be protected, but may be appetite and distress. It means therefore that more than anywhere else, watch the such points must always be awake [...]The idea of border, economic power and appetite, international anarchy and independence, there have always worn consciousness as an obsession. We are, until our position in the world [...] as a shepherd in a Carpathian wolf ford. Means, therefore: A state with such a situation, where winds, waves follow you everywhere, is he the first to know this situation, to give permanent account all, good and bad, many are hiding in it. All this state, and above all his political elite ruling, must have always thought the intent them" [27].

CONCLUSIONS

Even more, in the special study, "Geopolitics, as national educational factor", Bratianu claimed: "Destinies of nations are planted in the earth itself which we were born, as the statue is included in the block of marble that will chisel off". But, "it takes inspiration and a skilled artist to spread the image of clay or stone, and have faith and will of a people to rule the earth what is given to bear fruit in the fullness of its powers and properties".

And so, for the first time in the interwar period, the Black Sea region, at least in terms of Romanian geopolitics, became, again, a major european player / framework.

References

[1] Today, the full version is: „Wider Black Sea region": "The concept of a Wider Black Sea region is both old and new. In the early 1990s, Turkey took the initiative to institutionalize cooperation around the Black Sea into the Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Already at this point, Turkey took the constructive approach of extending the definition of the region beyond that simply of the littoral states, to adjoining areas of the Balkans and Caucasus. Hence Greece, Albania, Serbia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova are included in BSEC's membership. (...)it is only in the past few years that the idea of the Wider Black Sea region has gained acceptance. This is to a substantial degree a result of the work of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, which has played an important role in gathering officials and scholars from the countries of the region as well as from Europe and America to a series of seminars on the Wider Black Sea region" (Svante Cornell, Anna Jonsson, Niklas Nilsson and Per Häggström, *The Wider Black Sea Region: An Emerging Hub in European Security*, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2006, p. 16) or "The wider Black Sea region has become a new strategic frontier for Europe, Russia and the United States in terms of energy security, frozen and festering conflicts, trade links, migration, and other key policy areas. Prospects for the Black Sea in the 21st century will be shaped by the interaction between major external actors, the ambitions of states and peoples in the region, and the region's role as a crossroads of civilizations" (*The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st Century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives*, Edited by Daniel Hamilton and Gerhard Mangott, Center for Transatlantic Relations, The Johns Hopkins University/Austrian Institute for International Affairs, 2008, Introduction). The recent concept generated, quite rapidly, and an intense debate: "The wider Black Sea region is geographically predestined to be contested. This pattern has been many times confirmed in its restless history. More recently, after the end of the Cold War, its position has quite astonishingly led to years of neglect. Ronald Asmus and Bruce Jackson have not hesitated to name the wider Black Sea region the Bermuda Triangle of Western strategic studies. Moreover, being located at the crossroads of the European, Eurasian, and Middle Eastern security areas, the entire region has also appeared outside the

strategic perspective of the other two security entities" (Vit Stritecky, "Challenges For The Black Sea Region", http://www.mfa.gov.tr/challenges-for-the-black-sea-region-.tr.mfa). Its importance has increased noticeably in recent decades. "The Black Sea region is coming into its own - but it is a contested and sometimes dangerous neighbourhood. It has undergone countless political transformations over time. And now, once again, it is becoming the subject of an intense debate. This reflects the changing dynamics of the Black Sea countries and the complex realities of their politics and conflicts, economies and societies. Geography, the interests of others and the region's relations with the rest of the world in large part explain its resurgence. Straddling Europe and Asia, the Black Sea links north to south and east to west. Oil, gas, transport and trade routes are all crucial in explaining its increasing relevance. In the last two decades the Black Sea has changed beyond recognition" (*A 2020 Vision for the Black Sea Region A Report by the Commission on the Black Sea*, p. 3, http://www.blackseacom.eu).

[2] Crossroad idea even in the name of the recent symposium organized by International Centre for Black Sea Studies, "The Black Sea region as an influential crossroad between East and West: a path towards extroversion", Athens, Greece, 2-4 4 July 2012.

[3] Different perspectives on geopolitical relevance of the Black Sea area – Madalina Tomescu, "The Geopolitics of the Black Sea Basin", in Geopolitics, History and International Relations, Vol. 2, Nr. 1, January 2010.

[4] "We have just crossed the Terek [River], upon a very indifferent raft," wrote Frederika von Freygang, in 1811, "and are now out of Europe" (Frederika von Freygang, *Letters from the Caucasus and Georgia*, London, John Murray, 1823, p. 32). An innovative perspective, Deniz Devrim, Marti Grau, "The (In)hospitable Black Sea: Wetern Imagination and Multilateral Framing in a Contested Region", in Quaderns de la Mediterrània, nr. 13, 2010, pp. 117-125.

[5] European Parliament resolution of 20 January 2011 on an EU Strategy for the Black Sea 2010/2087(INI) (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2011-0025+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN).

[6] Alexander A. Bauer, "Between the Steppe and the Sown: Prehistoric Sinop and Inter-regional Interaction along the Black Sea Coast", in *Beyond the Steppe and the Sown*, D. L. Peterson, L. M. Popova and A.T. Smith, eds., pp. 225-246, Leiden, 2006

[7] Neal Ascherson, *Black Sea: The Birthplace of Civilisation and Barbarism*, Vintage Books, London, 2007: "This is not just a place, but a pattern of relationships which could not have been the same in any other place, and this is why Black Sea history is first of all the history of the Black Sea", p. 26

[8] Speech by Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu, at the SRI-Harvard Black Sea Security Programme Regional Seminar: "A Synergetic Approach to Strategic Knowledge Enablers in the Wider Black Sea Area", Bucharest, 4 April 2011, http://www.sie.ro/en/Interviuri/interviu33.html

[9]. The case, e.g., for the middle of the 19th century, of the Crimean War. "Throughout history, the fate of this region has resided much more on the balance of outside powers than on internal politics: whenever one power dominated the region, peace and prosperity entailed a haven of civilization. On the contrary, whenever two or three powers competed for control of Black Sea region, that was war, economic and demographic decline, and the retreat of civilization" (George Prevelakis, "The geopolitics of the Black Sea region", in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Volume 1, Issue 3, 2001, September 2001, pp. 148-152).

[10] "Historically, the Black Sea Region has always been a border zone. In the 18th century and the bigger part of the 19th century the Ottoman Empire and Russia were rivals in the struggle for dominance of this inland sea. The present day Black Sea states appeared in the 19th and 20th centuries as a result of the dissolution of the Ottoman and Soviet empires. In the period of the Cold War the Black Sea zone was frozen in the framework of the world's bi-polar confrontation but in the 1990s a process of intensive geopolitical fragmentation began there" (Plamen Dimitrov, "Wider Black Sea and the new Frontiers of European Geopolitical Space", presentation at International Conference: Wider Black Sea: Perspectives for International and Regional Security, January 14-15, 2008, http://www.aiprg.net/en/content/29/

[11] Or the Baltic states.

[12] Liviu Bogdan Vlad, Gheorghe Hurduzeu, Andrei Josan, "Geopolitical reconfigurations in the Black Sea area at the beginning of the 21st century", in Romanian Review on Political Geography, 11th year, no.1, 2009, p. 65-76

[13] Charles King, *The Black Sea: A History,* Oxford University Press, 2006

[14] Even more, "Some analysts questions whether the Black Sea area is a region at all, arguing that it is not seen as such from the outside (by the international community), nor from inside (by the Black Sea countries themselves). The Black Sea area is also called an *intellectually constructed region*, typified with a weak regional identity" Mustafa Aydin, "Regional cooperation in the Black Sea and the role of institutions", in PERCEPTIONS, Autumn 2005, pp. 57-83, p. 59. And, for the greek analyst Panagiota Manoli, the perspective is one subregional – we recomand his most recent work, *The Dynamics of Black Sea Subregionalism*, Ashgate, 2012.

[15] Radu Săgeată, "Romania. A geopolitical Outline", in Wilfried Heller, Mihaela Narcisa Arambasa, *Am östlichen Rand der Europäischen Union: Geopolitische, ethnische und nationale sowie ökonomische und soziale Probleme und ihre Folgen für die Grenzraumbevölkerung*, Universitätsverlag Potsdam, 2009, p. 49.

[16] Gh. I. Bratianu(1898-1935), Romanian politician and historian. A member of the Brătianu family and initially affiliated with the National Liberal Party, than he create and lead the National Liberal Party-Brătianu. In 1917, Brătianu began studying Law at the University of Iasi, from which he graduated in 1920. After obtaining a Ph.D. degree from the University of Cernăuţi, in 1923, he started teaching history at the University of Iasi. He later pursued his history studies at the University of Paris (in 1929, he obtained a

second Ph.D. degree, under the direction of Ferdinand Lot). In 1940, he became a history professor at the University of Bucharest. In 1942, he was elected to the Romanian Academy. In 1947 he was placed under house arrest by the communist authorities. In May, 1950, he was arrested, and sent to Sighet prison, without trial. He died there three years later, under unknown circumstances.

[17] For an evaluation of Bratianu's analyses dedicated to the Black Sea see volume I of Ilie Bădescu, Dan Dungaciu, Dan, *Sociologia si geopolitica frontierei*, Editura Floarea Albastra, Bucuresti, 1995, pp. 103-110 and Dan Dungaciu *Natiunea si provocarile postmodernitatii,* Editura Tritonic, Bucuresti, 2004, pp. 292-298

[18] Gheorghe I. Bratianu, *Marea Neagra. De la origini pana la cucerirea otomana*, volumele I, II, Editura Meridiane, Bucuresti, 1987

[19] Apud Victor Spinei, „Introduction", Gheorghe I. Bratianu, *Marea Neagra. De la origini pana la cucerirea otomana*, volum I, Editura Meridiane, Bucuresti, 1987, p. 33.

[20] *Ibidem*, p. 50

[21] "Geopolitica si Geoistoria" was a Romanian journal of geopolitics, geohistory, political geography and historical geography. Occurred in Bucharest, in 1940-1944; among supporters were geographer Simion Mehedinti (1868-1962), geographer and geopolitolog Ion Conea (1902-1974), sociologist and geopolitolog Anton Golopentia (1909-1951), and other geopolitical analyst and Romanian geographers. Here have been published and translations of foreign authors, especially Germans perspectives. Even if appearances are irregular, the journal will receive a prestigious group of authors from the first number, among the signatories have also: Sabin Manuila, with the study "Basinul de mijloc al Dunarii in lumina geopoliticii" ("Middle of the Danube Basin in the light of geopolitics", in fact, an extensive critical analysis of another study, published in The Hungarian Quarterly by Tibor Eckhard); Mircea Popa Veres, "Cedarile noastre teritoriale. Dezorganizarea economiei transporturilor" ("Our territorial cessions. Disorganization of transport economy"); Ion Conea, "Transilvania, inima a pamantului si statului romanesc" ("Transylvania, the heart of the earth and Romanian State", a replica of a study of Andre Rona, "Biographies des frontieres politiques du Centr-Est europeen", 1936). For a historical perspective of the concept and geopolitical science in Romania, we recommend Calin Cotoi, *Primordialism cultural si geopolitica romaneasca, Lecturi in oglinda*, Editura Mica Valahie, Bucuresti, 2011, pp. 180-207; Ilie Badescu, *Sincronism european si cultura critica romaneasca: occidentul, imperiile si Romanii in marea tranzitie*, Editura Dacia, Cluj, 2003; Ilie Bădescu, Ioan Mihăilescu, coords., *Geopolitica, Integrare, Globalizare*, Editura Mica Valahie, Bucuresti, 2011

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[23] *Ibidem*

[24] An interesting perspective on foreign interests in the Black Sea, Mariana Cojoc and Marian Cojoc, in their volume "Propaganda, Contrapropaganda si interesele straine la Dunare si Marea Neagra (1919-1939)", Bucharest, 2003. Overall general situation in Tudor Stirbetiu, "Securitatea Romaniei la Dunare si Marea Neagra in perioada interbelica" ("Romanian Security on the Danube and Black Sea, in the interwar period"), Analele Universităţii „Ovidius" Constanta – *Seria Istorie,* Volumul 8, 2011

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THE IMPACT OF ACTUAL ECONOMIC CRISIS ON INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

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Abstract

    In developing countries, many workers are employed in the informal economy with low income, with a limited level of job security and without any social protection. Globalization has the potential to increase global welfare and improve employment. However, while world trade has expanded significantly, the share of workers in the informal economy either rose or remained constant. These results are likely to be more serious due to the global financial crisis.

    Keywords: crisis, informal employment, labor market, discrimonation

INTRODUCTION

The concept of informal employment is ussually applied in developing countries, but it could also be applied in developed countries. However, many definitions on informal employment, as they are applied in developing countries, raises issues and questions in the case of developed economies. As is known in developing countries there is a higher proportion of workers involved in the informal sector and informal enterprises operate paradoxically open into to market., Household surveys are used in order to measure this form of employment.[1] In contrast, in developed countries, companies operating outside the scope of government regulation (for example, those unrecorded) are more likely to be illegal only rather than in developing countries. These companies are carrying out independent and they do not report the income of employees involved in undeclared activities or activities that produce illegal goods and services. This raises several significant challenges. Criteria which are often used in measuring informal employment in developing countries, are also applicable for measuring employment in developed countries? Given the clandestine nature of the employment in developed countries, the question is whether existing instruments can be adapted to capture informality or different approaches are needed?[8]

I. DETERMINANTS OF INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT

There is an important debate in the literature on what led to the increase of informal employment in developing countries, a phenomenon observed in recent decades. It is important to understand the determinants of informality, to find the right policies. In this respect, the literature suggests a set of alternative explanations.[9]

First, informality may to some extent be seen as a result of the type of development which fails to generate enough jobs for all. This was emphasized by the low capacity of public and private sectors to adapt to the rapid growth of population and

labor and was aggravated by labor market discrimination between men and women and between different social groups.

Second, globalization and economic liberalization led to greater diversity of forms of informal employment. This in turn led to a greater heterogeneity among informal workers and an increase in those with higher skills and productive capacity.

Third, official regulations were designed especially for larger companies being often inadequate for the needs of small and medium enterprise sector. Changes in labor legislation and / or implementation of labor market regulations have an impact on the share of informality in the economy.

An important aspect of this debate is whether changes in the informal sector can be attributed to changes within the labor sector and beyond. This second possibility emphasizes the fact that some sectors are prone to informal working relationships, which makes the relative importance of growth in the economy, would lead to an overall increase in informality.

II. MULTI-SEGMENTED LABOUR MARKET

Instead of trying to conceptualize labor market informality in terms of motivations of different actors (eg, waiting time for a formal job, tax evasion and social security, outsourcing to subcontractors informal), many researchers have tried to understand informal employment according to inherent characteristics that distinguishes an official job from a formal one. It stressed the mutual nature of informal employment which brings together members of different social networks more or less extensive. These networks are a rudimentary form of economic security that can help those individuals who do not have links with the formal labor market in order to find profitable jobs. In the absence of relevant interventions of the state, they are often the only institutions where participants have access to the labor market, especially in developing countries. Therefore, participation in social networks is not only essential for mere survival of their members, but also helps to mitigate the challenges that arise in the formal economy for some of them. In parallel with the development of the social network of informal employment, it was discussed an ideea about a multi-segmented labor market.[1] This alternative approach combines dual, legal and structural opinions by using the most appropriate elements to explain segmentation of informal employment. The main idea in this approach is that the informal economy consists of different segments including various types of agents: lower segment dominated by households engaged in survival have little connection with the formal economy (as suggested dualists), a level segment dominated by small businesses who choose to avoid taxes and regulations (as suggested by lawyers) and an intermediate segment dominated by small and large companies subordinated people (as proposed structuralists). Across regions or countries, the relative importance of each of the segments may vary depending on the relevance of three ways. Note is that workers have access only to certain segments of the labor market depending on their social network size and their bargaining power. The probability of moving from one segment to another depends on the individual characteristics of persons who are employed or seeking work (level of education and skills, experience, age, gender) and the conditions in each country (existence of an adequate legal framework, the

importance of social capital, macroeconomic environment). In addition, the transition between segments may vary depending on the type of motivation (economic, social, psychological) and the level at which decisions are made (individual, community, collective).[3] Dynamic creation of jobs in various segments of the labor market and the flow of formal and informal economy, depends on several factors, such as:[6]

- institutional characteristics (taxes, labor law, the commercial law, labor relations, social networks);
- individual characteristics (human capital, social relations, preferences);
- firm-specific characteristics (location, size, sector, network production);
- market characteristics (dynamic domestic demand, macroeconomic policies, openness to trade, exchange rate)

In this approach, individual characteristics will determine which of the various segments of the labor market a worker has access. Institutional characteristics will determine the flow dynamics between the various segments, ie both their direction and their relative importance. Other features will determine labor demand in each market segment and create conditions for further growth in production and employment.

III. THE INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

In recent decades the world economy integration has reached unprecedented levels. In 2007, according to indicators of economic growth, world trade volume accounted for more than 61% of world GDP. The financial crisis has demonstrated the importance of world trade as an engine of global growth. Moreover, one in five jobs is related to trade activity - even in large economies like the United States because they are either export companies or in companies that provide trade-related activities. Expansion of international trade to support economic growth worldwide and led to more rapid expansion of employment opportunities. International Labour Organization has estimated that during 1995 - 2005, due to the global expansion were created 40 million additional jobs each year in its member countries.

Despite this dynamism, not improved as much as decent working conditions in the labor market. Creating new jobs occurred simultaneously with the proliferation of non-standard employment contracts in developed economies (part-time contracts) and expanding informal economy in developing countries (IILS, 2008).[5] Persons from the labor market often get occasional jobs without a contract itself or access to social security (such as pensions, accident insurance, unemployment, etc.). Those who are already employed in the labor market may be motivated to give the formal sector, hoping to increase net income available. However, persons employed in the informal sector are less protected, remain vulnerable to sudden changes in the labor market must accept severe reductions in their salaries and it is unlikely that such persons to take part in training programs funded public authorities.[6] Failure of product growth and the opening of trade benefits all countries in the world has caused some concern regarding the current model of globalization. Some have attributed the increasing globalization of informal employment, others have argued that the expansion of international trade has not helped those employed in the informal sector to find better working conditions.[7] Regardless of opinions of experts, it is clear that employees have

limited control over working conditions and increased competition resulting from international trade is a key factor in dynamic modeling jobs and quality of work.

Table 1 Employment in the informal economy in non-agricultural activities by component, both sexes (latest year available)

Country	Persons in informal employment		Persons employed in the informal sector		Persons in informal employment outside the informal sector	
	thousands	% of non-agricultural employment	thousands	% of non-agricultural employment	thousands	% of non-agricultural employment
Armenia (2009)	138	19.8	71	10.2	67	9.6
Azerbaijan (2009)	407	26.5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Moldova (2009)	136	15.9	62	7.3	73	8.6
Russian Federation (2010)	n.a.	n.a.	7.785	12.1	n.a.	n.a.
Serbia (2010)	113	6.1	66	3.5	57	3.0
Turkey (2010)	4903	30.6	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Source: ILO, Department of Statistics

Traditionally, the economy is prevalent in developing countries and emerging economies. In time, new forms of informal employment as reactions to different market regulations.[2] These new forms of informal employment are important challenges for policymakers, as they demonstrate that the growth and modernization policies are not sufficient to eliminate or reduce informal employment.[4] At the same time, certain types of informal employment have emerged as a result of the failure of public authorities to provide adequate social security and taxation to reduce incentives in line with existing formal labor market. Obtaining a true picture of the size and dynamics of economy proved to be a daunting task.

Table 2 Employment in the informal economy in non-agricultural activities by component and sex (latest year available)

Country		Persons in informal employment		Persons employed in the informal sector		Persons in informal employment outside the informal sector	
		thousands	% of non-agricultural employment	thousands	% of non-agricultural employment	thousands	% of non-agricultural employment

|							
Armenia (2009)	F	37	12.7	15	5.2	22	7.5
	M	101	24.8	56	13.7	45	11.1
Azerbaijan (2009)	F	254	41.7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	M	153	16.6	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Moldova (2009)	F	50	11.4	11	2.6	39	8.8
	M	85	20.8	51	12.4	35	8.4
Russian Federation (2010)	F	n.a.	n.a.	3536	10.9	n.a.	n.a.
	M	n.a.	n.a.	4249	13.3	n.a.	n.a.
Serbia (2010)	F	35	4.3	17	2.1	21	2.6
	M	79	7.5	48	4.6	35	3.3
Turkey (2010)	F	1116	32.6	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	M	3788	30.1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Source: ILO, Department of Statistics

Despite more than three decades research, no consensus in the literature regarding the concept and definition of underground economy in view of the many facets of this phenomenon. In developing regions, most workers are employed in what is called "vulnerable employment", defined as the percentage of work done on their own and the total unpaid employment. Vulnerable employment is characterized by informal working agreements, lack of adequate social protection, low wages and hard labor. Based on available data, it is estimated that vulnerable employment rate remained about the same between 2008 and 2009, both in the developing and the developed. According IILS estimated there is substantial heterogeneity in the dynamics of informality in the Black Sea Region (see figure 1 and table 1 and 2).

Figure 1 Persons in informal employment by sex

Probability of working in informal employment is related to the qualifications of the individual. Figure 2 presents the regional average rates of informal employment by level of education, calculated over the ten years for Black Sea Region. It is noted that rates of informal employment highly qualified people have remained low and stable. The incidence of informality increases significantly for those categories of persons with lower levels of qualification and had an upward trend in the period despite economic growth in the region.[6]

Figure 2 *Incidence of informality by skill level*

CONCLUSIONS

Informality deprives about 60% of potential workers from obtaining profitable incomes and appropriate career opportunities. While high rates of informality limited state resources that could be used productively and lowers aggregate demand thus preventing the development of successful integration of countries in the world economy.

The integration of a country into the world economy can help informal workers by improving their living standards and giving them access to decent working conditions. Integration into world markets and tackling informal employment should thus be considered complementary, as only formal jobs allow a country to benefi t fully from trade openness.

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DIRECTIONS OF EXTERNAL POLICY
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

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Abstract

This study presents some of the directions of external policy of European Union from the perspective of the Treaty from Lisbon.

On 1st December 2009, the Lisbon Treaty came into force, thus ending several years of negotiations on institutional issues. The Union has a single legal personality, which enhances negotiating power, causing her to be more efficient in the world and a more visible partner for third countries and international organisations. The evolution of the European security and defence will be keeping some specific decision-making procedures, making it easy to ensuring a strengthened cooperation within a smaller group of Member States.

Keywords: Lisbon Treaty Foreign Affairs, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and security policy, European External Action Service, Synergy of the Black Sea, Neighbourhood Policy

I. The Lisbon Treaty and the impact on the foreign policy of the EU

On 1st December 2009, the Lisbon Treaty [1] came into force, thus ending several years of negotiations on institutional issues.

Treaty of Lisbon amends the Treaty on European Union and the EC Treaties (without replacing them) and puts at the disposal of the Union the legal framework and the necessary legal instruments to deal with future challenges and to meet the expectations of citizens:

A more democratic and more transparent Europe, where the European Parliament and national parliaments shall enjoy an enhanced role, in which citizens are more likely to be listened and defining more clearly what is to be done at European and national level and by whom.

A more effective Europe, with working methods and simplified voting rules, with efficient and modern institutions for a European Union with 27 members, better able to act in areas of major priority.

A Europe of values, rights, freedom, solidarity and security, which promotes the values of the Union, introduces the Charter of fundamental rights into European primary law, provides new mechanisms of solidarity and ensures better protection of European citizens.

Europe as an actor on the international scene - foreign policy tools available to Europe are grouped both in terms of development and adoption of new policies. The Treaty of Lisbon gives Europe a clearer voice in relations with its partners around the world. It also uses the force of Europe in the economic,

humanitarian, political and diplomatic support to promote European interests and values worldwide, while at the same time, the specific interests of the Member States in the field of Foreign Affairs.

1.1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and security policy [2]

The Treaty of Lisbon creates the function of high representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and security policy, whose role is to lead the foreign policy of the European Union (EU).

Previously, the powers of the High Representative of the Union were provided by two separate people within the EU:

- EU High Representative for foreign and security policy (CFSP);
- Commissioner responsible for external relations.

Therefore, the Treaty of Lisbon brings together powers relating to foreign policy and security in the hands of a single person. The objective is that the EU's external action to gain consistency, effectiveness and visibility.

However, the High Representative of the Union does not have a monopoly on the external representation of the EU. In addition, the Lisbon Treaty assigns the European Council's President the task of ensuring at his level the external representation of the EU, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative. However, the text does not specify in what way work should be divided between those two people, leaving the practice to determine which their respective roles are.

1.2. The European External Action Service (EEAS) [3]

The European External Action Service is a new institution of the European Union, whose establishment was provided for by the Treaty of Lisbon. The service officially launched on 1 December 2010, assists the EU High Representative for foreign policy and common security in the exercise of its mandate. Reflecting on the structure of national foreign ministries, SEAE has a central body in Brussels and EU delegations in third countries. It deploy its activity working in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States. Role of the Department is to contribute to greater coherence and visibility of the EU's external action.

EU-wide, the service will contribute to greater coherence and increased impact and visibility of EU action in international political plan. Foreign policy and security of the EU more effectively, with an increased impact, will contribute to a better promotion of the values and interests of the Union and its Member States.

II. Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union

The objective of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is to share, with neighbouring countries, the benefits resulting from the existence of the EU, which contribute to increased stability, security and well-being for all.

European neighbourhood policy aims to prevent the emergence of gaps between the enlarged European Union and its neighbours, offering them the opportunity to participate in various EU activities, through a closer cooperation in the fields of political, economic and cultural.

This ambitious policy initiative, launched in 2003, provides for the gradual transformation of trade relations and cooperation, with a view to obtaining a higher degree of integration between the EU and neighbouring countries. Economically, the European Neighbourhood Policiy provides preferential commercial relations with these countries, participation in the internal market of the EU, a better link with the Union (for example, in the sectors of energy, transport and telecommunications), the opportunity to participate in certain programs of the EU and a substantial financial and technical assistance. [4]

European Neighbourhood Policy was launched, on the one hand, in order to avoid creating new separation lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours, and on the other, to strengthen the prosperity, stability and security within and around the EU. In this sense, the ENP addresses the strategic targets set out in the European security strategy of December 2003.

The general framework of the ENP was presented, for the first time, in the European Commission communication on Europe enlarged, in March 2003, and was followed by a more comprehensive strategy document on the European neighbourhood policy, published in May 2004, which is defined in terms of the concrete way in which the EU seeks the cooperation of the European Neighbourhood Policy with the countries concerned.

Through the ENP, the EU aims at shaping a coherent approach to EU relations with the countries of Eastern and southern neighbourhood, allowing closer cooperation in order to create an area of prosperity and good neighbourly relations. It is a privileged relationship, based on a mutual commitment to common values (democracy, human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development).

The ENP remains distinct from the process of enlargement of the EU, even if there is the possibility of evolving relations with EU States by the subsequent adherence.

Romania has a natural interest in facilitating, in the vicinity of the EU, a common space of security, stability and progress in deepening the relations between the EU and its neighbours in the East and in the South, on the basis of common interests and shared values.

Partners

European Neighbourhood Policy applies to the States, the immediate vicinity of the EU's land or sea:

- in the Southern vicinity - Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian national authority, Libya, Lebanon and Syria;

- in the Eastern vicinity - Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Even if the Russian Federation is a neighbour of the EU, bilateral relations are based on a unique strategic partnership involving the four "common spaces".

The centerpiece of the ENP is bilateral action plans agreed by the EU with each of the partners. They define a programme of political and economic reforms with the short-term priorities and medium. EU action plans concluded with the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Near East

and Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon and Egypt in the vicinity.

Given that the ENP builds on existing agreements (partnership and Cooperation Agreements and association agreements in the framework of the euro-Mediterranean partnership, the ENP is not yet operational in the case of Libya or Syria, taking into account that such agreements are not in place. For Belarus was launched an Action Plan which provides for the virtual possibilities of collaborative EU-Belarus and Belarusian Government conditions for materialisation of such cooperation.

III. Synergy of the Black Sea [5]

Began in 2007, for the period of German presidency of EU Council, pursuant to the actions undertaken by Romania, Bulgaria and Greece, supported by other member states and with the contribution of the European Commission, the Synergy of Black Sea appeared as a new initiative for a EU regional policy specially addressed to the region. It was officially launched on February 14th 2008, at Kiev, by a meeting of the ministers of exterior of the EU member states and of the states in the region followed by the Synergy (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova Republic, Russian Federation, Turkey, Ukraine). The main arguments which determined the undertaken of such initiative on EU level concerned the direct neighbourhood, the strategic location, the relation with the West Balkans, as well as with Central Asia, Middle Orient, the potential in terms of power, transports, commerce, environment, consolidation of democracy.

The Synergy of Black Sea has as main objective the consolidation of the cooperation in the Black Sea Region, with the beneficial involvement of EU. It provides lines of orientation for the proposal of some pragmatic projects of cooperation between the states in the region and the EU in the following fields: democracy, human rights, good government, management of borders, frozen conflicts, energy, transports, environment, maritime policy, fishing, commerce, migration, development, education, research and development.

Main fields of activity: [6]
- ➢ Democracy, observance of human rights and good government;
- ➢ Traffic management and improvement of security;
- ➢ „frozen" conflicts;
- ➢ Energy;
- ➢ Transports;
- ➢ Environment;
- ➢ Maritime policy;
- ➢ Fishing;
- ➢ Commerce;
- ➢ Networks of research and education;
- ➢ Science and technology;
- ➢ Occupation of labour force and social affairs;
- ➢ Regional development.

Aware of its global importance economically and commercially speaking, the European Union uses its influence both in its own interest, and in the interest of the others. The Union promotes the prosperity and supports the democratic values worldwide; at the same time, it supports the consolidation of stability and well-being of citizens within its borders. The integration of new member states in EU consolidates its role on the international scene. EU is the greatest global commercial partner, and, at the same time, is the most important supplier of aid for the developing countries. The Union created an external politics and of proactive security, with the possibility of organising missions of crises management and of maintenance of peace in Europe and worldwide. In the complex international context of these days, EU added new instruments to the traditional instruments of external politics. It took over for instance the initiative to solve some issues such as planetary heating and the climatic changes. Global problems need global solutions.

Counting around five hundred million, the population of the European Union is the third as size in the world, after China and India. Its extension and impact commercially, economically and financially speaking, turn the European Union in an important global power. It covers the most part of the global commerce and generates one fourth of the global well-being.

IV. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

The principle of foreign and security policy (CFSP) was formalized in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. EU countries have always recognized the need for joint action on issues relating to foreign policy and defense, but they were difficult to accomplish. A first step was made in 1970 by the process of "European political cooperation", whereby Member States have tried to coordinate their positions with regard to foreign policy within the framework of the United Nations or other international bodies. However, whenever they appeared particularly sensitive issues or situations in which the EU countries had a particular interest, it was not possible to adopt a common position, because the decisions should be unanimous.

The emergence of a new post-Communist world order and magnitude that took the international terrorism have led the European Union to strive higher to express a common position in relation to international affairs.[7]

An important contribution in support of this vision is the numerous crisis-management missions – 23 in 8 years. In the meantime, the European Union has built a reputation of an actor capable of a comprehensive approach to crisis management, focusing both on the side of his involvement, and the civil, especially in the field of rule of law.[8]

The first EU military mission took place in the Balkans. EU military force took over in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the stabilisation in 2005. They followed other short-term missions in Africa, Asia and the Middle East.

In May 2007, the EU sent a police mission to Afghanistan with a term of three years. In early 2008, an EU military force of more than 3,000 persons had been placed in the area of the border between Chad and the Central African

Republic to protect refugees from neighbouring areas of conflict (the Darfur region of Sudan).

In December 2008, the EU launched its first maritime operation. Its mission is to protect ships against pirates operating along the coast of Somalia-especially those carrying food aid to this country.

Foreign and security policy is one of the areas in which the Governments of the Member States continues to be the essential, although the European Commission and, to lesser extent, the European Parliament, are associated with this process. Important decisions are taken by unanimous vote.

Conscious of the limitations of the system, the Union has introduced more flexible voting procedures on CFSP decisions in respect of certain Governments, allowing you to abstain from a vote authorizing the use of a qualified majority or by accepting that a majority of Member States to act on its own initiative. However, unanimity is still required for making decisions with military implications or in the field of defence.[9]

V. Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)[10]

Institutional transformation that the EEC has recorded through the new Treaty gave an undertaking by the EU foreign policy and security - CFSP (pillar II), which also included "a potential framework of a common defence policy" which could "lead, in time, the common defence" (article. J.4). For the first time since the end of World War II, the size of the European security and defence have a legal framework to enable institutional development.

Tragic events in the Balkans have reiterated the need to espouse a more pronounced role of the EU in managing security problems in Europe, including in the light of the development of European defence capabilities. In this context, on the occasion of the summit of the Franco-British Saint Malo (December 1998), both countries have decided to launch an initiative designed to strengthen the profile of the EU in the security and defence dimension.

The escalation of the Kosovo crisis has created prerequisites for the "Europeanization" of the bilateral franco-British initiative, the German EU Council Presidency assuming responsibility for its implementation at the level of the European Union. This endeavor has managed to capture the support of the EU Member States for the purpose of creating a dimension enhanced security and defence at Union level. In this respect, the European Council of June 1999, carried to Cologne (Köln), has adopted the platform for action to ensure that "the European Union should have the ability to perform autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the corresponding decision tools and readiness to use them to respond to international crises without affecting the NATO".

Decisions taken by the Cologne European Council marked the debut Of the European security and defence policy (ESDP), conceived as an integral part of the institutional pillar II – EU foreign policy and security. Under these auspices, the Finnish Presidency of the EU Council (July-December 1999) has assumed responsibility for the development of structured PESA. In this respect, the European Council in Helsinki (December 1999) adopted the global objective of the Helsinki

Headline Goal-ESDP (2003 HG) which target the EU has made available a package of forces and capabilities allowing implementation by the Union of the Petersberg tasks.[11]

The tragic events of 11 September 2001 have influenced and how the EU's response to such threats. In this respect, the European Council in Sevilla (June 2002) has decided to extend the spectrum of Petersberg missions to include combating the financing of terrorism. At the same time, the EU-NATO relationship gained an identity institutionalised through the adoption, in December 2002, Copenhega, NATO-EU agreements on EU access to Nato assets and capabilities, other than national ones, in order to conduct operations under the leadership of the Union.

Known as the "Berlin +" Agreements, they contained :

- guaranteed access to the NATO planning of capabilities, to ensure an operation;

- the presumption of availability to EU capacities and collective means of Alliance (including command and control structures and AWACS fleet);

- identification of European command options for DSACEUR during the course of UE operation with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.

The conclusion of these agreements will allow the launch, in March 2003, of the first EU military operation – Concordia (FYROM) and, subsequently, post-SFOR operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (December 2004).

Summit of December 2003 marked a new stage of the development process of the European identity on security and defence. The main event which marked the progress of the meeting of Heads of state and Governments represented the adoption of the strategy for the security of the European Union, drawn up under the auspices of the High Representative for foreign policy and security Javier Solana.

"Solana Document", as would be known security strategy, to determine the strategic objectives of the European Union in terms of assuming a role much more pronounced when the overall management of new kinds of risks and threats. Starting from the analysis of their impact on the overall European security, established 3 major objectives that the Union should promote the values and principles that govern it: promoting an effective policy of conflict prevention, by using the whole set of capabilities (military and civilian) that the EU possesses; the orientation of the Union appeals in order to create a climate of security in the immediate vicinity of Europe (the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus); international maintaining order by promoting effective multilateralism, respect for and development of international law, in full compliance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

By the same occasion, the European Council adopted in December 2003, the EU strategy on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, strengthened by the adoption of a joint declaration on EU-US cooperation on this dimension.

Through the new document, aimed at identifying ways in which the EU will be able to bring its contribution to the global approach to combating this type of threat. From this perspective, the EU considers that the promotion of a stable international and regional environment is a prerequisite for combating the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and should also close cooperation with key actors (the USA and the Russian Federation, Japan and Canada). It is also necessary to increase the financial and political support, as regards the technical verification of non-proliferation regimes, international and EU efforts in resolving regional conflicts by using all the instruments available under the CFSP/CSDP.

In accordance with the mandate of transmitted through the Security Strategy, the Member States decided at the European Council of June 2004, to adopt a new approach as regards the development of capacities in the field of security and defence. From this perspective, it was adopted as the new Global Objective of the EU (Headline Goal 2010-HG 2010) to focus on improving the quality of EU requests to defense capacities, and their adaptation to the demands formulated by means of the Security Strategy. In particular, HG 2010 aims to:

- boost inter-operability of forces placed at the disposal of the EU, and to strengthen the capacities of their deployment and support;

- extending the spectrum of missions which the EU will meet in the spirit of the provisions of the Security Strategy by the inclusion of new types of operations such as: disarmament, support third countries in combating terrorism, security sector reform;

- the development of rapid reaction capabilities of EU decision-making, both on decision make pallier (the objective being that the decision to launch an operation to be made within 5 days) and as regards the deployment of Theatre (up to 10 days after adoption of the decision).

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[11] Humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping and tasks of combat forces during the conduct of crisis-management operations

IMPORTANCE OF THE DANUBE - BLACK SEA CHANNEL FOR THE PAN-EUROPEAN TRANSPORT CORRIDOR VII

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Abstract
The Danube - Black Sea Channel is a very important link of Danube Navigation System, through which the river is connected to a sea port of first magnitude - Constanta South -, where the largest vessels transiting Suez and Bosfor have access and can operate. The economic aspect of the Channel is not only given by the shortening of the transport distance, but also by the fact that through the connection of the Danube to Constanta port, it became possible that the river transport be continued on the sea, with specialized ships, of very high capacity, which, in comparison to small and medium ships, have a much lower cost per ton transported. The Danube - Rhine transport corridor, through the mediated developments, acquires more features of a logistic area with all his characteristic attributes, from the transport flow to those specific to free areas and to the banking facilities and leveling of regulations. It is concluded that for Romania, the Danube – Black Sea Channel and Constanta port, as the final point of the Pan-European Transport Corridor VII, represent important factors of integration in the European Union.
Keywords: Danube - Black Sea Channel, Pan-European Transport Corridor VII, European connections

I. GEOGRAPHICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LOCATION. EUROPEAN CONNECTIONS

From the administrative point of view, both canals, the Danube - Black Sea and Poarta Alba - Midia - Navodari are located in the South-Eastern Romania in Constanta county. In figure 1, it is schematically presented the waterways system in Dobrogea.

Danube - Black Sea Channel route starts from the Danube in Cernavoda locality follows Carasu Valley till Poarta Alba locality and then crosses Dobrogea Plateau on the direction of Basarabi - Straja - Cumpana - Agigea, the last locality being located on the Black Sea shore.

Poarta Alba - Midia Navodari Channel detaches from the main one at km 36 (Poarta Alba), drives itself in Nazarcea Valley line, crosses Dobrogea Plateau through Ovidiu quarry area and outlets in Midia maritime port.

Danube - Black Sea Channel, between Cernavoda and South Constanta was open to navigation at the end of May 1984. At the end of October 1987 Poarta Alba - Midia Navodari Channel also became operational. In 1992 Rhine - Main - Danube Channel was also brought into service.

The two channels, Danube - Black Sea and Rhine - Main - Danube, form an independent ensemble of the "Danube navigation artery". Through the execution of these two canals it is made the connection between Rotterdam port from the Northern Sea and Constanta port from the Black Sea. This navigation way of the Danube makes possible the connection of these areas to other regional economic co-operation bodies, for example Black Sea area and Mediterranean Sea area.

It can be said that through the execution of the Danube - Black Sea Channel and the Rhine - Main - Danube Channel, the "Danube navigation artery" has become an interdependent ensemble whose impact exceeds the limits of the riparian countries, registering as a strategy factor at European and even global level. [5]

Figure 1. Danube - Black Sea and Poarta Alba - Midia - Navodari Channels - General Layout

II. PRESENT AND PERSPECTIVE SITUATION OF THE DANUBE - BLACK SEA AND POARTA ALBA - MIDIA - NAVODARI CHANNELS

Dobrogea region is known as a draughty area of Romania and an area with strong and dry winds. By realizing the two navigable canals the drought effects in the hydrographical basin can be prevented. The existence of the sea breeze makes the two navigable canals become a filter for the air coming to the centre of Dobrogea, respectively to the towns on the Black Sea seaside.

2.1. Historical data regarding the design and construction of Danube – Black Sea and Poarta Alba - Midia - Navodari Channels

The first attempts to realize a navigable Canal were made even at the end of the XIXth century, but they could not be realized both because of the incapacity of the Romanian economy to support such works and because of the technical and technological difficulties that had to be solved.

The idea of realizing navigable Channels to link the Danube to the Black Sea started from two main elements:
- ➤ realizing a navigation route to allow the river ships to reach the Port of Constanta;
- ➤ the central region of Dobrogea has no water resources, which prevents the economical development of the area.

Ten years before the works for the Suez Channel were started, Ion Ionescu de la Brad had published in Constantinopol (1850) the results of his investigations and research regarding the development and refurbishment of the central area of Dobrogea, being the first Romanian specialist giving reasons for the necessity to build a navigable route between Cernavoda and Constanta.

Ion Ionescu de la Brad goes back to this problem by his studies and articles published in Bucharest (1879), where he reached the conclusion that "directing the Danube to a new navigable branch between Cernavoda and Constanta is an economic necessity that will contribute to the development of the entire region".

Among the projects developed by foreign specialists, it should be mentioned the one developed by the counselor of the German Government, dr. eng. Th. Rumelin, and submitted to the imperial authorities (1917) under the name of "Dobrogea Mare Channel", with the proposal to immediately start to build it, taking into account both the importance of the new navigation route for the economic relationships of Germany and of the other countries in the center of Europe with the ones in orient and strategic military considerations.

After the World War II, the problem of realizing the Danube - Black Sea Channel became topical again, the excavations being initiated in 1949, on a route starting from the Danube at Cernavoda, following Valea Carasu up to Poarta Alba, then Valea Nazarcea. The exit to the sea was provided by a new port, sheltered under Cape Midia.

For the works performed in those years (1949 - 1953) forced labor was used, and the occasion of building the Channel was used by the regime to exterminate its opponents considered as "class enemies".

After Stalin's death (1953), the works were suspended and the excavated volumes (about 20 million m^3) were used, starting 1959, within the Carasu irrigation system.

The studies were restarted in 1972 by the Ministry of Transportation, and in July 1973 the realization of the Danube - Black Sea hydro-energetic transportation complex was approved.

The entire Channel design activity, including laboratory studies, experimental researches and research regarding the hydro-mechanical automation equipment were realized entirely in the country, the general designer collaborating - for this - with 39 specialized institutes in 17 ministries and central and local bodies.

The execution of the Channel started at the end of 1975. On November 10th, 1982 the Ministry of Transportation was assigned the task to use the same general designer to develop the studies and the other technical and economical documentations in order to realize the Poarta Alba - Midia Navodari Channel which, separating from the main Channel Danube - Black Sea at its 35th km, forms the north branch of the navigable Canal system in Dobrogea.

Danube - Black Sea Channel was open to navigation at the end of May 1984 and Poarta Alba - Midia Navodari Channel at the end of October 1987.

2.2. The main characteristics of Danube - Black Sea and Poarta Alba - Midia - Navodari Channels

The main characteristics of Danube - Black Sea Channel and Poarta Alba - Midia - Navodari Channel can be summarized as it follows:

2.2.1. Danube - Black Sea Channel:

The navigation on the Channel takes place simultaneously in both directions (upstream and downstream), with the speed of 8 – 9 km/hour. The Danube-Black sea Canal follows Valea Carasu up to Basarabi, crosses the Dobrogean plateau in the Straja – Sud Cumpana – Nord Agigea area and reaches the maritime port of Constanta South. The length of the Channel between the Danube at Cernavoda and the Black Sea (port of Constanta South aquatory) is 64.410 km.

Danube - Black Sea Channel has two ports, as follows:
➢ *The Port of Medgidia* - with the surface of the aquatory of 18 ha, the surface of the port platforms of 18 ha and the width of the access inlet of 125 m;
➢ *The Port of Basarabi* - with the surface of the aquatory of 14 ha, the one of the port platforms of 9,0 ha, the width of the access inlet being 110.

2.2.2. Poarta Alba - Midia - Navodari Channel:

The main constructive features of the Poarta Alba-Midia, Navodari Canal have been set taking into account the elements presented below:
➢ The navigation on the Canal takes place simultaneously in both directions (upstream and downstream), with the speed of 8 – 9 km/hour;
➢ The Poarta Alba-Midia, Navodari Channell follows Valea Adanca (Nazarcea), crosses the plateau at Ovidiu in the limestone quarry area, follows the north border of the Siutghiol lake (Mamaia) and reaches the

aquatory of the maritime port of Midia. A branch of the Channell enters the Tasaul lake (Navodari), up to the port of Luminita;

➢ The Canal length from the separation from the Danube - Black Sea Channel (at its 35th km), up to the aquatory of the port of Midia is 27.500 km, and the eastern branch, through the Tasaul reservoir (Navodari) is 5 km long; The ports on the Channell are located as follows:

➢ *The Port of Ovidiu* - with the surface of the platforms of 3,6 ha;

➢ *The Port of Luminita* - located in the Tasaul (Navodari) lake, with the surface of the aquatory of 25 ha and of the port platforms of 6,1 ha.

2.3. Beneficiaries of the two navigable canals

The main usage beneficiaries groups for this infrastructure having complex functions are the following groups:

1. Shippers using this infrastructure as transport route directly connecting by water the ports of Constaţa, respectively Midia with the Danube river. The main advantage is that the goods can reach directly the maritime ship operating in the ports of Constanta, respectively Midia without additional trans-shipping being necessary;

2. Industry existing in the hydrographical basin of the two navigable channels having a high capacity source of industrial water, capable to answer any water supply requirement for industrial processes. Industry can both take over the water in the two navigable channels and discharge the water with a view to transiting it to the sea;

3. The agriculture practiced on the grounds on the hydrographical basin of the two navigable channels as the water in the two navigable channels represents the water source for irrigations.The sizes of the realized pass allow the transit of the water volumes requested by agriculture to irrigate cultivated grounds.

4. Local communities adjacent to the two navigable canals. Realizing the two navigable channels generated a lot of benefits for local communities:

➢ a water source for potabilization absolutely necessary for local communities is ensured;

➢ an emissary for treated sanitary waters and for storm waters discharge is ensured;

➢ the protection of localities against floods is ensured by collecting all the torrents in the area and directing them to the bed of the navigable channels;

➢ the drainage of the phreatic water layer is ensured in the areas where the elevation of the ground is lower than the elevation of the water in the navigable channels (in the Carasu Valley area)

5. Dobrogea region, as the realization of the navigable channels created new conditions for the development of this region by:

➢ creating new work places in the ports on the navigable channels;

➢ the possibility to valuate agriculture in a superior way, as Dobrogea is known as a droughty area;

➢ increasing the capacity of the water sources for potabilization created conditions to extend the tourist resorts of the Black Sea seaside;

➢ by collecting the torrents and the water excess on the grounds adjacent to the navigable channels, the floods in the entire hydrographical basin of the two navigable channels are prevented.

6. Environment in the area of the hydrographical basins of the two navigable channels.

III. FUNCTIONS OF THE DANUBE - BLACK SEA CHANNEL AND ITS ECONOMICAL ADVANTAGES

The main function of the Danube - Black Sea Channel is of course the high capacity of the navigation channel, extremely advantageous, which allows:

➢ the connection of the trans-European Navigation System to a sea port of first magnitude: Constanta, where the largest vessels transiting Suez and Bosfor have access and can moor;

➢ shortening of the transport distance between Cernavoda and Constanta by approx. 400 km than the route through Sulina;

➢ the diminution of the total sea transports cost, given the possibility to use ships of high and very high capacity that have access only in Constanta South port;

➢ attracting an important volume of external traffic, from Central Europe, for which Constanta port and even Medgidia become entrance-exit gates to the Middle East, South Asia and pacific countries;

➢ direct access of the Central European countries to the free area of Constanta South.

All these offer the Danube - Black Sea Channel an important role in the European Union and Black Sea Region. In the same time, the canals system in Dobrogea has complex functions which, besides navigation, also provide:

➢ irrigation of important plough land which count up approx. 198.000 ha, with extension possibilities to 220.000 ha;

➢ cooling the aggregates of the Nuclear Power Station, by collecting from the canal's reach 1, a discharge 53 m^3/s with the assurance 98 % for each aggregate;

➢ taking over, under certain circumstances, from the canal's reach II, of some discharges from the return hydroelectric Station at Cernavoda, with the input power $Pi = 12$ MW;

➢ turbining the available discharges in the hydrographic basin, through the two hydroelectric stations from Agigea locks ($pi = 10$ MW), and the ones from Ovidiu locks ($pi = 2,70$ MW);

➢ supply of potable and industrial water for a part of Constana city, agricultural farms in the area and some units in the cement and petro-chemistry industry from Medgidia, Ovidiu, Navodari and Midia, the drawn discharge reaching even 15 m^3/s;

➢ drainings on low areas from Carasu Valley bottom land (approx. 2.000 ha), as well as on areas with humidity excess in the entire hydrographic basin (approx. 6800 ha), the evacuated discharge reaching 11,5 m^3/s;

➢ regulation of water flows and floods transit through the canal in the entire hydrographic basin, through the draining and diversion galleries from Agigea and Midia and through the siphons batteries at Agigea.

From the above mentioned, the following conclusions emerge:

1. Through the construction of Danube - Black Sea Channel a new orientation was provided in the Romanian transport economy, the objective being the main link of an unitary, integrating, navigation system;

2. The Channel completes the trans-European Navigation Main Line Danube – Rhin, 3.500 long, providing the attributes of a transport corridor of exceptionally importance, ended at the West with the greatest port in the world/: Rotterdam, and in the East with Constanta port, which has now the chance to become an important logistic area at the Black Sea;

3. Through the connection between the "Danube Navigable Branch" and Constanta port where the biggest ships that transit Suez and Bosfor have access, it was started from the premises that both the transport on sea and the inland transport, on Corridor VII - Danube, to be made in the most advantageous conditions, with very low costs;

4. The Danube - Black Sea Channel turns Constanta port into the most important port of Romania, a very important port of Central Europe's countries, in their economic relationships to Gulf countries, South-East Asia, Far East and Australia.

IV. MAJOR PROBLEMS REGARDING THE CHANNELS OPERATION SYSTEM

The activity on the two navigation channels is reflected through two main parameters namely:

➢ cargo traffic that transits the canals in terms of tones capacity of thes ships that transited the channels;

➢ water volumes taken over by the two navigation channels.

Since the placing into operation till present, it can be observed a permanent increase of goods through this two navigation channels, and for the next 10 years it is estimated a doubling of the cargo traffic. In this situation it is necessary to use both navigation lines, because only on one navigation line can transit approx. 35 - 40 mil. tones capacity, equivalent to approx. 25 mil. tones of cargo and approx. 20 lockage manoeuvres/day.

Regarding the water volumes transported through both navigation channels, these have an ascending trend because:

➢ agriculture - after the decline since 1990, started to take over more and more irrigation water each year;

➢ there will be built factories which will require water.

For the above mentioned functions this transport infrastructure includes the following constructions and installations:

1. Fairway with a total length of 100 km;

2. Four locks located at Agigea, Cernavoda, Ovidiu and Navodari;

3. A complex system of constructions, equipments and installations for the adjustment of the levels in pools and in the lakes limitrophe to the navigation channels;

4. High waters discharge galleries located in the area of the sea lock (Agigea and Navodari); these locks are provided with special equipments for the water control in the tunnels;

5. Water gates between the lakes limitrophe to the canal; and the canal in order to provide the water flow on both ways (from the lake to the channels and contrariwise);

6. Micro-hydro-electric power stations located at Ovidiu and Agigea Locks. I mention that these micro-hydro-electric power stations, besides producing electric power, they also operate as a spillway for the water excess and also adjust the levels in pools of the two navigable channels;

7. Installations and equipments for the quantitative and qualitative control of the water in the two navigable channels made of:

➢ installation to measure levels on the entire length of the two navigation channels;

➢ complex monitoring system of the qualitative parameters of the water in the 2 navigable channels;

➢ inferential meter system placed along the navigable channels;

➢ complex supervision system for the channels navigation and traffic;

All the data provided by the above mentioned systems are collected in the zone dispatchers located in the locks and ports and from here transmitted to the central dispatcher located in the administrative office of the company (near Agigea lock).

Regarding the equipments status, a general assessment can be made mentioning the biggest problem, namely the age of the infrastructure and the equipments. At 25 years from the channels inauguration, several and severe design and development problems showed the weakness of the operation system and also major risks regarding the channels operation itself and of some connected activities as well. Therefore:

1. equipments and installations are older than 21 years;

2. the pumping station equipment is older than 41 years;

3. the operation time of the equipments and installations, according to the initial project is:

➢ 20 years for the control and activation hydraulic installations;

➢ 15 years for the electric installations;

➢ 50 years for metallic structures (gates, cofferdams, valves, bridges, etc.);

➢ the conception of the equipments and installations is at the level of 1978.

Even the best equipment of the channels was found with serious deficiencies. Briefly, I remind:

➢ deficiencies and degradations in the locks structures (buildings, hydrotechnical concrete, metallic parts, mooring devices, etc);

➢ design and operation deficiencies at the main operation equipment (gates, valves, pumps, etc.), installations (pipes, reinforcements) and auxiliary equipment.

The locks operation is strongly connected to almost all the other elements and systems of the channels. It is important to take into account the necessity of the

channels rehabilitation, considering all the major problems that affect them (the problems of the fairway and constructions, equipments and installations).

At 25 years after placing the channels into operation, in several unprotected bank areas appeared degradations with serious consequences over them:

➢ Risk of landslides which can partially block the channel;

➢ Erosion of soft soils, unprotected by vegetation, which is also the cause for the continuous and slow canal clogging;

➢ Rock falls on the operation road which can reach the canal and affect the navigation safety.

The rehabilitation of the constructions, installations and equipments of this transport infrastructure it should be mainly based on:

1. *Providing conditions for the cargo traffic transit, which is continuously rising*. According to the estimations regarding the cargo traffic evolution on the two navigable canals, it results that in 2017-2018, two locks should be operating in parallel. This operation is possible only if the equipments and installations afferent to the locks have a corresponding fiability. This objective can be reached only after replacing the elements of the infrastructure with a low fiability or a high degree of physical and/or moral usage;

2. *Preparing the navigation channels to take over higher and higher discharges for their transit on the Sea*. For this objective it was mainly taken into account the extension of the production capacity of the Nuclear Power Station at Cernavoda which uses the channel to discharge the cooling water in urgency situations or during the execution of repair works at the cooling water outlet canal. It must be taken into account that the Nuclear Power Station at Cernavoda provides approx. 15% of the Romanian necessary of power, percentage which will rise when placing into operation the reactors 3 and 4 presently under execution (estimated to be finished in 2012 - reactor 3 and 2015 - reactor 4);

3. *Bringing the structures, equipments and installations to the technical and legal regulation requests*. All the equipments and installations of the navigable channels were designed and executed according to the technical regulations in 1978 - 1984. Meanwhile, many regulations have changed fact which imposes the adaptation to the new regulations and to the installation afferent to the two navigable channels;

4. *Completion of the works at part of the installations which can endanger the safety of the navigation canals, the navigation safety or the safety of the communities in the hydrographic basin of the two navigation channels*. Although the navigation channels have been in operation for the last 25 years, there still are unfinished works which include installation and equipments. These works were isolated with metallic cofferdams and may be a source of incidents with extremely serious consequences.

CONCLUSIONS

The Danube - Black Sea Channel is a very important link of Danube Navigation System, through which the river is connected to a sea port of first

magnitude: Constanta South, where the largest vessels transiting Suez and Bosfor have access and can operate.

For Romania's economic relations, but also of the Central European countries with those in the Gulf, East Africa, South and South-East Asia, Far East and Australia, the port of Constanta has a particularly favorable situation.

The transport route for the mentioned directions, but also the Turkish ports from the Black Sea and the Caucasian countries is shorter by 400 km than the existing one at the mouth of the Danube (Sulina).

The economic aspect of the Channel is not only given by the shortening of the transport distance, but also by the fact that through the connection of the Danube to Constanta port, it became possible that the river transport be continued on the sea, with specialized ships, of very high capacity, which, in comparison to small and medium ships, have a much lower cost per ton transported. Large vessels require large depths that can be provided only in Constanta South and not at the mouth of the Danube, where they are important alluvial deposits.

Regarding the ones presented, it is specified that, within the total transport costs, mainly in the case of mass goods, the most important component is the freight for the transport by sea. This rate may be even double for vessels of small or medium capacity, towards the specialized, high capacity ones.

The economics of the Channel usage is given by shortening the route and mainly by the Constanta port facilities of regarding ships that can be used. In 1992 was completed the Main - Danube Canal between Kelheim and Bamberg localities, called the Europe Channel. It was done in this way the linking between the networks of the waterways in Western Europe, whose main axis is the Rhine and the one in Central and South-East Europe with the axis on the Danube.

In this way it formed the Trans-European Navigation Main Rhine - Danube, which crosses diagonally the entire continent. This Trans-European artery connects the waterway networks in 13 countries (figure 2).

Figure 2. European network of intern waterways

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Connecting the Trans-European Navigation Main Rhine - Danube to Constanta port confirms and strengthens the position of this port located at the Eastern end of the Transport Corridor no. 7. The particularly attractive conditions provided by the port, include: specialized terminals for various goods and containers, RO-RO berths and ferryboats, large storage and processing platform. The facilities offered by the Danube - Black Sea Channel cause positive influences on the development of the areas along the entire axis of transport, which now lays from Rotterdam to Constanta. The Danube - Rhine transport corridor, through the mediated developments, acquires more features of a logistic area with all his characteristic attributes, from the transport flow to those specific to free areas and to the banking facilities and leveling of regulations.

It is concluded that for Romania, the Danube - Black Sea Channel and Constanta port, as the final point of the Pan-European Transport Corridor VII, represent important factors of the Black Sea Region.

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EVOLUTION OF LABOR MARKET IN BLACK SEA REGION IN THE GLOBAL CRISIS AND ITS IMPACT ON YOUTH

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Abstract
Generally, labor market conditions were always more fragile for young than older people. In the present economic and financial crisis, young people were and are among the groups most affected. The problems faced by young people in the labor market have a significant impact on their living standard, their families and community's national or international whose members are. The most important effects of youth inactivity are the risk of poverty, inability to play an active role in social development. The importance of knowledge the youth unemployment is crucial to turn the young people into active persons, through specific policies for this population.

This paper presents a brief comparative analysis of youth unemployment in the countries of Black Sea Region in the period 2007-2010.

***Keywords:** young, youth unemployment, impact of the crisis on youth employment*

INTRODUCTION

Global financial markets crisis that hit the world economy in mid 2008 has affected the world economy as a whole, but had a major impact on labor markets in European countries. This has made, after several years of economic growth and employment rate relatively high, EU recording reduces that have not been seen for decades.

The crisis affects the labour markets in the different regions of the world to a differing degree. The effects of the crisis in 2008 were the loss of working places for 6% of the employed (given a 5.7% share in 2007). Youth unemployment increased by 0.4%. The report of the ILO on the *Global Employment Trends for Youth 2010* draws attention to the fact that out of 620 million economically active youngsters at the age of 15 to 24 years old, 81 million were unemployment by the end of 2009. The level of youth unemployment rises from 11.9% in 2007 to 13.0% in 2009.

In the world, in 2010, over 75 million young people were unemployed. The global youth unemployment rate was 12.6% much higher than the adult

unemployment rate: 4.8%. At the world level, the youth unemployment rates are considerably higher than adult rates, although there are regional variations in terms of the generational gap.

The economic and financial crisis has exacerbated the pre-existing trends, including a lack of sufficient jobs and rising vulnerable employment. If it is use the employment-to-population ratios, the jobs crisis appears even more acute: 40% of the potential global labour force, many of who are youth. This further shows that employment opportunities have grown at a slower rate than the increase in world population.

Fiscal contraction in both developed and developing countries is further dragging down economic growth prospects and casting increasing doubts on the ability of markets to generate new and decent jobs [Ortiz et al. 2011a]. In this context, a big proleme is that more than 120 million potential new young workers are entering the global labour market each year, nearly 90 percent of which are from developing countries. For these, it is necessary to be created, in the next ten years, nearly 1.1 billion new jobs to evade further unemployment woes.

Because the crisis effects on labour markets are particularly unfavorable, the policies, which are being adapted as a means to decrease its impacts and eventually overcome the crisis, are of particular importance. The importance of knowledge the youth unemployment is crucial to turn the young people into active persons, through specific policies for this population.

This paper presents a brief analysis of youth unemployment in the some countries of Black Sea Region in the period 2007-2010.

DEBATS

The inaccessibility of decent employment was already a pre-crisis reality for most youth in the Black Sea Region and will remain a post-crisis challenge. The Black Sea region, a strategic bridge connecting Europe with the Caspian Sea area, Central Asia and the Middle is a region with significant economic and cultural potential. Economic crisis were recorded in all Black Sea countries. In all countries, except Azerbaijan, reducing real GDP began in the early months of 2009, and at mid-year regional GDP fell by 6.3%. The largest reduction was in Ukraine (-15.1%) and Armenia (-14.2%). Declining growth, business bankruptcy have determined in the countries of this region reducing the employment rate, increasing unemployment, expanding areas of poverty.

The labour market situation of young persons is also dire across the region, with youth unemployment often twice the rate of their adult counterparts. The informal sector plays a significant role in the region as a provider of jobs, containing the subsequent lack of protections and flexibility of employment relations inherent to this sector. At the same time, formal sector employment relations have been marked by increasing flexibility as well.

The international economic and financial crisis and has significantly effects over the **Bulgarian** real economy. The effects are most strongly pronounced in the beginning of 2009 when the rapid decrease in labour demand, the closure of working places and the increase in unemployment are evidenced (Figure 1).

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Figure 1. Dynamic of GDP, Employment Rate and Unemployment Rate in Bulgaria

Data source: Statistics Eurostat on-line [lfsi_emp_q], [une_rt_q], Labour Force Survey, National Statistical Institute, http://www.nsi.bg

The impact of the crisis over the labour market is not uniform throughout the crisis period. Some of the effects of international crisis were: a substantial decrease in foreign investment, a decrease in production volumes as a result of the shrinking demand on the markets of the country's main external trading partners.

In 2008 unemployment continues to decrease, following the inertia stemming from a stable economy characterized by growth since the beginning of 2000. But, beginning with 2009, unemployment increased, and the process continued in 2010.

During the past ten years, youth employment rates in Bulgaria have remained limited compared to the EU-27 average (Figure 1). The employment rate of young people aged between 15-24 years has been consistently; in this period two times lower than the employment rate for persons aged between 15 and 64.

So, in Bulgaria, as in other EU countries, young people have been the most affected by the economic crisis. Generally, in Bulgaria, the age group 25-29 years old had the more stable position in the labour market. However, in the years of the crisis, their activity rate of the young people (15-24 years) increased from 25.94 % in first quarter 2011 to 28.7 % in third quarter 2011.

In Bulgaria, in comparison with the other Member States, had the highest share of young people neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET) (for example: 13.7% for age group 15-19 years, and 21.6% for age group 20-24 years in 2008). Some of the reasons for this situation are connected with the high

unemployment rates of young people and the still weak positions of the vocational adult training and non-formal education after graduation. The impact of the global economic crisis on youth employment has been severe and in other two countries in Black Sea Region: **Georgia and Ukraine**. The youth unemployment was in Georgia 5.5 % and in Ukraine 4.9 %.

In **Ukraine**, the population aged 15-24 years represents 14% of total population and 16.2% in Georgia. In 2009, the labour force participation for total youth in Georgia was 33% (41.9% for the young women population and 24.2% for the men). The average share of young people in the labour force was 41.5% with 46.4% for females and 36.5% for males.

The youth employment rate is higher in Ukraine (34.1%) than in **Georgia** (21.1%), but the situation is reversed for the youth unemployment rate: 17.9% in Ukraine and 36.4% in Georgia. If in Georgia the unemployment rate for youth women was 33.5% and youth men was 41.3%, in Ukraine, the unemployment rate for young men was lower than for women (17.5% vs.18.2%). The low youth employment rate shows that the economies do not create enough jobs for the young persons wishing to enter the labour market, at least in the formal economy.

The employment in the informal economy in Ukraine (2010 Labour Force Survey), is 22.9 per cent of total employment, while the share of young workers in the informal economy is 33.2 %, with 35.2% for young men and 30.5% for young women. The correlation between educational attainment and unemployment, in the sense that the higher of educational attainment level, the lower of the youth unemployment rate, is generally valid in Ukraine and Georgia. But, this correlation needs to be taken with caution, and analysed together with other indicators of the youth labour market. Also, in many cases youth with lower levels of education are likely to be found among the under-employed or the inactive.

In **Turkey**, the young people continue to face challenges - aggravated by the economic crisis - in education and training systems and in accessing the labor market.

The youth employment rate (for the population aged 15-29) is 37 %, which implies that a proportionately larger increase in youth employment is needed. Employment rates for all young age groups (15-19, 20-24, and 25-29) have fallen between 2008 and 2009 (Figure 2)

In 2009, the unemployment rate has increased significantly, with four or five percentage points for each youth group. The differences between unemployment rates for skilled workers aged 20 - 24 and skilled workers aged 25 - 29 age group suggests that there are high barriers to entry to the first job, even in very young qualified. The long-term unemployment rate fell during the crisis. For the age group 15-19 years, reduction of long-term unemployment rate was more significant than in the age's groups 20-24 and 25-29 years (figure 2).

Figure 2. Youth Employment/ Unemployment Trends in Turkey

Data Source*: www.turkstat.gov.tr*

Turkey did not have youth employment policies before the crisis. Neither during the crisis did not take measures to reduce the high level of youth unemployment and raise employment rate for young.

In **Romania**, the activity rate of population aged 15 -24 years, from first quarter 2007 - third quarter 2011, ranged between 28% and 33.6%. Activity rate for men ranged between 33.3% and 39.7%, and for women between 21.9% and 28.1%. The activity rate of rural population aged 15-24 years ranged between 42.8% and 34.5%, higher than in urban (23.1% - 26.8%). Analysis of statistical data on employment, aged 15-24 years, on education levels, reveals a reduction of the indicator for those with secondary and higher labor market, thus the labor market lost from quality labor due to lower quotas of young people entering the labor market and the international mobility of labor. As areas, young people aged 15-24 are engaged mainly in construction, trade, hotels and restaurants and the group 25-34 years in real estate and trade.

Of total employees, young people aged 15-24 years represented, the third quarter of 2011, 7.48% of total employment. 0.65% of all employers were under the age of 24 years. Of total employed people aged less than 24 years were 5.98%, young freelancers 3.86% and 20.96% of unpaid family workers. Men are most numerous socio-professional categories, partly justified by the period of life favorable for women to have children and hence the lower proportion of labor market participation.

In rural areas, is registered a slightly higher of employment rate for young people with primary/no education, secondary. This is explained by the fact that rural areas offer employment opportunity activities (paid or unpaid) developed in agriculture for people with a lower level qualification. Rates close to those two residence (slightly in favor of urban areas) is recorded for vocational education graduates (1 pp) and secondary (more than 3 percentage points), while rural youth with higher education continues to have an employment rate over 3 percentage points higher compared to the same level of education young people in urban areas.

Financial crisis has led to faster growth of **youth unemployment**, but it is worth their weight reduced the total number unemployed. According to data from the National Institute of Statistics of Romania, the unemployment rate in Romania, for people aged 15 to 19 years and 20 to 24 years in 2010, reached the level at 27%, 21.2% respectively.

Data provided by National Employment Agency (NEA), indicates that the unemployment structure by age group at the end of 2011 was as follows: 81,911 unemployed were under 25 years, 35,494 unemployed aged between 25 and 29, 108,536 unemployed were between 30 and 39 years, 119,909 unemployed were between 40 and 49 years, 58,564 unemployed were between 50 and 55 years, 56,599 unemployed people aged 55 years provide. Regarding the distribution by development regions of Romania, the highest rates of youth unemployment were registered with in 2009 in South-West Oltenia (10.4%), Central Region (9.5%) and South Region (9.4%) (Figure 3).

**Figure 3.** Evolution of unemployment rate (15-24 years), in development regions of Romania

Increases of unemployed number were registered in the counties of: Galati (822 people), Alba (773 people), Suceava (666 people), Covasna (491 people), Valcea (466 people), Nasaud (360 people) and Cluj (326 people). The counties with the largest share of the unemployed not total unemployed were in 2011: Virginia (77.20%), Buzau (74.72%), Dolj (74.13%), Galati (73.24), Braila (72.69%) and Covasna (72.24%). Most unemployed (276,900 people) came from rural areas.

At territorial level, the number of unemployed decreased in 8 counties recorded decreases in Dolj (with 1011 people), Iasi (375 people), Maramures (with 348 persons), Neamt (201 people). In Bucharest the number of unemployed decreased by 32 people. Distribution of unemployed by age groups and backgrounds is presented in Figure 4.

Figure 4. ILO unemployed by age groups and area

In terms of long-term unemployment, at the end of December 2011, were registered at NEA, 15,682 young people under 25 years, over six months (representing 19.15% of all unemployed under 25 years) and 127,965 adults unemployed over 12 months (representing 33.75% of all unemployed adults), the share of long term unemployed in the total number of unemployed was 31.16%. In terms of registered unemployment, it is found that the rate is lower among those with higher education and is higher among those with low education level (Table 1)

Table 1 *Unemployed under 25 years, registered, users of financial rights, by gender and level of training*

		2007	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**
	Total	*65217*	*24743*	*61794*	*49189*
	Primary, secondary and vocational	41699	7700	19410	10519
	High school and vocational education	18042	11931	31010	28758
	Universitary	5476	5112	11374	9912
Female	*Total*	*29907*	*13741*	*29285*	*23648*
	Primary, secondary and vocational	16412	3607	7183	4023
	High school and vocational education	9721	6398	14794	12940
	Universitary	3774	3736	7308	6685

Data source: TEMPO-Online - time series, the National Statistics Institute of Romania

Young age group 15-24 years faces with the greatest difficulties of employability. They are more vulnerable, more easily fall in unemployment, especially if they are recent graduates or early in active life, when are looking for a job according to professional and personal aspirations

The incidence of unemployment is high, the proportion of young unemployed ILO lasting six months and older in total unemployment is more than half.

From the data presented it can be said that the labor market, namely business is more exigent than the young workforce, entering the labor market after graduation. Young people hardly find a job suitable both professional and remunerative, so that the fluctuations of employment and unemployment and vice versa stay on longer when the unemployed are an important barometer of the continuing education system reform in Romania. In addition, information regarding training courses or adaptation work can give us information about system failures and lack of correlation between education and labor market demand.

Transition from school to work and labor integration of young people is a key issue, with a strong economic and social impact, and is also an important measure of external efficiency of the education system. Unfortunately, there are large differences on levels of education in the development and implementation of monitoring systems graduates.

There are no systematic studies and even a national database to monitor the socio-professional insertion of graduates on the labor market in the early years, highlighting the failure prediction of educational content. Also, there is not an adequate indicator system, allowing an assessment of the university system on the Romanian economy and society[13]. There are only fragmented studies, at level of individual universities, without an attempt to aggregate results.

CONCLUSIONS

Regional and national labour markets have responded in various ways to the economic shocks induced by the global financial crisis. Rising unemployment has been important, in the Black Sea Region countries. The unemployment continued to increase in 2010, reflecting continued uncertainty in the labour market outlook. But other effects include the deterioration of working conditions and quality of employment, a crisis-induced increase in part-time work, and discouragement with labour markets leading to reduced participation. All these effects have a significant negative impact on individual, family and community well-being.

Youth are often at a disadvantaged position in labour markets.

The impact of the economic crisis about the young people is more important than on the adults, the effect of the crisis has been a further deterioration in the labour market position of groups that were already vulnerable prior to the crisis.

In all Black Sea Region countries, the young people face significant barriers when trying to get a job or remain in one. There are difficulties in making the transition to the labour market, i.e. getting a first (full-time) job after finishing education and training, such as the issues of low-skills on the demand and supply side and a general lack of childcare facilities on the supply side

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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS.
DETERMINANTS FOR ROMANIA [1]

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Abstract
> *This paper tries to provide a brief and comprehensive view on the foreign direct investment (FDI) in Romania. Besides, FDI will be viewed in the regional context of the CEE and EU member countries. Some common and specific features of FDI will be here approached and some conclusions will be drawn. (1) Data on* **the net inflow** *will develop on recent periods, see the one around financial crisis. (2) Less significance for the current FDI stock is kept by current and newly added inflows. (3) FDI* **by economic activities** *broadly regards the links between foreign capital inflow and home development. (4)* **By home inside regions**, *FDI will be seen as both creating imbalances among regions and contributing to the regional development. (5)* **By country sources**, *all the CEE countries mostly receive their FDI from the western part of Europe and EU. Finally, (6) by* **FDI types,** *the same inflow gets strongly dominated by corporate development.*
> *Keywords: foreign direct investments (FDI), economic growth, employment, multinational companies (MNC); direct investments abroad (DIA).*
> *Jel Classification: E22, F23, O11*

I. COMMON FEATURES OF THE CEE COUNTRIES AND THE LARGER EU AREA

The FDI [2] inflow in(to) the CEE [3] countries is as *unequal among recipient countries* as it is all over the world. Just after the 1989 revolutions in this part of the old continent, different transitional economic strategies were implemented. A country like Romania chosen a "gradual" strategy, despite its important liberal political party's influence on its *de facto* evolving. As another example, the neighboring Bulgaria really preferred an opposite "*shock therapy*", but in a different context of facts, plus this was starting later, in 1997 [4], after long and costly political hesitations. Actually, as seen from today (and not as in early nineties, for instance) it is not simple to conclude about better or worse strategies, but rather about economic differentiations on the ground, as exogenous for strategies applied, and about that the decision to invest ultimately belongs not to policymakers, but always to investors themselves.

Some common features of FDI throughout the region might be: (1) the FDI country-sources are EU member countries, as for 60-65% of the FDI inflow in Romania, and something around this percentage in the other CEE countries. The US also stays as an important investor (in the top-10 of investor countries, in every CEE

country), and in the Russian Federation the US are the top investor. As for (2) activities targeted by FDI, situations are different in Romania (more on industries), than in the rest of countries (more on services etc.). (3) Romania especially, but also the other countries are unequally receiving FDI in their inside regions. (4) All the CEE countries perform a much less developed direct investments abroad (DIA [5]) outflow, than the FDI inflow so far. Contrary to this, there is to be noticed an inside CEE region FDI flow, but mostly supported by the Russian Federation's big MNCs [6] (UN: *WID 2003).*

On the contrary, among the CEE countries differ: (1) the absolute level of FDI inflows and stocks; (2) so, the same indicator as per capita; (3) dynamics of FDI inflows into the same country during different sub-periods; (4) for each individual country, as well, the FDI inflow's share in the gross capital formation and stock, as related to GDP in each country etc (op.cit.). As for one more significant aspect on the same reference period, the FDI inflow in post-communist economies developed on its significant components: (a) the *subscribed (equity) capital* of companies, (b) the *intra-companies (MNC) loans*, and (c) *reinvested profit*. Of which, the first two prove more significant numbers the way that the (I) subscribed capital was dominant enough from the very beginning, then its domination decreases in favor of (II) *intra-MNC loans* throughout the advanced period and up to present. Finally, the flow of *equity capital* into FDI enterprises is broken down into: [7] "*Greenfield*", [8] *mergers and acquisitions*, and [9] *corporate development* [10].

Equally recall that "*Ernst & Young*" recently published its yearly last poll results, according to which both the Western and Eastern parts of Europe are found as certain and attractive areas for investors. And this trend comes up in the larger world-wide context of the same investor companies' decreasing interest for the other emergent areas like Brazil, Russia, India and China (the BRIC group).

II. Romania

The lines below exclusively belong to the Romania's developments. This post-communist economy has faced two significant periods of its proper FDI process: first, the early "nineties" period, the one of the low level of inflows, due especially to small and insignificant investors, and the later one, of higher level of inflows, a higher development of the process and of its connection with the home development, and these all connected to the big multinationals (MNC) involved in. In other words, as consequently, the first above defined period of FDI accounts for a "more homogeneous" inflow, a systematic and easier to be influenced by the political authority process one. Later on, since 1998, the MNC changed the face of the FDI process (Andrei D. 2008). Then, data on 2009 and (sometimes) on 2010 helps some descriptions on the last economic crisis context. See the following paragraphs for details.

2.1 The net FDI inflows

See the three below Figures II.1.1, II.1.2 and II.1.3 for the FDI inflows into Romania considered as two faces of the same revealing about the 2003-2010 period [11]. Romania performed a rather stable FDI inflow growth, as from significantly

low amounts in the early two thousands. Then, as continuing on the right hand side of the graphs – for the two wages of the EU enlargement (2004 and 2007) – the Romania's FDI trend rather speeds up between 2004 and 2007 (see especially Figure II.1.1). As differently from at least some of its neighboring countries, Romania hardly succeeded to join the influential MNC's interest in late nineties and after 2000. Then, however, the high speed of the latter FDI developing compensates some of the previous periods' slowness in such a way. In 2004-2005 Romania was over passing, by its FDI inflow, the ones of the central and Eastern Europe FDI recipient country leaders of the nineties like Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, and found itself among important FDI country recipients on larger territorial scales [13]. There is also no doubt that the Romania's post two thousands economic growth was also linked to the FDI inflow in both senses: *FDI sustained growth and conversely* (Andrei 2008 [12]).

The same FDI inflow and stock are ever since as high as 65-70% dominated by the EU [14] (old) member countries, but none of them is individually dominant (Andrei D. 2002-2010). In the declining 2010 – in the aftermath of the good FDI peaks of 2004, 2006 and 2008 --, the FDI gross inflow totalized as high as million EUR 2,697, namely a 22% lowered inflow, as compared to the previous 2009. As for the EU's FDI sources, the 2010 top 5 expresses as: (1) Austria (18.1 % of total stock at the end of 2009, for 18.8 % less, as compared to previous year), (2) Netherlands (21.8 %, 17.2 % higher than the previous year), (3) Germany (13.4 %, 15.7 % less than in the previous year), (4) France (8.5 %, the same as in 2008), and (5) Greece (6.6 % replacing Italy, on this position earlier in 2009).

**Figure 2.1.1** Net FDI inflows and its structure

Data source: *National Bank of Romania & National Institute of Statistics: Foreign Direct Investment in Romania, Report of 31 December 2009 and NBR Annual Report 2010*

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Figure 2.1.2 Net annual FDI inflows as compared to previous year levels

previous year = 100

Calculated on data provided by: *National Bank of Romania & National Institute of Statistics: Foreign Direct Investment in Romania, Report of 31 December 2009 and NBR Annual Report 2010*

**Figure 2.1.3** Net FDI inflow, of which: significant privatizations*

Significant privatizations are the ones higher than million EUR 10 each
Data source: *National Bank of Romania & National Institute of Statistics: Foreign Direct Investment in Romania, Report of 31 December 2009 and NBR Annual Report 2010*

2.2 The FDI stock

The FDI stock at the end of 2003-2009 interval totalized EUR 49,984 million [15], see 2.4 % higher than in the previous 2008. Of which, the equity capital's *reinvested profits* of the foreign participation companies were cumulating EUR 35,600 million, meaning 71.2% of the total stock. As a result, the other part, the one of *intra-company loans*, was EUR 14,384 million, so 28.8% of the total existent stock at the same 2003-2009 period ends [16](Fig II.2.1).

Figure 2.2.1 Romania's yearly FDI stock during the 2003-2010 interval

Calculated on data provided by: *National Bank of Romania & National Institute of Statistics: Foreign Direct Investment in Romania, Report of 31 December 2009 and NBR Annual Report 2010*

Figure 2.2.2 Romania's FDI stocks during the 2003-2010 interval- year to year dynamics

Calculated on data provided by: *National Bank of Romania & National Institute of Statistics: Foreign Direct Investment in Romania, Report of 31 December 2009 and NBR Annual Report 2010*

2.3 More descriptive aspects of FDI

By *economic activities* [17], the bulk of 2010 FDI belongs to the (i) *manufacturing industry* (31.3 %), out of which the largest recipients were: *metallurgy (5.2 %), food, beverages and tobacco (4.1 %), oil processing, chemicals, rubber and plastic products (6.3 %), transport equipment (4.7 %), cement, glassware, ceramics (3.3 %)* and *textiles, wearing apparel and leather goods* which still hold a rather small share of less than 1.6 percent of total FDI inflow. Another group of activities that have so far attracted a significant FDI amount is the one of (ii) *financial intermediation and insurance*, a sector roughly including *banks, non-banks* and *insurance companies* and accounting for 19 % of total FDI stock. (iii) *Construction and real estate* detain 12.9 %, (IV) *trade* 12.3 % and *IT and communications* 6.5 % (Fig II.3/1).

Figure 2.3/1 The FDI stock at the end of 2009,broken down by main economic activities

Data source: *National Bank of Romania & National Institute of Statistics: Foreign Direct Investment in Romania, Report of 31 December 2009*

By development regions within (from the territorial point of view), the FDI inflows of the whole post-1990 period went mainly to *Bucharest-Ilfov region (63.4 %),* in which context, at the other end of the scale the *NORTH-EAST* region stays the least attractive to foreign investors, making up for 1.9 % of foreign direct investment(Fig II.3/2).

Figure II.3/2 The FDI stock at the end of 2009, broken down by development regions within the country territory

2009

63%

5.4%   2.3%   7.3%   4.3%

7%

4%

7%

■ Bucharest   ■ South   ■ South-Vest   ■ Center

■ Vest   ■ North-Est   ■ South-Est   ■ North-Vest

Data source: *National Bank of Romania & National Institute of Statistics, Foreign Direct Investment in Romania, Report of 31 December 2009*

*By country sources* [18], at 31 December 2009 the top 5 countries by ratio in the total FDI stock was: (1) Austria (18.1 % of total stock at the end of 2009, down with 18.8 % compared to previous year), (2) the Netherlands (21.8 %, up from 17.2 % compared to previous year), (3) Germany (13.4 %, down with 15.7 % compared to previous year), (4) France (8.5 %, the same as in 2008), and (5) Greece (6.6 % replacing Italy in top 5 country sources) (Fig II.3/3 [19]).

Figure II.3/3 The FDI stock at the end of 2009, broken down by country sources

2009

2%   1% 1%

7%   5%   2%

9%

22%

18%

13%

5%

6%   4%

2%   2%   1%

□ Austria   ■ Germany   □ Italy   □ Switzerland   ■ Luxemburg

□ USA   ■ Spain   □ Other Countries   ■ Netherland   ■ France

■ Greece   ■ Cyprus   ■ Hungary   ■ Great Britain   ■ Turkey

■ Czech republic   ■ Belgium

Data source: *National Bank of Romania & National Institute of Statistics, Foreign Direct Investment in Romania, Report of 31 December 2009*

But the top appears to have been modified the next year (Figure II.3/4) –
actually, the Netherlands over passed Austria, but that was not for the first time:
similar shifts between these two investor countries equally had occurred in the past
(Andrei D. 2002-2010).

Figure II.3/4 Main investors countries by the share of total FDI stock

Calculated on data provided by: *National Bank of Romania & National Institute
of Statistics: Foreign Direct Investment in Romania, Report of 31 December 2009
and NBR Annual Report 2010*

    By FDI types, as already mentioned above, the flow of equity capital into
FDI enterprises shares among: (1) *Greenfield,* (2) *mergers and acquisitions* and (3)
corporate development. The "*Greenfield*" type FDI seemed to have significantly
reduced their share in the 2009 corresponding inflow, see EUR 19.0 million, for
0.6% of total. *Mergers and acquisitions* evolved not much differently than that,
meaning with EUR 34 million for 1.1% of total. This way the *development of
companies* kept the high rest of EUR 3,065 million for as high as 98.3% of total
(NBR, *Reports* of 2009 and 2010).

    Last, but not least, the significance of FDI for Romania regards their
capacity to finance the current account deficit of the external balance of payments.
The Romania's current account deficit has reduced along the international financial-
economic crisis from EUR 5,168 million in 2009 to EUR 4,969 million in the next
2010. But this decreasing deficit was also decreasingly financed by the FDI inflows,
see from 88.2% in 2009 to 54.3% in 2010 (NBR, *Reports* of 2009 and 2010).

CONCLUSIONS

Overall, the FDI process in Romania looks not different from what happened in the whole CEE countries region, as concomitantly. Its long term evolving (since the early nineties) encountered first an early period of low and insignificant inflow, followed by another period of MNC involvement and of pre-joining the EU. Then, neither joining the EU moment (2007), nor the economic crisis (since 2008) has too much modified the picture, except for: (i) important *inflows reduced*, (ii) some structural changes in favor of *corporate development* as against "*Greenfield*" and *mergers and acquisitions,* and (iii) reducing the current account *deficit financing by the FDI* inflows.

As for the rest, the *EU stays the dominant FDI source* for Romania both before and after 2007, as the year of joining the EU. It is also equally true that only *the whole EU* dominates the Romania's FDI inflows (and stock, as consequently), but *no any individual EU member country*. That was the same since the late nineties so far, equally in the sense that the top investor countries in Romania has often changed regardless the important historical events, as highlighted above. But, let us here emphasize that not even the financial crisis, with its lowering capital flows, has significantly affected the investor countries top in Romania – in other words, investor countries and may be even individual investors in Romania would remain the same.

Besides, non-European investor countries like the *US* and *China* sometimes also contributes to this top countries revising, be it in a lower measure and lower part of the investor countries top (Andrei D. 2002-2010). The American interests of such a kind seem rather be missing in the area (and this for a quite long time), the same for the *British* investments in latest years [20], as over passed by many other investor countries (see Belgium, as for instance). *China,* on the contrary, keeps a "discrete" upward slope of its capital investment in the "little" Romania [21].

Lastly to be noticed in this respect, and so back to the EU member countries in a way, joining the EU by CEE countries did result into one more (new) aspect, as off the western part of the Union – this is about an interesting start of direct investments among neighbouring CEE countries. To be here noticed the Czech investments in Romania, a very beginning as such, this following in a certain measure some "older" Hungarian investments in the *Center* region. These countries start acting like real EU member countries.

Otherwise, it is certain that the investor countries' contribution to the Romania's FDI inflows stays also linked to economic *activities,* for which aspect the *manufacturing industries* stay dominant, in their turn, but less than the, let us say, European and EU's dominance, in its part. Actually, the top 5 activities that cumulate 82% of the FDI stock, as mentioned in the above II.3 paragraph, keep in common their international area of development -- here including manufacturing with its afferent exports and this equally expressing that foreign investors do not quite look for the domestic demand, as existent and evolving, in the first place. Or, this is one more aspect developing at the same for the whole period, here including within the economic crisis of the last years.

Last, but not least, since the very beginning and irrespective of all events encountered, the quite strong domination of the *Bucharest-Ilfov* region, as FDI recipient, is as unshaken as the role of this region for the whole economic development in the post-communist era. The significant *economic disparity* among regions is certainly not entirely favourable or strength for the whole country, but the thesis of *correlation between the FDI level and economic growth* verifies here, in this restricted area, as the most highly.

And let us have just one more word for the latest years of international financial and economic crisis, as influencing the Romania's FDI. Romania resents the capital inflow's diminution, as for certain, but future analyses of what will be happening here would be expected rather on the investors countries' evolving, on the Union's one, on the euro currency, as much as they are supposed to influence even the structure of this capital. This country stays dependent on the development of this larger region, and less on either the world-wide picture, or even on its own development resources.

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[11] As for instance, in 2004, Romania could compare in this respect even to the big Russia, equalized the India's concomitant FDI inflow and got higher than developed countries like Israel and New Zealand (Andrei 2008, pp. 151)
[12] See the conclusions of my Ph.D. paper defended in 2008 at the Romanian Academy of Sciences.
[13] European Union (EU)

[14] This number includes exchange rate changes, changes of some assets' prices and accounting restatements of some initial stock values.

[15] Note that the *net* intra-company loans include both short and long term loans offered by foreign establishments to the direct foreign investors in Romania, as either directly or indirectly – i.e., through other companies, as members of the same group, but non-residents in Romania

[16] See CAEN Rev. 2 for nominations.

[17] The FDIs' distribution takes into account the *country of origin* of the direct holder of at least 10 percent in the resident direct investment enterprises' equity capital on an "*immediate country base*".

[18] Also see Andei D. (2002-2010).

[19] To be noticed that these two countries were keeping the first two positions, as investor countries world-wide in the first half of two thousands (UN: WIR 2005, pp. 303-307)

[20] Plus, the UK keeps its own behaviour and capital outflows, as different from the other EU member countries.

[21] Actually, China does not miss any investor countries' top 10 of any month since 2002 (Andrei D. 2002-2010

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THE INTERETHNIC CONFLICTS BETWEEN INDENTITY RIGHTS AND PEACE RIGHTS

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Abstract
The interethnic conflicts represent the oldest type of conflict in the world. They are complicated situation the state confronts with, because of the pressure it is subjected to. Thus, state has the difficult mission to assure both the security to its citizens, and to respect human rights, especially ethnic identity rights. On the other side, all citizens have peace rights, especially to social peace.
This article aims to realize an analysis of the interethnic conflict from the perspective of respect for ethnic identity rights, but from the perspective of peace (social) rights. Also, some case studies will be analyzed – interethnic conflicts from the Balkan area.
Keywords: interethnic conflicts, identity rights, peace rights

I. IDENTITY RIGHTS

In society today, **the role and the purpose of the rule law is to protect every citizen's general interest and of each one's.[1]** To respect human fundamental rights, to assure the principles of separation of powers, to respect democratic rules able to generate correct decisions, constitute targets which reveal the state's "good side", as M. Duverger specifies. They also show the "bad side", namely that it pushes people to the dangerous "slope" of political passions and of fratricide fights for power[2].

The analysis made by Immanuel Kant and Rene Casin disclose the fact that the main purpose of the state presumes to defend inalienable human rights. Kant connected this objective to morals and explained it through morals, while Casin connected it to "general civic interest". State acts like an external force within a necessary relationship with civil society, which endorses processes, internal development; as a sensitive seismograph, civil society it called to reveal from the inside what should be corrected in the state judicial rapports and to stimulate the positive elements.[3] From such a perspective, starting also from the fact that human cannot live outside the society, person's identity right and abidance by all the collateral rights and obligations become a very important matter. Why? **The individual, as a social being, has rights and obligations.** He becomes a citizen when he acknowledges that these rights imply certain obligations and responsibilities, which he must respect and assume. Within social action he manifests his **personal identity – as an assembly of competences, which make him being unique and to realize his obligations in a specific manner.** If natural

rights are the same for all the individuals as human beings, the obligations are the expectations of society from the individual. His personal characteristics and the way he respects and accomplishes his duties confer him a certain social status and difference him from the others[4]. Identity is a biological construction, by individual's membership to the human species, psychological, by hereditary dowry, bearing the original family mark, and socio-cultural, by the elements that confer specificity to the people/ethnicity which includes the individual. So, we can discuss about a personal identity and a social one, which define both by the acquisitions that confer them certain specificity, and by the manifestations of obligations, which he has from the many roles he has to accomplish within social life.

John R. Gilles remarked in his introductory study to the volume "Commemorations – the politics of national identity" (1994), that the idea of identity depends on the idea of memory and vice versa. Individual identity or group identity suppose a certain constant, in spite of the time, more or less alert, or the changing we are going through, more or less visible. Identity is sustained by the way we remember how we related to the other persons, to society or values, in the past.[5] The identity rights are strongly connected to difference rights, which recognize that every person and each group are individuality. Equal rights don't mean to equalize them, but to treat them differentially, depending on this individuality. If people weren't different, they couldn't communicate, in other words, they couldn't enrich each other. Here is why it settles a relation of expectations between individual/group, in which rights and obligations are levers through each manifests: individual as a human being with rights, society, through its institutions, as a community body that watches to be respected, to protect the individual, to punish those who violate rights and obligations.[6]

II. PEACE RIGHTS

"Right to peace" and "peace rights" are two collocations that start from the same premise, premise-concept: "peace". The difference between the two collocations is more in the semantic analysis domain, because basically, from an etymological point of view, the two terms reside in the same imperative concept of the contemporary world and not only, "peace". Analyzing them separately we discover that first concept "right to peace" it is part of the organic structure of the second concept "peace rights", and the second concept couldn't exist without having as foundation the "right to peace". The starting point, as a primordial element for realizing peace rights is, so, the right to peace – right that every human being have, but even from the first moments of his existence, without being conditioning by something or someone; forming in the same time with life rights and being a real component of the last one, being so a natural right, fundamental to individual. So, life itself, being a possession to anyone, is inconceivable without peace, without that intense moment and feeling that is a right for each of us, both as an individual, and nation. Political and philosophical literature, as well as judicial studies, argues that people have peace right, this right has an overwhelming meaning and it is mandatory for everybody to respect it.

Victor Hugo shows that "*however it is today, tomorrow is peace",* and George Toparceanu stated that there weren't something more valuable than human rights to silence, peace, because "*war stops the time and inversely displays on Earth all the stages of the human civilization". "Mankind can do anything, if the right to peace is accomplished*", said Nicolae Balcescu. Thus, we reach to the idea that right to peace is an opposable right "erga omnes", and so, for its possible existence for the entire society is urgently necessary the existence of right to peace, as an essential institution to gain, maintain, and consolidate right to peace of each individual, from here indirectly resulting the natural development of nations and the achievement of the progress and civilization objectives of the entire humanity. Peace right, so, just protects, maintains and consolidates right to peace.

Defending right to peace by the force of right is the essence of Nicolae Titulescu's philosophy. In his view "*Peace is, indeed, a movement phenomenon. It is a living thing that gradually accomplishes. Peace doesn't mean rest or desertion. Peace is just a purpose, a direction. But the fulfillment is in the direction, and the road is passed from the moment you stepped on it. Everything consists in keeping the beat when advancing!"* Thus, peace defending, through judicial means, perfecting of the guidelines and international law institutions, fight against aggression war are fundamental components of the Nicolae Titulescu's conception, that found an illustrious illustration in his entire theoretical and practical activity. Generalizing the necessity to solve the interstate differences only by pacific means, N. Titulescu firmly agreed to unfailing abidance of the judicial guidelines with imperative character, that prohibit the aggression war, contributing, thus, to specify, to result and enrich their content.[7] Right to peace is a normative instrument, which realizes the passing from the formal legal protection of peace to the implementation of obligation to maintain peace. A junction between what is called sein and sollen, by the western doctrine, right to peace has both a negative dimension (absentia belli), and a positive dimension (the construction of a peace world). International law consecrated the following institutions: human rights, people rights, state rights and, also, from another perspective, individual and collective rights. Right to peace, to a first analysis, is at the junction of human rights to people rights and state rights and, beyond that right to peace is a different institution, with a complex content. Its judicial character is given by its international admission written in documents as Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). "*each person has right to social and international order in which exposed rights al freedom can be entirely accomplished*" (art.28). Right to peace cannot be conceived as ut singuli, because the protected fundamental value, peace, can only be assured by concrete action of the entire international community. U.N.E.S.C.O. Constitution Preamble is very expressing in this matter: "*once wars start in people's minds, in their minds it has to take shape the defending of peace*". Right to peace is a plenary right, opposable erga omnes and inalienable; obligation can be in non faciendo or in faciendo. The Human and Peoples Rights African Charter states in art.23, that all peoples has right to peace and security.

The UN General Assembly adopted a Declaration over people right to peace on November 12th, 1984 (Resolution no. 39-11), which has an important contribution in drawing this right.[8] The Declaration solemnly proclaimed that

peoples had a sacred right to peace, states having the fundamental obligation to assure a pacific live to them. For this purpose it is emphasized in the declaration that the states' policy must follow to eliminate the threats of war, and especially with the nuclear one, to renounce to use force within international relations and to promote pacific settlements of the dispute.

III. THE INTERETHNIC CONFLICT – A THREAT TO PEACE

The word "ethnicity" was introduced by Vacher from Pouge, in 1867, to unify race and culture in the same entity, which could represent a group of individuals from the same culture (same language, same customs, etc), recognizing and nominating each other and acting with the conscience of this membership. It is also named as "ethnic group".[9]

The conflict refers to the situation in which the community capacity to eliminate tense situations by regulation mechanism as state/clan authority structures, is limited or reduced to absence, permitting, thus, to the involved parts to apply violence.

The circumstances when the conflict frequently appears are:
- Corrupt, repressive, illegitimate regimes;
- Weak, corrupt and declined states;
- The existence of some discriminatory actions headed to other ethnic and social groups;
- The lack of existence of a legal setting, necessary to a better management of the cultural, ethnic or/and religious differences;
- Religious communities politically active which have a hostile and separatist speech;
- Frozen conflicts during the Cold War;
- Sudden changes to the political and economical level;
- Lack or poverty of the resources (water, arable land);
- The significant amount of weapons and ammunition;
- Region tense relations.

The reasons of the conflict are generally connected directly to the involved parts' interests and can be related to the resources, power and identity. Mainly, the reasons of the conflict can have two different shapes: reasons directly connected to the parts' interests and reasons that imply values. Thus we have here another two terms: conflict of interests and conflict of values.

We talk about conflict of interests when the involved parts realize the meaningful value of some functions, parts or resources, but the misunderstanding appears about who should to own or control. The conflict of values appears when the implied parts' involved are deeply different[10]. The fact that a conflict involves ethnic or ethno-religious or language minorities changes the dynamic of the conflict. Within ethnic and religious conflicts, the level of discrimination and of political and cultural claims are high, each of those could be the cause of an ethnic protest or of group mobilization.

Another aspect is that of self- determination, which can constitute the first cause of the ethno-religious conflict. Although, for many years the ethnic or religious factors weren't considered real problems for national security, at the moment they were discovered as having potential to inflame a tensioned situation or the conflict between state, the way they were approached was reconsidered both by the academic medium, and the decision factors, and this has been happening since the end of 70's, because of the religion as a major feature of a conflict, which was a totally an unexpected fade in. The first major shock was at the moment of Iranian Islamic Revolution, and since then became clear that religion, as conflict factor, has an important part, if not to provoke some conflicts, but to express them. This is because, mostly, religion appears in the conflict as a mark of ethnicity.[11]

The ethnic and religious factors, being part of the security cultural dimension, have a major importance in security analysis, the space of cultural security manifestation being to the inter-relating level of the individual security with the national security, meaning that the individuals or sub-state groups, in our case ethnic or religious groups, can become a national security problem, their behavior degenerating to terrorist, separatist or revolutionary actions, etc. The adequate conditions necessary to transform or religion in factors to generate armed conflicts could be: the existence within a space, at a certain moment, of some strong ethnic and religious discriminations[12]; the combination of the religious discriminations with the ethnic and political ones, and with socio-economic differences; aggressive and violent religious proselytism; religious fundamentalism, especially Islamic, etc.

The factors that stimulate and worsen the ethnic-religious conflicts are: the polarity of the politic system (centralization and functionality of a central exclusivist power); weak, inefficient, corrupt, non-functional political-administrative institutions; the low degree of manifestation of socio-economic coherence (dangerous social differences, graphed on tribalism, regionalism, ethnic-cultural and religious antagonism); differences of status; weaknesses of the democratic regime, of civil society and the weak development of the public spirit; the lack of friendship between the ethnic-religious groups within a state or between states or provinces; expectations without realism of some religious or ethnic-cultural and religious groups, with unjust perceptions of opportunities and threats; degradation or collapse of the expectations of some ethnic-cultural and religious groups; external interventions (armed, political, religious, terrorist fundamentalist) in states or regional security complex; historical tradition; conflict will etc.

But, there are, also inhibitor factors of some ethnic-religious conflicts. Among them are: the existence of a real democratic political regime, of the ethnic, religious and cultural pluralism; of a central democratic power and, also, of an efficient public administration; developed public spirit, matured civic society; socio-economic coherence; stable social status; lack of friendship between social groups within a state or between states; historical tradition; lack of conflict will[13]. In the frequent analyzed cases (Balkan, Caucasus, Central Asia, Near and Middle East), the ethnic- religious conflicts are rarely pure. Most of situations, the purposes, objectives, the way the conflicts materialize are complex, the religious factor or ethnic being predominant or not. When the membership to a religion or ethnicity becomes an essential or important element to identify to a social group (especially

to national identity), the political-military conflicts have a religious character, respectively predominant ethnic; also, in those situations when social groups are disadvantaged within society identify to a religion or ethnicity, the conflicts between advantaged and disadvantaged take the shape of interethnic or religious conflicts.[14] An ethnic-religious conflict can be doctrinaire and identity substantiated: the religious conflict is partly an identity conflict, or, at least merged with this. It appears from the need to exercise identity rights of the minority group, so that, the methods to solve the conflict, developed to solve the identity conflicts, could be useful. Above all, is the fact that it is attended with needs, which are not only identity needs, but of meaning, to be understood, the need of self-respect, of purification. What does mean to solve a doctrinaire conflict, in fact representing two opposite visions about world? Do the individuals need to be persuaded to quit these visions, or rather to re-evaluate them, offering them another light to watch through, another way of express them?

Also, among the ways of solving conflicts with ethnic-religious nature, we can include the national intervention, also, with the two forms:

- Political intervention – when a foreign state acts in the name of a minority on another state, offering ideological support, non-military financial support, access to communication, external market, troops to maintain peace, establishing blockades, and

- Military intervention – in this case, a foreign state acts in the name of minorities, providing finances for military equipments, training, military advisers, salvation missions, donating and selling equipments, to engage in raid abroad.

Thus, it reveals an important question: Is the exercise of identity right more important than to assure right to peace to those who are involved in such a conflict? Hasn't a political intervention, with a mediation part, more effect, for example? We also have to consider another version, namely the potential of an ethnic-religious conflict of being considered a threat to peace and international security. A threat to peace can be indentify according to some actors' behavior and/or in a process/situation. The threat source was indentified in UN Security Council practice using many ways. It was interpreted as residing in state, Government or regime action, or in certain processes or situations (humanitarian emergency, terrorism, etc.). A state behavior, respectively of a government was sometimes considered as a threat source to peace. Thus, some of the situations that take place within the borders of a single country can be characterized by the Security Council, as dangers or threats to peace an international security. This approach is sustained by the concise provision from the art.2 (7) from the Charter, which allows to the Security Council to apply the constraining measures within the chapter VII, indifferent of the internal state jurisdiction. They intend to determine a capable criterion to regulate the permission to intervention of the Council in the internal state jurisdiction. Such a criterion was formed by come authors, by reporting to the necessity of an answer from the Council to the systematical and massive violations of human rights. The start point of these suggestions is within the justifying character of the unilateral action of the states or groups of state as an answer to the humanitarian emergency and that these are founded on the humanitarian intervention doctrine. An example in this situation is the expulsion of the Kurdish from the Northern Iraq in 1991 and the

possible destabilization of the situation from its neighboring countries, which were considered a threat to the peace by the UN Security Council, through Resolution 688 (1991). This Resolution combines a threat action of a government with a larger situation, which expands over the borders of a country.

4. SHORT ANALYSIS OVER THE INTERETHNIC CONFLICT BETWEEN ROMANIAN, HUNGARIAN AND RROM

Some consider that interethnic conflict appears from the lack of an answer with what the state clerk treats a request of ethnic group[15]. It is majority or minority. It is considered that an interethnic conflict degenerates directly from the disobedience of some collective rights, in fact of some individual right, but only collectively relevant: to avoid, but, the concept of "minority tyranny", it is better to remind that for democratic societies, collective rights are equal for majority or minority, thing less mentioned by some analysts. Over the time, especially after 1989, appeared some conflicts characterized as interethnic between majority Romanian and two ethnicities: Rrom and Hungarian. We will shortly analyze this matter, to appreciate whether such an ethnic conflict is real.

The problem of "Rrom integration" is still discussed, with the specification of this ethnicity's particular rights. But it isn't mentioned anything about the fact that "integration" introduces an element that disadvantages an ethnicity, because it means to determine the members of it to adapt to society live in, meaning to renounce to a part of their identity. This matter generates a rebellion from the ethnic groups, which affects social peace. On the other side, it should be understood that integration doesn't mean to eliminate the human differences, but rather to consider and adopt them as possible and practicable, so that the individuals to participate both to linguistic, cultural, and religious community life, and to a larger society life of the state as a whole.[16] The communities' fear and refusal to know each other generate violence. Only during December 1989-1997 in Romania took place over 30 violent interethnic conflicts, in which were registered attacks against Rrom communities, ended with arson of houses and killing some people.[17] But when it comes for the Hungarian minority in Romanian the problem is different. They weren't ever considered to be integrated! Why? The answer comes from the perception which majority's members have toward this minority. Otherwise, the Hungarian from Romania are already integrated. The problem is about tolerance. Tolerance for the human differences allows pacific coexistence of people coming from different ethnic, religious, linguistic areas. There are two types of arguments to support tolerance. First of all, there are main arguments to regulate the constraint: the damage principle, for example, stipulates that people cannot be constrained but on the purpose to prevent them to damage others, or that to punish them for the damages they caused. The second type of argument call the necessity to assure public silence, social harmony and legitimacy of governmental system, all capable to be threatened by any resentments of a certain minority prevented to continue its religious or cultural life[18]. But there has to be a balance between the different involved interests, as those of the individuals who can be disadvantaged by ethnic-linguistic or religious preferences of a government regarding the employment

opportunities or educational consequences and, the same as, state legitimate interests that confront practical limitations to assure services in minority languages, coming from a real lack of financial or human resources. Finding a balance can and must count on the principles of tolerance, coexistence and integration[19]. Here is why some authors, to whom we join, consider that there wouldn't be any ethnic conflicts between Romanian and Hungarian, but just defining conflicts of some historical moments to the level of cultural-political divergent elites, periodically revived and social-collectively reconfigured by some Hungarian intellectuals and politicians as:

1) The ascertainment of the Romanian national state, considered a conjunctural Balkan state, and the evocation of an ideal traditional state and European civilization, assumed as representative for the Hungarian stability.

2) The defining of identity, Transylvanian versus Romanian. Ethnic and cultural minority or national culture of resistance.

3) A circulated theme: the conquer of Transylvania by the ethnic Romanian, their settlement mostly in towns, by great Carpathian migration flow directed to this region, especially durinf the communist period.

4) Sociological ambiguity of the autonomist idea.

5) School division. Is this a recovery of the ethnic identity or segregation?

6) Differences of perception of ethnic self[20].

Except what was called "Black March" in 1990, there weren't interethnic conflicts between Hungarian and Romanian. Mrs. Smaranda Enache, co-presindent of Pro-Europe League, stated: "It isn't difficult to observe that there isn't a real conflict between the most of Romanian and Hungarian from Transylvania. If this conflicted were, Transylvania would be paralyzed. Or, what we can see is that Romanian and Hungarian cooperate in the most different domains, they continually relate and make future plans"[21].

CONCLUSIONS

The researchers that study the ethnic causes and effects, usually, looked for answers to three major questions: What social conditions determine people to use violence? What conditions permit to people to solve peacefully their conflicts? What is the international community's part, when the relations between different ethnic groups become violent and get out of control? The researchers developed theories referring to the ethnic conflicts and political institutions that would contribute to solve the conflict and prevent violence. Some principles were deduced from the studies regarding past and present conflicts.[22] The experts' conclusions were presented to the person with decision, to the politicians, hoping that the principles would be used to elaborate public politics and politics regarding interethnic relations.

Within deeply divided societies, where fear and ignorance are often driving forces of the ethnic conflict, people tend to identify themselves through their ethnic group, considering it as a irreducible defining characteristic of society. Such societies can easily become ethnic violence victim when ethnic group are not equal and discriminated, and when discrimination is approved by public politics. So that,

it is considered that to prevent public institutions violence ethnic groups have to be permitted to participate to political process and to defend human rights.[23] Only then ethnic groups wouldn't be afraid of future and would feel "with the world" in such a society. It is necessary both the majority group to understand and to grant respect for the identity of the minority ethnic, linguistic, or religious group, but, it also very important for the minority group to respect peace rights, not only for the majority group, but for entire society. This mutual respect is the foundation of the social, cultural, scientific progress.

Nowadays, the most of daily activities take place in multicultural surroundings, fact facilitated by the technological progress in the communication and transportation area, and studies as the just presented could be starting points for future scientific steps, which can have as a ground the education, where, because of the different programs of changing the teachers and the students, there is a propitious surroundings to develop the communication capacity between the individuals coming from different cultures [24]. This fact could facilitate some scientific initiatives in the domain, because the cultural exploration out their manifestation space is mostly a slow approach, and often, because of the difficult way it is treated, incline not to enjoy the attention or increased audience.

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[10] *Ibidem*, p. 15

[11] Dinu, Mircea, *Op.cit*. p. 15

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MIGRATION IN THE BLACK SEA REGION. CHALLENGES AGAINST STATES' SECURITIES

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Abstract

After the enlargement from 2007 the European Unions's Eastern borders extended to the Black Sea Region. This Region has served as a bridge and a crossroads of traditional and modern routes of commerce and migration. Besides that, there are unsolved conflicts which characterize the state fragility, the flourishing of organized crime. The illegal migration remains a problem which affects every country in the region and in this context the Black Sea region has been identified as the new front line for combating threats to international security. The goal of this paper is to identify the effects of the enlargement on the EU's security, the specific characteristic of illegal migration in the region and what policies in managing illegal migration should be made.

Keywords: illegal migration, state securities, policies in managing illegal migration

INTRODUCTION

Societies with a rich diversity of skills and experiences are better placed to stimulate growth through their human resources, and migration is one of the ways in which the exchange of talent, services and skills can be fostered. Yet migration remains highly politicized and often negatively perceived, despite the obvious need for diversification in today's rapidly evolving societies and economies. Nevertheless, international migration is likely to increase in scale and complexity due to growing demographic disparities, new global and political dynamics, technological revolutions and social networks, with profound impacts on the socio-economic and ethnic composition of societies. This will result in new policy challenges related to the successful integration of migrants into the host society, how they are perceived in their countries of origin and, more broadly, the way migration is experienced by the community at large. In this context, the image of migrants in their home and host societies acquires fundamental importance.

DEBATS

In order tobenefit from the diversity that results from migration and to rise with the challenges generated by such diversity, an informed and transparent political and public debate must take place

The risk of maintaining the status quo is threefold:

1. Continued politicized debate will only serve to foster sectarian agendas, rather than promoting broader national, regional and international interests. One of the greatest challenges for those who seek to foster a rational debate is to prevent migration from being used as a platform for other political, social and economic issues.

2. Negative attitudes and reactive approaches are likely to continue to dominate over positive attitudes and proactive approaches.

3. Both integration and reintegration efforts will inevitably be undermined unless migrants themselves become active participants in the migration debate, rather than being the subject of debate.

Public opinion and perceptions about migration vary between and within countries (as well as between subgroups within a community) and over time. Given such nuances, it is not possible to isolate a single public opinion, yet claims based on public opinion often gain saliency in political and public discourse. The findings presented in this report, based on an extensive review of existing surveys and survey analyses globally, explore some of the more consistent factors influencing public opinion and what often lies at the core of prevailing negative sentiment.

One of the most consistent findings is the over-estimation of the absolute numbers of migrants in a given country/region or of the proportion of the population that migrants represent. Estimates tend to be even higher for irregular migrants. Research findings also show that when survey respondents are provided with more information about migrants/migration, rather than simply being asked if they think there are "too many migrants", their responses tend to be more favourable. Findings are therefore influenced by prevailing conventional wisdom, the way survey questions are worded (biased or not) and the respondents' understanding of what 'migrant' means (labour migrant, refugee, asylum-seeker, irregular migrant)

The latter can also influence the extent to which migrants are perceived to contribute or not to a given place.

The 2010/2011 period was characterized by the slow and sometimes hesitant march towards economic recovery from the worst global recession in decades. GDP growth rates swung positive for most high-income countries in early 2011, while many emerging and developing economies posted healthy indicators of growth. A wide range of predictions about effects on migration flows had been offered as the crisis unfolded but they were only partially confirmed by available evidence. In many ways, the 2008/2009 economic crisis and its aftershocks have mirrored at a global level what had happened at the regional level, following the Asian economic crisis a decade earlier.

Most analyses of attitudes towards international migration and migrants have focused on the destination end of the process and, thus, upon immigration. However, migration also has profound impacts on sending countries and their populations. Emigration has become an issue of increasing significance, not only because of its increasing scale but also because of the increasing evidence of its impact on development in recent years (World Bank, 2006). Therefore, as with immigration, attitudes and perceptions about emigrants can play a role in shaping policy and/or vice versa. However, unlike with immigration, relatively little empirical research on public opinion about emigration has been undertaken. This is

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particularly the case in developing countries, which have become important sources of migrants to high-income economies as well as to other developing countries. Some qualitative and smaller-scale survey work is available, but with little coverage of return migration. This is changing, as return is increasingly recognized as a core component of the migration cycle.

In 2010, Europe's recovery from the global economic and financial crisis seemed to be on the right track, albeit incomplete. The European Union (EU) estimated a GDP average growth rate of 1.8 per cent for 2010 (a significant improvement over the -4.2% in 2009)47 but at the same time, the average unemployment rate increased from 8.9 per cent in 2009 to 9.6 per cent in December 2010. The foreign labour force, in particular, continued to be more likely to be jobless than their native-born counterparts (IOM, 2010a; MPI, 2010a). For instance, in Spain, at the end of 2007, 12.4 per cent of immigrants were jobless, compared with 7.9 per cent of native-born Spaniards. By mid-2010, those figures had gone up to 30.2 per cent and 18.1 per cent, respectively. In Germany, "the unemployment rate among migrants in summer 2010 was almost twice that of Germans – 12.4 compared to 6.5 per cent" (UC Davis, 2010a). In the United Kingdom, the situation affected various groups of immigrants in different ways: Eastern and Central European nationals were relatively unscathed by the rise in joblessness, unlike migrants from Africa, Bangladesh and Pakistan (ibid.). In Southern Italy, the unemployment of seasonal workers led to unprecedented social tensions and anti-migrant riots (The Economist, 2010). However, unemployment also hit nationals – in some cases generating new emigration flows from and within Europe. Ireland, for instance, has experienced significant waves of nationals leaving the country to look for better work opportunities, due to its recent economic crisis. At the end of 2010, net emigration from Ireland reached about 60,000 people (compared to 7,800 in 2009), making it the highest level since 1989. It is estimated that the cumulative net emigration may total 160,000 people, over the period 2009 to 2013, if the labour market situation does not improve.

Measuring international emigration is an even more challenging task than measuring immigration. Reliable estimates of emigration (either flows or stocks) are necessary for policy makers in order to manage international emigration and assess its consequences for countries of origin. Currently, the most effective (even if not totally reliable yet) method of measuring emigration is through the destination countries' censuses gathering information on foreign nationals. Facing this challenge, the Black Sea Migration Profiles obtain their international information on emigrant stocks from the Bilateral Database on Migrant Stocks produced by Ratha and Shaw (2007) from the Development Prospects Group of the World Bank. This Ratha and Shaw (2007) new database shares many of the weaknesses of the original Sussex database, but has the advantage of being: a) more reliable (uses a fewer number of assumptions than the previous one) and b) is the most comprehensive and up-to-date database available presently. Interpreting the meaning of migrant stocks also presents some difficulties such as measuring children born abroad to seasonal migrants who may appear as foreign born, but are not necessarily migrants. Another example is the case of students that are included in some national migration statistics but not in others.

In the Black Sea these types of statistics are collected for a fair number of countries. The CIS countries in the Black Sea region inherited their system of migration data collection from the period of the Soviet Union, and therefore these countries collect information on flows of migrants mainly through population registers. Registration is done in the place of residence, and foreigners as a rule, must have a residence permit. The exception is Georgia which abolished registration in the early 1990's and re-established this system only in 2004. However, time criterion for registration may vary from country to country and more importantly from the UN recommendations. For example, Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia provided information on residence permits categorized as short and longterm residence, while the other countries do not specify the length of stay of the migrants registered. Information on work permits was also provided in the Profiles in the form of flows by Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine. These processes, both securitization and externalization of migration issues in the EU, evolved gradually and are still developing. Statistics confirm the fact of a steady growth in numbers of applications for asylum.

It was only very recently that the Black Sea Region gained a prominent position among the Western strategic community's interests. The initial impetus originated from those European countries which are located in the region, namely Bulgaria and Romania. After NATO and EU expansion to those states, they "felt that the process of EU and NATO enlargement should not stop with their countries" and that they "had a responsibility to work for stability beyond their own borders" Secondly, the 'Color Revolutions' in Georgia and Ukraine signaled the opportunity for democratic transformations in the region and prospects of developing liberal democratic societies and regional stability. The third factor is the geographical proximity to the Middle East and the gradually evolving understanding of threats emanating from the latter. The Black Sea Region is characterized by a variety of threats and risks. Most of the states in the region are fragile states and bad governance and weak state institutions, absence of the rule of law and an ineffective judiciary system, low level of economic development and low living standards are endemic to the region.

All countries of the Black Sea Region are affected by illegal migration but to differing extents, namely being a source, a transit or a destination country (or a combination). There are two major routes going across the BSR. First is the Eastern route ('Central European Corridor') – involving, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova continuing to the EU (through Slovak and Polish borders). Second one is South-Eastern ('Balkan route') engaging South Caucasus, Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Balkans countries. Due to the lack of available research on illegal migration in Black Sea Region (the BSR as an entity), for the purpose of this paper, analysis of illegal migration in BSR will be made by grouping/categorizing the countries as follows: 1. Greece, Bulgaria, Romania; 2. Turkey; 3. Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and 4. Russia, Moldova, Ukraine. The main sources of analysis are four reports: by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development concerning illegal migration and human trafficking in Central and Eastern Europe (Yearbook 2003 and 2006) and in Commonwealth of Independent States (2005),

and as well by International Center for Policy Studies "Ukraine's policy to control illegal migration" (2006).

Greece, Bulgaria and Romania are EU member states who are affected by illegal migration. Several flows lead to Greece as a destination country, which will be illustrated further in the text. Greece is a member of the Schengen area, and has thus introduced all required measures with regard to border management. Very recent trends can be observed, namely that the latter two after their accession to the EU gradually turned into destination countries as well. Bulgaria has three border sections exposed to illegal migration, namely with Greece, Turkey, and Serbia. Main flows of illegal migration through its territory go from Moldova via Bulgaria to Greece; from Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon through Turkey into Bulgaria and then EU member states. Since Bulgaria lies on the routes leading from territories in conflict, substantial improving of its border control is essential. Thus, in 2006 Bulgaria undertook legal and institutional transformations, namely by reforming the National Border Police Service and adopting the "Strategy of Integrated Border Management" The Strategy aims at strengthening the borders and "effective combating against terrorism and all forms of cross-border crime". As for Romania, it primarily serves as a transit country and, as has been noted, the gradual shift to a country of destination has been observed. Notably, for many years it has been used by criminal networks for illegal migration and its accession to the EU even "has intensified certain types of criminal phenomena at its borders" Remarkably, Romania is also a source country of illegal migrants. Its citizens mainly move towards Italy and Germany. From a policy perspective, issues related to migration and asylum remained a priority for the EU throughout 2010. In line with the objectives of the Global Approach to Migration, adopted by the European Council in 2005 and confirmed in 2006, several efforts were made to foster partnerships with third countries to promote comprehensive and coherent migration policies – including, for instance, the facilitation of labour migration and the improvement of border management.

On 22 November 2010, the European Commission adopted a Communication called EU Internal Security Strategy in Action,49 recommending several actions targeting the most urgent security threats facing Europe. In this regard, the Commission was planning to "strengthen security through border management" and decided to establish a European external border surveillance system (EUROSUR); identify "hot spots" at the external borders; issue joint reportson human trafficking, human smuggling and the smuggling of illicit goods, as a basis for joint operations. Also in 2010, the European Council presented the Stockholm Programme – "An open and secure Europe, serving and protecting the citizen". This multi-annual programme (2010–2014) defines strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the areas of freedom, security and justice. "The EU strategy has two major components: more effective control over external borders to preserve internal freedom of movement, and cooperation with sending countries to accept the return of their citizens and to cooperate to reduce illegal out-migration" (UC Davis, 2010a). To this end, "the Stockholm Programme expanded the role of the European Union (EU) Border Agency Frontex50 and provided the agency with a budget of 83 million Euros in 2010 (compared to 6

million in 2005) (UC Davis, 2010c)". Bilateral readmission agreements between the European Union Member States (EU MS) and countries of origin or transit are an integral part of the programme. One such agreement was concluded with Pakistan in October 2010: "The main objective of this agreement being to establish rapid and effective procedure for the identification and safe and orderly return of Pakistanis staying illegally in the EU territories." Tighter EU border control not only contributed to more apprehensions (during the third quarter of 2010, 34,000 irregular border-crossings were detected, representing an increase of about 4,000, compared to the third quarter in 2009), but also deterred potential migrants from moving towards EU borders (during the first quarter of 2010, only 150 immigrants reached Italy and Malta, compared to the 5,200 for the first quarter of 2009 (Frontex, 2010).

However, the Stockholm Programme also includes several measures aimed at facilitating labour migration, highlighting the fact that migration remains a priority issue within the EU. In particular, it places the Global Approach to Migration and the external dimension of the EU's migration policy (based on partnership with third countries) at the centre of the policy debate. The Stockholm Programme also emphasizes equal rights between third-country nationals and EU nationals, as well as the importance of integration programmes. Furthermore, the preparation of the Action Plan for the implementation of the Stockholm Programme between 2010 and 2014 promoted discussions within the European Commission on the development of community legislation in the field of seasonal employment and admission of third-country nationals in the context of intra-corporate transfers. The introduction of the European Blue Card system for skilled migration (adopted in 2009; implementation expected in 2011) represents one step towards such a common labour migration strategy (IOM, 2010a; Collett, 2010).

CONCLUSIONS

Migration touches all countries and requires a multidisciplinary approach that comprises various areas such as border security and crime prevention, economic and labour market developments, regional economic integration and protection of human rights;

This kind of multidisciplinary approach for migration management in the region requires an effective fight against irregular migration flows and simultaneous facilitation of legal ones;

National migration policies requires coordination and active cooperation among involved authorities.

The flow of illegal migration though the Black Sea Region countries to a large extent determines the inflow of illegal migrants from Eastern Corridor and Balkan route. The most intensive flows of illegal migration go through Turkey (52.000 persons) and Ukraine (44.000). Each BSR country is involved in the illegal migration chain, but in different roles. The most advanced reforms undertaken by European Union member states Greece, Bulgaria and Romania, and Turkey (which is making reforms according to the EU standards). Institutional weaknesses at controlling illegal migration have created favorable conditions for the prevalence of

organized crime. The remaining countries require profound comprehensive reforms in order to tackle illegal migration. Moreover, there is no institutional co-operation among countries in the region on combating illegal migration, thus leaving the challenges of illegal migration to be tackled by countries alone. Finally, a positive trend should be noted, namely the economic stabilization in CIS countries. This may lead to decreasing in numbers of CIS migrants.

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FROM GEO-GOVERNANCE
TO UMANISTIC GOVERNANCE

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Abstract

The hypothesis: for all the progress in the construction of the new identity of European Union, the European Civil Society (resistance against the coercive European Political Society) cannot accept "the embedded neo-liberalism" (the EU's actual hegemonic Project) without finding real solutions for so-called "social fracture" of globalisation and this represents a big threat to the soft security model of Europe. Principal questions is Can Civil Society from Black See Space participate on the potential anti-hegemonic project of European Civil Society against the actual "embedded neo-liberalism", the hegemonic project of European Political Society?

This article introduces the integrator concepts like humaine sustainable security and global humaine governance, as possible theoretical solutions for the democratisation of the process of global geo-governance.Geo-governance is defined as a new type of relation between Western Great Powers and transnational capitalists actors, according to the author of this article.

Keywords*:geo-governance, humaine governance, sustainable security, global market, competitiveness, balance of power.*

I. CAN CIVIL SOCIETY FROM BLACK SEE SPACE PARTICIPATE ON THE POTENTIAL ANTI-HEGEMONIC PROJECT?

The principal question of our paper is; Can Civil Society from Black See Space participate on the potential anti-hegemonic project of European Civil Society against the actual "embedded neo-liberalism", the hegemonic project of European Political Society? (EU as an "integral state" in a neo-Gramscian perspective) An overview of the paper is necessary for the readers. The EU accession raises economic, social and political issues. These three dimensions are interrelated because « *people use to organize themselves to make demands on the political and economic system, but when more orthodox avenues are blocked, they will opt for extreme strategies that entail riots, strikes, demonstrations, rebellions, or even civil war to express their grievances* » [1] and this represents a big threat for internal security. EU integration will have different effects on social groups and will create losers and winners. Our paper represents a theoretical approach, framework for understanding the European integration and Globalization processes with a principal chapter divided in three subchapters; the evaluation of the impact of change on the security concept and the relationship between Globalization and European Integration, the introduction of the common challenges and opportunities for the design of a common agenda of all types of powers (political power, economic power and social power). The third subchapter presents the prospect for a global

humane sustainable governance regime in Europe different of the present European governance struggle, based on the collaborative experience of the EU, including the measure for alleviating the costs for losers and increasing the number of winners and eventually the conversion of losers in winners in a European feminist view. In sum this paper will try to analyze the challenges of the potential polarization of different interests in Europe, especially in the post-Wall Europe and to see if there is any possibility for aggregating interests of the old and evolving actors in Europe. In this logic we have to rethink security from a feminist vision and imagine new policies and strategies at European and national level, dealing with humane sustainable security in the frame of Humane sustainable global governance, the anti-hegemonic potential approach of the European Civil Society, divergent in a neo-Gramscian perspective but convergent approaches of Global governance from the Commission on Global Governance image[2].(*Though the Commission gives the image that global governance is somehow a sum of the actions of all this participants, the process has actually emerged as a conflict between the "top down " elite agenda and the" bottom up" popular agenda*).

1.1. The impact of change on the New Potential integration Strategy of the EU towards the Black See countries

This first subchapter of the first chapter evaluates how structural change in the international system level, such as Globalization and the end of the Cold War, have impact on the Security agenda, by looking at those ignored types of threats [3] related to security in post-Cold War Europe, from a feminist point of view; hunger, disease, person abuse and exploitation, pollution of the air and water and especially unemployment, as well as the vision and strategic power of individual person.

This subchapter also explains the relationship between Integration and Globalization, by warning on the present and future impact of integration on the poor of the most of the Central and Eastern European Countries. An analysis of challenges and opportunities of European Enlargement is not an end in itself; it is a useful way of understanding the social and political world in order to change it, in a neo-Gramscian, feminist perception, producing a more "feminine" society and a new model of governance, by adapting the emergent geo-governance to the realization of human rights and sustainable security.We continue trying to answer what is the relationship between three simultaneous processes in the most of the Black See Countries: multilevel and multidimensional process of transformation, the process of integration into the EU and both of these processes are occurring in the larger context of the Globalization process. All these three macro-processes are strongly interrelated and it is difficult or even impossible to distinguish clearly the transformation, integration and global processes and their impact on the economies and societies of the transition countries because we don't have a theoretical approach able to explain this simultaneity and existent theory of integration are limited. European Union Potential Strategy for enlargement towards this space on 2050 has to be build on humaine sustainable security and governance. We assume that if we would like to find solution in the real life we have to find solution also at the theoretical level, taking into account the power of ideas for change. We need a new theory of integration as a useful instrument for generating alternative models of

governance adequate to the reality of European Integration. We need new theory because the old ones are limited and are not able to explain the reality.

Despite the continuing domination of states, multinational corporations, nongovernmental organisations, intergovernmental organisations and supranational institutions such as the EU share the stage of global politics affected by economic and political development combined with technological changes. The inability for governments to manage problems arising from trans-border transactions requires co-operation even at the cost of losing autonomy. We try also to demonstrate that state sovereignty and personal sovereignty are myths only, because in reality, multi-national corporations are not subordinated to states and International organisations, such EU and law have superior authority and for this reason states can't determine their own policies. These actors have different interests and power politics is made less important because they are operating within the societal domain and beyond direct state control. We are summing, in this subchapter, the existent theories of integration pointing out their limits.

Neo-functionalism explains European Integration through an emphasis on the internal dynamics of European Politics, of spill - over, from different sectors of economy to political sector. The wider structure, within European Integration is situated, is completely ignored. It is impossible to take into account structural change such Globalization and the end of the Cold War.

In contrast to neo-functionalism, which emphasizes the importance of non-governmental interest groups in the process of European integration, intergovernmentalism considers the international structure to be an anarchic system in which states are the only important actors. This approach argues that states pursue rationalist policies of power maximization and security in order to ensure their survival in the absence of a central power at the International level.

Liberal intergovernmentalism put the predominant emphasis on state as the main actors in international relations neglecting the power of ideas and transnational actors as independent forces behind integration. The behavior of TNCs, after1980s in the EU, is interpreted as rational adaptation of intergovernmental commitment, while policy involvement and ideas of TNCs are view as the result of intergovernmental demands, but not as independent force. [4]

Neo-Gramscian alternative Theory gives another answer to this behavior, showing the role and power of influence and control of this transnational capital and financier actors at the European level, being a critical theory which try to explain the change and treating the human nature and all structures, including the international system, as product of history and consequently subject of change.

The revival of European integration since the mid-1980s has reconciled regional integration with Globalization. How it was possible? The answer is obviously simple, the same transnational factions of capital that are behind the current drive of European integration are components of a wider transnational historical bloc, working within high profile fora such as the G-7 meetings (now G8) and including also private organizations such as the Trilateral Commission and the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT). It is this bloc which has generated the ideas, institutions and material capabilities for a global shift towards more neo-liberal forms of state and which influenced the development of European integration

making it compatible with Globalization, not opposed to it. It is correct to agree with Cox, that the task to change World Order begins with the long laborious effort to build new historical blocs and our thesis will try to analyze the potentiality of such occurrence in the post Cold Europe.

Change of the polarity of the international system after the Cold War, reflects the development of new structural variables, as results of trends aiming to revise institutional entities as European Union and state policies. Not all elements of change are causes of conflicts, because it is not polarity but polarization that can lead to conflicting situations. There is no evidence that such a process will occur in the European subsystem yet, but the coming situations are not predictable, thus this paper will try to analyze the potential polarization in Europe, as a product of willingness for change of the losers representing the social power of the European integration process with its both aspects deepening and enlargement, process which is driven by the transnational forces of globalization, which are the real winners.

What is important to notice is that the states become "a transmission belt" from the global level to the national economy level, "undermining the sovereignty and autonomy in all aspects of security". This phenomenon "can be called internationalizing of the state", according to Robert Cox.[5] This phenomenon created the so-called "social fracture", engine of the conflicts of globalization.

Linked with this social fracture of Globalization and European enlargement towards South-East European Countries, few of them part of the Black See space, we have to start our analysis by looking to the ongoing hegemonic project of "embedded-neo-liberalism" synthesis aimed to unify the transnational capitalist actors (TNCs) and first subchapter of the first chapter will elaborate on it. This includes the social purpose supporting the emergent European Order. The Maastricht compromise reflects the gradual rise of what can be called an "embedded neo-liberalism". This is neo-liberal view as it emphasizes the primacy of global market forces and the freedom of the movement of the transnational capital. So, as a result of such processes, markets become increasingly disconnected from their post-war national social institutions and we risk a shift from a "national dictatorship" to an "international dictatorship" of Finance, in these so called transition countries. In one side, one may read "embedded neo-liberalism" as the outcome of the transnational struggle between the three projects of neo-liberalism, neo-mercantilism and supranational social democracy. This was a struggle in which the neo-liberal became dominant but still had to accommodate the concern both of the former neo-mercantilist and of the social democrats. The neo-liberal project incorporated these rival concerns in such a manner that they were subordinated to the interests of globalizing capital (neglecting the social democratic concerns in this compromise). In the other side, "embedded neo-liberalism" can also be interpreted as the emerging hegemonic project of Europe's transnational capitalist class. This class has become dominated by- the leadership of a globalist faction both in terms of financial firms and global industrial TNCs.[6]

This process of assimilation is an extremely attractive and powerful project, which became the basis for expansion towards Central and Eastern Europe. Our paper would like to argue that European Integration is not a win-win scenarios yet, as it is considered on the theory of integration[7]; even the removal of barriers to

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free trade and closer integration of national economies, they have the potentiality to enrich everyone, especially the poor. What is the reason for this failure? The neglect of the social protection and the denying of the existence of genuine unemployment by the standard model that economists had used for generations could be one explanation; the only reason that unemployment existed was the wages were too high, suggesting the simple remedy: lower wages. They argued that markets worked perfectly and outworn presumption that markets, by themselves lead to efficient outcomes and this failed to allow the desirable intervention of the government in the market for the guidance of economic growth and make everyone better off.

The "embedded neo-liberalism" is interpreted as a potential hegemonic project unifying Europe's "transnational capitalist class" by expressing its collective interests and identities. The discourse and strategy of the European Round Table of Industrialists continued to play an important role in the evolving regime of European socio-economic governance into the 1990s. The question is who will articulate and defend the public interest against the global reach of private financial and commercial interests, when the latter will go too far? the Gramsci's concept of Civil Society in contrast with the actual concept of civil society at the European level. Gramsci's concept of civil society has the potentiality to advocate the losers of integration, "organic intellectuals" having the noble mission of imagining a counter-hegemonic project - basis for a new building bloc.It is possible to analyze the history of European integration revival project, as well as we shall discuss future possible scenarios and developments including the opportunities for resistance against the dominant hegemonic projects. The method of understanding historical processes put forward by neo-Gramscian perspectives open the door for alternatives for European Integration.

II. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER

The second subchapter introduces the common challenges and opportunities for a new European security order in the "post-Wall" period, from the winners and losers of EU integration perspective in an aggregated effort of finding the common denominators in a cooperative paradigm and discusses the need for redefinition of security, in a feminist perspective (related to it, the definition of a threat and its perception also it is necessary). Any discussion about the common denominators has to start with the opportunity of a new system of collective security in Europe - as they have been expressed through the decisions taken in Maastricht, Amsterdam, Berlin, Madrid and Saint. Malo - and also should take account of the constituent elements of change that produced the"new order"[8]. The elements of Change usually create conflicting relationships; the wisdom and challenge will be to deal creatively with them, transforming these challenges in opportunities for new policy and strategies in an aggregated effort of all European actors involved in building a new Sustainable Humane Security Order, based on common denominators. This can be an opportunity for the regime-building process, which should draw from states their common interests in redefining the terms of an interstate security community

in Europe, recognizing non-state actors as "critical supporters" for this process, in a feminist theoretical perspective of cooperation.

The condition for successful security regime building, as an opportunity is the identification and definition of the threat. NATO experience in Kosovo has shown that there is a linear relationship between the internal cohesion of an alliance and the way in which members perceive external threats and challenges. The nature of interstate relations in post-Cold War Europe has changed to such an extent that the definition of a specific threat is very difficult by replacing " the Soviet threat" with a complex of secondary threats or collective risks. After the Cold War the militarized conception of security was challenged by multifaceted and holistic conceptions[9] like humane security, concept which lacks a clear definition and any agreed upon measures on it. We have to notice that the Military security failed to ensure the territorial security of a nation-state. The collapse of so called communism and of Soviet hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe, removed the immediate military threat. The replacement of the major military threats from the East by the multilevel and multidimensional threats has lent great instability to the European Security System, which was not prepared to deal with it, in term of competences, policies and institutions. Because Europeans face so many security challenges and promising opportunities, all of which compete for higher attention and resources, it will be difficult to deal with non-traditional threats. However, some of them will not be ignored for long time. Individual security can no longer be satisfied only through military measures; it needs multidimensional understanding.

Humane Sustainable Security is difficult to be achieved in actual existing international system mainly dominated by sovereign states. A current state - centered system has been inadequate to provide security and welfare. Nation states risk losing their external and internal *sovereignty.* In our logic of Humane Sustainable Security nation states have to reorder priorities, problem is what criteria? The sovereignty of the Human Person, Participation in decision- making and Response to Unmet Human Needs Could be.The lights of Humane development will remain out for a majority of humankind until the emergence of a world-order system. It is important to emphasize that we are not advocating constant mobilization for national security. It is rather a question of recognizing the reality that present corporate priorities and elite rule are not primarily due to ideological or personal demons. The world does not need more demonology. What is needed is objectivity- not the rationalized fatalistic acceptance of the status quo, but to identify the all sources of powerlessness: of leaders as well as of citizens. The surest way to entrench the status quo is to focus too exclusively on the powerlessness of the people and to rely on demonology at the cost of a more holistic analysis.

The defi*nition of security* issues, the way in which they were analyzed and the policies that resulted were the fruits of the dominant geopolitical and ideological atmosphere during the Cold War period. Security concept has a strong political base and it changes according to it, Security continues to be calculated by the degree of "*destructive capacity possessed in relation to an expected enemy. The achievement of security in a global setting is largely reduced to the management of boundaries of the territorial state- the degree of capacity to keep unwanted persons, ideas, things out, and to keep what is wanted within.*

1. To extent that security is globalised, it is associated with establishing the conditions that best enable the expansion of gross planetary product and stimulate the growth of world trade within a framework stabilized by policies that produce the triple indictment"[10]

What is remarkable about this *geopolitical image of security* is its durability, one that traverses the distinction drawn earlier between modern, *state-centric geopolitics* and post-modern *market-geared geopolitics*. The absence of critical self-reflection is terrible. What needs to be acknowledged here, among other challenging perspectives, is the relevance of feminist voices from around the world in fashioning other possible responses to these challenges. The revision of security is crucial to the all enterprises of *global civil society* and the shaping of the global polity in accordance with the criteria of *humane sustainable governance.*

Subrahmanyam clearly identifies this element of necessity in the following passage:

2. "*Either humanity unites to survive, or it is bound to face a bleak future. The strategy of a non-violent and nuclear free world has no alternative, if future generations are to survive in condition of sustainable development. We of this generation have to stark choice before us. Either we become saviours of our posterity or its executioners. Either we opt for life or shatter the future of mankind.*"[11]

3. An alternative approach of security is needed: that of 'sustainable humain security' bases for sustainable development paradigm.

4. Firstly what is humane security? « *There are two basic aspects to humane security - freedom from fear and freedom from want. Freedom from want is no less important than freedom from fear because his objectives are to ensure the survival and dignity of individuals as human beings.*»[12]

5. Secondly *"the central premise of sustainable security is that we cannot successfully control all the consequences of insecurity, but must work to resolve the causes. Such a framework must be based on an integrated analysis of security threats and a preventative approach to responses. Sustainable security focuses on the interconnected, long-term drivers of insecurity, including:*

• *Climate change*: Loss of infrastructure, resource scarcity and the mass displacement of peoples, leading to civil unrest, inter-communal violence and international instability.

• *Competition over resources:* Competition for increasingly scarce resources – including food, water and energy – especially from unstable parts of the world.

• *Marginalization of the majority world:* Increasing socio-economic divisions and the political, economic and cultural marginalization of the vast majority of the world's population.

• *Global militarization:* The increased use of military force as a security measure and the further spread of military technologies (including CBRN weapons)."

"Sustainable security makes a distinction between these trends and other security threats, which might instead be considered symptoms of the underlying causes and tend to be more localized and immediate (for example terrorism or organized crime). It promotes a comprehensive, systemic approach, taking into account the interaction of different trends which are generally analyzed in isolation

by others. It also places particular attention on how the current behavior of international actors and western governments is contributing to, rather than reducing, insecurity. Sustainable security goes beyond analysis of threats to the development of a framework for new security policies. It takes global justice and equity as the key requirements of any sustainable response, together with progress towards reform of the global systems of trade, aid and debt relief; a rapid move away from carbon-based economies; bold, visible and substantial steps towards nuclear disarmament (and the control of biological and chemical weapons); and a shift in defense spending to focus on the non-military elements of security. This takes into account the underlying structural problems in national and international systems, and the institutional changes that are needed to develop and implement effective solutions. By aiming to cooperatively resolve the root causes of threats using the most effective means available, sustainable security is inherently preventative in that it addresses the likely causes of conflict and instability well before the ill-effects are felt.

The failure of EU states to define the nature and character of post-Cold War threats could not only undermine the attempts to transform the CFSP into "defense policy", but could endanger the integration process in other fields. By linking threats to internal security of the EU to the enlargement project by some politicians, the public opinion would be against enlargement project. Related to this aspect starts the question: "Is it the real threat for the internal Security of the EU, the enlargement towards few Black See Countries or "social fracture" of Globalization?" The answer is not so simple. The more politicians from Western Europe point to international competitive pressures, the EMU, and so to legitimate and push through changes in structures of social policy, the more they run the risk that potential and real losers of such policies will turn against Globalization and European Integration and demand more control over foreign economic policy, in short protectionism.

The challenge is to explain to the public opinion the real threat for individual security, on one side and to find the principal common denominators of the actors involved on the European affairs, on the other side. Therefore we will try to elaborate on these issues during the journey of our paper, as an opportunity and challenge at the same time, by looking at the emerging social forces, from Western and Eastern Europe, which potentially have the interest to convert the losers of integration in winners contributing to the emerging project of Humane governance, based on new core values as Sustainable Humane Security. It is important to challenge the neo-liberal wisdom, which has acquired a status of natural truth during the processes of Globalization.

2.1. Global humane sustainable governance as a counter hegemonic project, from European Civil Society perspective

1. The third subchapter deals with another question: Can EU neutralise the negative impact of the anarchical international environment by the long-term experience of co-operational and institutional frameworks of normative interaction?
2. We will argue that the nature of the new systemic reality, contrary to realist and neo-realist predictions, can converge with the efforts of the EU member states to

formulate norms and rules which can promote co-operative state and non-state behaviour and advance the integration process, in a feminist perspective, as a positive compromise for a model of humane governance. The European model represents a fusion between "liberal" and "realist" visions of the international system, states are basic units of analyses, in the view of realist, but contains the security dilemma within a non-violent conflicting - cooperative - relationship, or even culture of cooperation. The shift from state, as a unit of analysis, to relationship, as unit of analysis of International Politics, it is the important change in International Relations. Building constructive relationships between all the European powers and actors has been a challenge amplified by the existence of military and economic competition. It was a wise paradox and good example, at the same time. New type of relationship between old and transnational actors is called geo-governance. In this case geopolitical axis will certainly shift from *statist field, balance of power, stability, self-defense, spheres of influence and alliances* to global market concerns with *competitiveness, financial flows, capital sources, trade expansion, coordinating mechanism of labor market.*

The challenge will be to build a common agenda for all actors by a cooperative relationship in short between soft and hard power. The common denominator of all this powers is the struggle for survival and we assume that in a long term only humanistic values like humane sustainable security and humane governance for sustainable development can assure the survival for all. The question is can be this struggle transformed in cooperation for survival of the Human being and preservation of the Earth?

In the regulation of power relations, the European system puts constraints on the state behavior and the stability becomes a special vested interest of dominant powers, in the management of the status quo. Despite the continuing domination of states, multinational corporations, nongovernmental organization, intergovernmental organizations and supranational institutions such as European Union share the stage of global politics affected by economic and political development, but on the other hand, non-adversarial problem solving mechanism would not be promoted in a hierarchical order controlled by elitist decision- making. This is the biggest dilemma. Our hopes must continue to rest on the democratic energies of the peoples of the world, acting in all their diversity, yet conscious both of the threats that confront them and of the historic necessity to adapt emergent geo-governance to the realization of human rights, transforming it in humane governance for human sustainable security and human sustainable development. Global humane governance will be the subject of discussion of this subchapter. First section makes in evidence the necessity of creating such a system in order to avoid the blaming and also the prescriptive top-down approach of global governance after analyzing the world order present models. Second section discourses the conflict between long-term interest and short interest common values of the actual actors involved on international politics. Human sustainable security can transform the global geo-governance concept in Humane geo-governance and the third section will try to explain the prospect for Humane governance. Our paper will only present general ideas because the discussion needs more space. We give more space to the prospect for human sustainable security, which eventually will be part of the new

security identity of Europe, civilian approach.(see the non-violent peace force network-making the bridge between USA and Europe)

In order to find a global humane governance system, we need first a constitution developed around the following functions: disarmament, involving the protection of human rights; social justice, environmental protection; economic and social development; and the regulation of international processes such as trade, transportation and communication. What the new world-order models have in common is a commitment to the basic human values as fundamental criteria of world order. They begin with common problems and then formulate functional institutions to cope with those problems. In today's nation-state competition, those values that conflict with national security goals have little chance to become operative on any significant scale.The starting point of each Model or governance is the necessity to have as a common denominator but the problem is which one? Sustainable development and Humane security for all actors of international system and the Right to development can be the key words, as integrative concepts of all human needs for the humanity as a whole, shortly sustainable human security. In public policy debates, few argue openly in terms of their own self-interest. Everything is couched in terms of general interest.

Third section deals with *humane governance* opposite concept of *geo-governance. Humane geo-governance* is the preferred variant of *geo-governance.* Humane *geo-governance* is not a structure to be blueprinted, but a process of engagement that is guided by a principle of non-violence. *Humane governance* is a preferred form of *governance* being a process and a goal, which emphasizes the achievement of comprehensive rights for all peoples on earth. We have to worn that our passivity will ensure the triumph of the G-8 view of the human future. The prospect for human governance is urgency. In sum, Humane governance emphasizes people-centred criteria of success, as measured by declines in poverty, violence and pollution and by increasing adherence to human rights and constitutional practices, especially in relation to vulnerable segments of society, as well as by axiological shifts away from materialist/consumerist and patriarchal conceptions of human fulfillment. The perspectives of humane governance stress the accountability of elites and the participation by the peoples of the world and their directly elected representatives. It is necessary to explore the meaning of humane governance in a series of conceptual and policy settings, as well as some implications of conter-projects to shape geo-governance in more beneficial ways than those resulting from global market forces. The political imaginations of the rich and powerful are still caught up in greed and by efforts to retain short-run advantage. As a consequence, the historical opening at the end of the Cold War has been largely squandered, being treated as one more opportunity to consolidate power and wealth. If Globalization brought negative aspects, the positive aspect of Globalization is that it has brought an active civil society, fighting for more democracy and greater social justice.

CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE PROJECT OF THE EUROPEAN CIVIL SOCIETY

The principal question was if the civil society is ready to form a counter-hegemonic bloc at the European level in alliance with CEE governments, able to face the actual hegemonic bloc drived by embedded neo-liberalism. The answer is negative from two reasons: the actual European Civil society is manipulated by the EU by institutionalization of the civic dialog via the ESC, for the preservation of the status-quo and the other reason is the lack of financier independence, logistic and internal problem of democratization of these civic society entities from both sides Western and Eastern Europe. The creation of counter hegemonic bloc would be possible at the International level and we can't make any prediction yet. The actual tendency at the European level is for polarisation not for polarity and this represents a big threat for the soft security model of Europe. Therefore a marriage between Social Europe and neo-liberalism has to be a priority for the new identity of Europe, to curb the eventual polarization of social forces of all Europe. Europe could be a model of global humane sustainable governance. This hegemonic project should be developed around issues of a humane sustainable security system via a new entity and a regional strategy, which considers good environmental and social standards and full employment to be more important than efficiency, competition and high levels of economic growth, because the society is not a company. In this respect, it is important to challenge the neo-liberal wisdom, which has acquired a status of natural truth during the processes of globalization. This will not be easy and requires a long *war of position.* Institutions should be set up, which could provide the platform for organic intellectuals and for the development and promotion of an alternative to neo-liberalism. We need a new autonomous civil society representative entity, in neo-gramscian terms, able to face embedded neo-liberalism and its financial and political institutions in order to participate on decision making process of Global governance mechanism. This entity needs proper material, financial, information and human resources capabilities. New forms of direct democracy are needed too with new civil society entities as key non-state actors partners in developing, advocating, building and implementing humane sustainable security[12]. The question is if prezent social forces are prepared to face the actual hegemonic ongoing process of *embedded neo-liberalism.* Let's sum these potential forces of Europe and their input to this coalition already in formation:

- Pressure groups - Redistribution of benefits and losses resulting from lobby activities and these influential pressure groups both in the CEEC and Black- See Region and the EU itself can affect the position of losers and winners.
- Trade union- Intensified co-operation between trade unions within Europe, including the sector level: on co-ordination in respect of wages, working conditions and social regulation complemented by much closer co-ordination of national economic and social policies, going beyond neo-liberal solutions.
- Nation-states - particularly decision-making elites could be ready to participate on this coalition with new ideas able to re-legitimize their authority because even the most powerful nation-states - are no longer able to fulfill the

purpose for which they were created (elected) consequently not longer legitimate.A catalyst in this respect may be the occurrence of severe economic recessions.

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STRENGHTENING POPULATION'S RESILIENCE AGAINST TERRORIST RISK - A NEW APROACH TO IMPROVE ROMANIAN SECURITY STRATEGY

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Abstract: In a media saturated environment, terrorist threats, which are more and more complex and globalized, have led to a paradigm shift in the field of national or regional security. Military, diplomatic and intelligence conventional actions have been completed with strategies for informing and educating civilians. So, the resilience which is defined as being the population's ability to recover from situations with significant risk of psychosocial trauma as a result of violent events, such as threats or terrorist acts, has become a fundamental concept in preventing and combating terrorism. Knowing and managing the functional mechanisms of this new concept, in the context of specific terrorist risks, may contribute to the discouragement of violent actions and to the growth of the sense of security of the Romanian population.

Keywords: population resilience, counterterrorism, management, security strategy.

I. INTRODUCTION

The events of September 11, 2001 radically changed the security paradigm and led to the proclamation of a „ global war" against terrorism (WOT- War on Terrorism [1]). For the first time, the vision to combat that scourge had also taken into account the onset of extensive military operations, such as those in Iraq and Afganistan.

Nevertheless, other major terrorist actions followed in Bali, Madrid and London. Subsequently, the bomb attack in Norway, near a government building in Oslo, and the massacre on the Utoya Island particularly affected a population known as having a low level of violence in the social life and, especially, revealed a new facet of the motivation of terror

All these events have caught the attention of the international media, becoming a reference point on its agenda, terrifying images having been viewed by the wide public from all over the world. The data from the territory have shown that broadcast images deeply influenced the collective mentality leading to changes in behavior, beyond the boundaries of communication, which had been directly affected, this fact being likely to facilitate the achievement of the terrorists' objectives. In this way identifying a new type of response appropriate to the situation has become imperative.

Recognizing risk situations, governments, civil society and scientific research communities have given the necessary attention to these developments and

have supported efforts to seek new ways to deter terrorist action, based on controlling the consequences on population by increasing its resilience.

A first reaction may be identified in shifting institutional research policies, in an environment marked by new security risks and multiple threats, about which CIA says it is characterized (Global Trends 2015) by an increasing violence: *until 2015, terrorist tactics will become increasingly sophisticated and designed to produce mass casualties; we expect trend towards increasing human losses in terrorist attacks to continue* [2].

Gradually, the ordinary citizen has ceased to be a collateral victim, becoming a favorite target for groups which promote terrorism, with emphasis on social consequences. In this context, terrorism is increasingly perceived as being a psychological warfare.

Fear induced by continuing threats, maintained by the media, has influenced the public perception and has led to a social representation of terrorist phenomenon, which is marked by a constant and imminent danger in its multiple forms of manifestation.

The conduct of the population, determined by such perceptions or representations, can cause significant disturbances at economic, social and family level, creating even greater damage than the direct effects of terrorist acts.

Therefore, anticipating public response to terrorist threats or actions is a topic of interest, not only for the responsible authorities in the countries already affected, but especially for those states which have not so far experienced such events. Consequently, this issue has gone beyond the isolated interests of specialists and tends to increasingly impose itself as a research priority in the field, in order to sustain future strategies to prevent and combat terrorism.

II. RESILIENCE IN THE TERRORISM ERA

Professor Al Siebert considers that "*resilience means being able to recover from developments of life which at first may seem completely overwhelming. When people with good resilience experience events which change their course of life, they will handle themselves the emotional processes in a healthy manner. These people accept to feel sadness, anger, loss and confusion when they are injured or under pressure, but they will not allow these feelings to become permanent. An unexpected result is that people like that, not only will recover, but they will become stronger than before.*"[3] Thus, resilience represents adaptation and success in relation to adverse life situations, a process in which a central place is held by individual characteristics and cultural factors, but these are not the only determinants of resilience. Most studies in the field of social sciences show that one of the most relevant factors of resilience is related to the cultivation of interpersonal relationships based on support, trust and even love both in the family, but also in the proximal social environment or in community.

Summarizing the definitions and characteristics of resilience in terms of psychology and sociology, it can be concluded that they put out some key elements, namely:
  a)   *"good outcomes regardless of high-risk status;*

b) constant competence under stress;
c) recovery from trauma;
d) *useing challenges for growth that makes future hardships more tolerable"* [4].

Although Ungar M. (2004) considers it is difficult to reach a standard definition of resilience, *as a result of the influence of cultural and context elements on the resilience factors* [5], interpreting it as a process can lead to a proper understanding of its mechanisms and how it works, and also of its history and consequences in as many risk situations and in relation to as many benchmarks, of which the social one is crucial (individuals, communities population of a state or region).

So, taking resilience only as a personal feature of a certain population groups is a limited approach, recent research in this area highlighting the fact that resilience is *the result of individual ability to interact with the environment and of processes of promoting wellbeing and protecting people against the overwhelming influence of risk factors* [6]. In this context of analysis, the population's resilience against terrorist risks can be defined.

Since the attacks of the "twin towers" people have been forced to reconsider their assessments on the risks they face within the society, where "*managing the potential threat becomes as important as managing the real threat, as a result of the growth of the relevance of perceptions in an international environment increasingly saturated by the media*"[1].

Such a threat endangers the chances of civilians to lead a normal life and when the daily routine of each responsible person must include an action plan in the event of a terrorist attack, one's life will be marked by restlessness and anxiety.

After having detected such effects, new models and tools for research and measuring the impact of terrorist threats at population level were developed, which, on the one hand, allowed a thorough analysis of the general perception on terrorism, and on the other hand, had led to the development of the concept of resilience against terrorist risks.

In this context of analysis, resilience becomes a very current concept, taking into consideration the perspective that it provides a way to win the psychological war on terrorism, even if *the definition, terminology and its conceptual and methodological framework are not assessed as being sufficiently consistent and developed by specialized research* [7]. Therefore, an adapted response of the population to risk situations associated with terrorism can be achieved only by strengthening the resilience.

Given the necessity to integrate all aspects resulting from the definition of this concept, aspects which are relevant for society's resilience at risk situations associated with terrorism, *three fundamental levels of expression can be identified*:
a) at individual level ("*individual resilience*");
b) at the community level ("*social-community resilience*");
c) at national level ("*national resilience*").

If resilience is approached from a three-dimensional perspective, it will be much more than *the individual's ability to adapt adequately to external and internal stressors* [8] caused, eventually, by a terrorist act, understanding of the concept in a

much wider context which takes into consideration the joint action of all factors defined by the three levels of expression being required.

III. THE MECHANISM FOR STRENGTHENING RESILIENCE AGAINST TERRORIST RISKS

Managing population's resilience against terrorist risks, as a part of some new systems for protection against terrorism which are designed to improve the national security strategy, reveals two components: the prevention and the recovery. Preventive aspects aim at preparing population to cope with terrorist risks and with the manipulation associated with these, and the recovery aspects have as a target the efforts aimed at reducing the consequences of possible terrorist attacks and recovering after such trauma.

Both components are interdependent in terms of building resilience in the sense that good recovery can be achieved if prior steps were taken to train people, and managing terrorists' manipulation can not be handled without the awareness of specific risks, with all the arising implications, even if only in the hypothetical plan, when the population has experienced terrorist trauma only through the media and not directly.

Interpretations on how to enhance resilience factors resulted from analyzing the literature in the field and also from data research on Romanian population [9], allow the shaping of a functional model of resilience against terrorist risks, as it is shown by the diagram below.

THE FUNCTIONAL MODEL OF POPULATION'S RESILIENCE

Analyzing this functional model it results that the interventions of the responsible authorities to strengthen resilience are mainly oriented on the way individuals relate to the terrorist phenomenon, namely on those specific factors which define the relation with the source which generates fear and anxiety and in relation to which resilience is contextualized.

The principle which supports this approach is that *terrorism, as a form of psychological warfare, aims at amplifying the terrorist threat*, *namely the level of fear among civilians, by using, especially, the media in order to have as a result behavioral changes, in the way of diminishing the sense of security, lowering the moral of the citizens and their trust in their own capacities to survive but, mostly, their trust in authorities*.

This complex mechanism becomes a tool for manipulating the public and the "*citizens who are immunized against the psychological influence of terrorist attacks have a greater ability to resist such manipulation*" [10].

Such a immunity against the indirect damages of terrorism can be achieved by strengthening the factors of resilience through informing and training the individuals so as they to be able to understand the manipulation exerted by the terrorists and so to obtain a control of the public's response to the terrorist threats, on one hand, and by minimizing the traumatic impact of the attacks on the population when this type of events occur, on the other hand.

Whatever the approach, the factors which define the way population relates to the terrorist phenomenon are essential for implementing some real measures of resilience's management as an instrument to prevent and to combat terrorism.

The functional model of resilience supports one of the main principles of the terrorism as a form of psychological warfare, according to which this *is a fighting technique based on using the media directly or indirectly* [11].

In this context, and approaching terrorism through the analysis model proposed by Karber since 1971, according to which "*as a symbolic act, terrorism can be analyzed much like other media of communication consisting of four basic components: transmitter (the terrorist), intended recipient (target), message (bombing, ambush) and feed-back (reaction of target audience)*" [11], strengthening resilience against terrorism risks could follow a similar approach based on the components of the communication process.

Thus, *the vulnerable aspects of resilience can be activated and shaped in the population's mentality and conduct*, turning to account the potential of the factors which prove to be better consolidated after their assessment, using, mainly, the possibilities to intervene on those components of resilience which express the way people relate to the terrorist phenomenon. In fact, *this mechanism established by analogy with the public communication process, represents the functional component of the management of population's resilience against terrorist risks*.

From these analysis it can be concluded that a superior level of population's resilience can be achieved by intervening mainly on the factors which define the way the public relates to the terrorist phenomenon, the other components of the expression levels of resilience (individual, social-community and national) being relevant in terms of content elements of the functional process feed-back. But, considering the principle according to which resilience cannot resume only to one

factor or expression level, "*each of the dimensions could serve as input, output or mediator variable for the others, in the end all contributing to psychosocial resilience in the face of a terrorist threat*"[12], it results that apart from managing the perception of terrorist risk, relating to the media and the level of knowledge about terrorism, the mechanism for strengthening resilience includes also the other specific aspects of the expression levels of resilience. So, the factors of the functional model which express the way people relate to terrorism represents only the interface through which the consolidation of resilience can be achieved, without forgetting the influence of the other components.

After *assessing the main factors of Romanian population's resilience against terrorist risks* [9], *some specific parts have resulted which are essential for strengthening the vulnerable aspects of resilience*:

    a) Promoting a representation of terrorism based on rational reasons, against interpretations and conducts influenced by emotional mechanisms which interfere in the relation of the individuals with the terrorist phenomenon

    b) Encouraging the "taking action" approaches in relation to terrorist risks, in order to offset the gap with the mental, symbolic dimension of population's resilience, which has an important contribution in reducing the manipulation of the public through the terrorist messages broadcast by the media.

    c) Concentrating steps for strengthening resilience on the preparing component, taking into account the fact that a terrorist attack has not occurred yet in Romania, in order to ensure the success in a potential recovery phase, during and after a crisis generated by important terrorist threats or even by real terrorist attacks.

According to these reference points *for strengthening Romanian population's resilience against terrorist risks some real action steps* result as follows:

    a) Managing the perception of terrorist risks mainly through customizing them to real aspects of life, in the same time with developing population's capacity to understand and counteract terrorist propaganda mechanism.

    b) Shaping the media consumption behavior in relation to the information about terrorism through organized actions both at the level of population, but also at the level of the media.

    c) Developing the level of knowledge about terrorism and the necessary skills in crisis, through implementing informative programs and volunteering in Romania, aimed at improving security education.

    d) Strengthening with priority the resilience's factors which proved to be more vulnerable, in order to reduce the gaps compared to the dominant factors, which is a premise to obtain appropriate conduct of the population in relation to terrorist risks at all expression level of resilience: individual, social-community, national.

    e) Strengthening feed-back relations of the resilience's functional process and taking to account in a permanent way the output data from this

system so as to ensure continuity and efficiency of the population's resilience management.

The resilience's functional model can be interpreted as a framework to design government intervention on population's resilience in order to consolidate it and to improve security strategy. Within this model it seems that the feed-back relation between the resilience's factors assessed at a certain moment and the measures taken by the authorities is the most important. Thus, *managing population's resilience against terrorist risks depends on permanent monitoring of resilience*, aspect which becomes more necessary as resilience proves to be a dynamic psychosocial phenomenon, which is influenced not only by the development level and by the specific of its own factors, but also by the development of perception on significant risks and by the conditions of national and regional security under the influence of the media and of the politic decisions.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

In practice*, the concept of resilience seems to be quite controversial, because it is a manifestation of the variability of population response to specific risk factors, is dynamic and multidimensional*, and its research should integrate all three levels of expression - individual, social- community and national.

Also, *implementing resilience is a complex action step, and once it can be assessed, it can be concluded that it does not have an easily predictable evolution or it is not easily achieved or expressed at population's level*. In other words, experiencing a terrorist threat situation by a society does not certainly determine strengthening or decreasing population's resilience, its status being different from one country to another, from one community to another, and this must determine different political reactions and different response of the responsible institutions.

These fluctuations of resilience have been most easily perceived from the analysis of specific behavioral response recorded during recent history:
- many Americans believe that if a terrorist action similar to the 9/11 attack happen again in New York this will be more than they can handle, taking into consideration the population's psychical capacity to cope with such situations, but, paradoxically, in the same time, the majority of the same people wish to continue living in New York;
- Spanish population, "trained" due to the fact that ETA had had long periods of terrorist activity, had well coped with the attacks on March 11, 2004, but adopted a hostile position against the government, accusing it of having maintained a high-risk situation or of committing serious errors in identifying the initiators of the attacks;
- London's population, systematically "trained" by politicians, experts and media as a possible target of mass attacks, despite the devastating effects caused by the terrorist attacks in 2005, remained fairly adapted to adverse circumstances and with a high moral.

If only from these examples, it can be concluded that, at present, *strengthening resilience is an increasingly useful tool in combating terrorism*,

acting, both as a form of recovery on the population directly affected, but also as a means of prevention on the public indirectly threatened through the media.

However, decisive efforts are required from the academic community in order to determine the responsible authorities to accept resilience and to recognize its importance as an essential element for national or regional security strategy, even if research is in the theoretical and methodological process and unanimity on implementing the concept has not yet been reached.

Strengthening population's resilience can become a strategic tool for national security institutions which could complement the vulnerabilities of traditional ways of action aiming at reducing the effects of terrorism or other similar events (crime natural disasters, calamities, etc..) on civilian population, on the one hand, and at implementing viable strategies to prevent the effects of these risks on society, on the other hand.

Depending on the new challenges faced by the nations exposed to significant risks, including of terrorist nature, it seems that *resilience may influence military and political capacity of governments* to cope with these threats.

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